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Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes:
Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial
Ethics
Fred C. Zacharas"

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over time, the professional codes governing lawyer behavior
have become statutory in form.' Modern codes increasingly tell
lawyers how they must act.2 The recent adoption of the ABA's

* Professor of Law, University of San Diego. BA, Johns Hopkins University, 1974;
J.D., Yale Law School, 1977; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 1981. The author
received research assistance from Laurie Martin and Sandro Battaglia and helpful insights
and comments from many friends and colleagues, including Lawrence Alexander, Kevin
Cole, Steven Hartwell, William W. Hodes, John Leubsdorf, Robert Post, Gerald Postema,
Maimon Schwarzschild, Emily Sherwin, Paul Wohlmuth, and Chris Wonnell. Steve Walt
deserves special thanks for heroically reviewing multiple drafts. Geoffrey Hazard also must
be acknowledged for writing a critique of a previous piece that prompted the author to
think about the issue of regulatory specificity. Needless to say, the views expressed below
should not be blamed on any of those who provided assistance.
1 The observation that ethics regulation looks increasingly like legislation is Geoffrey
Hazard's. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE LJ. 1239 (1991).
His analysis of the "legalization" of legal ethics is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 7-9 infra.
2 The early codifications, Hoffman's 1836 "Resolutions of Professional Deportment"
and the 1908 ABA Canons, consisted of a series of general, often vague, norms of moral
conduct. See, e.g., DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDIES 752 (1836) ("I will never

permit professional zeal to carry me beyond the limits of sobriety and decorum"; "In all
intercourse with my professional brethren, I will always be respectful"); CANONS OF PROFEssIONAL ETucs, Canon 15 (1908) ("The lawyer owes 'entire devotion to the interest of
the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability'"); Canon 16 ("A lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought
not to do"); Canon 18 ("A lawyer should always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with
fairness and due consideration").
The MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIIArY (1969) [hereinafter CPR] moved
from abstraction to an elaborate mixture of norms (i.e., "Canons"), high-minded statements regarding the American lawyer's role (i.e., "Ethical Considerations"), and rules that
purport to fix appropriate conduct (i.e., "Disciplinary Rules"). Compare CPR, EC 1-5 ("A
lawyer should maintain high standards of professional conduct") with CPR, DR 1102(A)(1) ("A lawyer shall not violate a Disciplinary Rule").
The more recent MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr (1983) [hereinafter

MODEL RULES], interrupted the trend toward specificity by deregulating in some respects.
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Model Rules has been followed with a series of further proposals
designed to control specific lawyer conduct.'
This Article analyzes the drift toward specificity in lawyer regulation and suggests that the modem trend may go too far.4 There
is a place for both specific and generalized regulation, depending
on the purpose that the drafters have in mind for particular regulation.5 Before promulgating a code or reform provision, however,
it is important that drafters identify their purpose or, when the

See, e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 1.3 cmt. (tempering the CPR's requirement of zeal, noting
that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client," but "is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client"). But at the same time, the MODEL RULES included rules further defining the postures lawyers should take in a variety of situations. See; e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 3.3(b)
(requiring disclosure of client pejury); MODEL RULES, Rule 5.1 (spelling out duties of
firm members with respect to misconduct of other firm members).
3 See, e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 5.7 (regulating law firms' use or operation of ancillary businesses) (adopted in 1991, deleted in 1992); MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(0 (1990)
(regulating prosecutorial subpoenas of attorneys); MODEL RULES, Rule 6.1 (1993) (requiring lawyers to engage in 50 hours of pro bono service per year); OREGON RULES OF
PtoESSIoNAL CoNDucr DR 5-110 (Proposed Official Draft) (on file with author) (regulating lawyers sexual activities with clients).
4 The progression toward specificity mirrors changes in more widespread societal
attitudes toward regulation. Through the early 20th century, laissez-faire governed. See
JAMES E. INMAN, THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS 7, 11-13 (1984) (discussing
"free capitalism" period of regulation); Morton Keller, The Pluralist State: American Econmic
Regulation in Coaparative Perspective, 1900-1930, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 56, 58
(Thomas K. McGraw ed., 1981) (discussing laissez-faire period). Government regulation of
business and labor began to develop at the turn of the century, followed by growth and
more controlling regulation through the depression, war, and civil rights periods. See
INMAN, supra, at 7, 16-18 (discussing "regulated capitalism" period of regulation); Keller,
supra, at 64-73 (discussing influence of depression); David Vogel, The "New" Social Regulation in Historical and ComparativePerspective, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE, supra, at 155,
156-57, 171-85 (discussing growth of regulation during New Deal period and the 1960's).
The 1970's and 80's, however, reflect a backlash against intrusive and simplistic rules. See,
e.g., 3 C.FR. § 172 (1982) (executive order requiring OMB to conduct cost-benefit anal)sis of all "major [administrative] rules"). Calls for deregulation, on the one hand, and
more tailored controls, on the other, became the norm. See ALFRED E. KAHN, THE EcoNOMICS OF REGULATION xv-xxii (1988) (discussing "deregulation revolution"); THOMAS D.
MORGAN Er AL, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS 22 (2d ed. 1985) (detailing change
in regulatory climate); MURRAY L. WEI ENAUM, THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS REGULATION 5
(1979) (calling for deregulation).
5 In Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6
CEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (1992), Professor Pearce suggests that commentators have
mischaracterized or forgotten the true historical underpinnings of ethics regulation and
thus overemphasize the "adversarial ethic" in the modem codes. Pearce's rediscovery of
an overriding "republican" vision in the early codes may overstate the case, but it does
highlight the tension that the codes reflect. Pearce no doubt is correct that legal ethics
codes always have had a mix of purposes, encompassing both the notion that lawyers are
advocates and that they are moral individuals with responsibility for balancing and tempering their own actions. Id. at 278-82.

1993]

SPECIFICIY IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILMIY CODES

regulation serves multiple purposes, assign priorities among them.
Only with this foundation can drafters hope to formulate rules
that have an optimal effect.
Part I of this Article identifies the various purposes that can
be, and cannot be, ascribed to legal ethics codes. Part II defines
precisely what the Article means by "specificity." It then offers a
model, or continuum, illustrating the different levels of specificity
that professional rules may employ. Part III uses the example of
the modem codes' highly generalized regulation of prosecutorial
ethics to show how making rules more or less specific affects the
accomplishment of the drafters' objectives. Finally, Part IV illustrates the practical benefits of analyzing professional rules in specificity terms. It focuses upon one current proposal relating to prosecutorial ethics, Model Rule 3.8(f), governing prosecutorial issuance of attorney subpoenas. Part IV demonstrates how failing to
identify the underlying code's purposes and linking the specificity
of reform to those purposes leads to poor drafting and a muddled
debate.
II.

THE PURPOSES OF THE CODES

The legal community does not share a unified view of the
goals of lawyer regulation.6 Nor is there consensus over the nature
of the codes that currently exist. Yet any evaluation of a particular
provision or set of provisions necessarily turns on one's perspective
towards the codes.
Geoffrey Hazard, for example, suggests that lawyer codes have
become equivalent to legislation-legalized in format and judicially
enforced." To the extent that perspective is correct, it is appropri-

6 The disappearance of consensus is an historical development that appears to track
the codes' trend towards increasing regulatory specificity. See generally Hazard, supra note
1, at 1259-60, 1279-80 (describing history of professional regulation and suggesting that as
the number of lawyers, complexity of cases, and diversity of the bar increased and more
"legalized" professional regulation was proposed, the bar became a "community of strangers"); Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The
Controversies Over the Anti-contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PrTT. L REV. 291, 299-300

(1992) (noting that formerly "it was taken for granted that ethical codes were hortatory
and aspirational in character").
7 Hazard, supra note 1, at 1240, 1255, 1279. Professor Hazard attributes the change
to "overlapping interactions between the legal profession and the. courts" that have resulted in the creation of integrated bars, greater disciplinary enforcement, and the transformation of norms of professional conduct into binding legal rules. Id. at 1250. In terms
of ethics regulation, Hazard notes, and apparently favors, increasing pressures toward
formal regulation and stricter, better enforced rules. Id. at 1240. See also GEOFMY C.
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ate to judge the codes and code reforms as one would judge other legislation-in political terms and in terms of their adequacy as
a control mechanism for lawyer behavior 8 In contrast, the more
traditional view holds that the legal ethics codes are distinct from
typical "law"; they represent ideals and a model for practice, not
enforceable behavioral constraints.'
Under this framework, the
day-to-day impact of ethics rules on conduct becomes a secondary
consideration in evaluating codes and code amendments. Susan
Koniak bridges the two theories, classifying ethics codes as "law,"

HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw 17 (1978) (discussing reasons for the
pressures); Cramton & Udell, supra note 6, at 300 ("Since about 1930, and with accelerating speed since 1970, ethical codes have developed into law"); Monroe H. Freedman, The
Problem of Writing, Enforcing and Teaching Ethical Rules: A Reply to Professor Goldman, CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS, Summer-Fall 1984, at 14-15 (arguing for legislatively written and fully enforced legal ethics rules); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tighter Rules of Professional Conduct: Saltwater for Thirst?, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 311, 322 (1987) (noting "[tihe trend toward
more comprehensive and mandatory codification"); Murray Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 953, 953-54 (discussing shift from "articulating professional standards, suffused with ideas of morality and ethics, and enforced if
at all by informal sanctions and peer pressure, to enacting comprehensive and explicit
legislation attended by formally imposed sanctions for breach"). Hazard concedes the
value of looser "aspirational" or "hortatory" guides for lawyer conduct, but suggests that
professional rules are an inappropriate medium for such guides because, in practice, the
rules tend to be transformed into legislation or "black letter law." Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr., Legal Ethics: Legal Rules -and Professional Aspirations, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 571, 573-76
(1981).
8 That, in part, is the approach espoused by William Nelson. See William E. Nelson,
Moral Ethics, Adversary Justice, and Political Theory: Three Foundationsfor the Law of Professional
Responsibility, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 911, 921-23 (1989) (describing legal ethics as a
political device that empowers or removes power from lawyers in exerting influence within the legal system).
9 L Ray Patterson, An Inquity into the Nature of Legal Ethics: The Relevance and the
Role of the Client, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 43, 45-50 (1987) [hereinafter Patterson I] (describing traditional view and positing that "rules of ethics should be an integral part of
the law and rules of law should be an integral part of rules of ethics"); L Ray Patterson,
The Function of a Code of Legal Ethics, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 695, 699, 702-03 (1981)
[hereinafter Patterson II] (same). See also Hazard, supra note 1, at 1251 (describing traditional view, and arguing that codes increasingly have become "legalized"); Cramton &
Udell, supra note 6, at 299 (noting changing view that "ethics rules were intended to
govern the conscience of the individual lawyer and to be enforced largely by peer pressure").
Professor Patterson's orientation toward the "legalization" of the codes is more normative, and less historical/descriptive, than Professor Hazard's. Patterson seems to accept
behavioral control as the single valid purpose of ethics codes. See Patterson II, supra, at
702-03 ("unless one assumes that rules of ethics and rules of positive law have different
functions, to superimpose rules of ethics for lawyers on rules of positive law without
having them also apply to clients creates a logically untenable situation"). Although I
agree with Patterson's conclusion that code drafters should take into account "positive
law," id., this Article starts from the realistic premise that the codes have been written
(and probably will continue to be written) to serve a variety of functions.
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but law that stems from lawyers' unique perceptions of how substantive doctrines should apply to them."° Each of these approaches to legal ethics suggests a different starting point from
which to analyze regulatory reforms.
What is particularly interesting about the varying perspectives
is that they have been engrafted upon the codes after the codes'
adoption. Ordinarily, one would expect drafters and enacting
bodies themselves to identify what they hope to achieve and to
formulate rules furthering that objective. There are a variety of
possible objectives that drafters might pursue, ranging in nature
from the instrumental (e.g., forcing lawyers to act in a particular
way), to the methodological (e.g., influencing lawyer behavior by
threatening discipline or encouraging introspection), to the ideological (e.g., setting purely hortatory standards). Historically, however, promulgators of the professional codes have never been clear
about their overall goals."
Nevertheless, some consensus exists regarding lawyer regulation. One can list functions regulation might accomplish, but
which most observers can agree are not (and should not be) the
current codes' goals. One can also identify aspects of the codes
that, even under Hazard's and Koniak's view, distinguish regulation of legal ethics from typical legislation.
Perhaps most importantly, the professional codes generally are
not conceived as defining moral behavior; that is, setting a prescription for how "good people" should behave. 2 Although the

10 Susan P. Konak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389,
1396-98 (1992). After reviewing aspects of professional regulation that are in tension with
state law, Professor Koniak argues that code drafters and disciplinary authorities have
attempted not only to supplement substantive law governing lawyers, but also to trump it
with their own vision. Id. at 1416-27.
11 Ted Schneyer, Profesionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 677, 688-725 (1989) (describing behind-the-scenes
political jockeying that resulted in the adoption of the MODEL RULES). Of course, individual drafters probably have had agendas. Geoffrey Hazard and L. Ray Patterson, for example, were involved in the drafting of the MODEL RULES and may have emphasized their
own priorities. See supra notes 7, 9. But the drafters as a body neither came to any
agreement nor expressed the overall goals the MODEL RULES were to further.
12 Different justifications for this outlook have been offered, ranging from the notion that "moral" considerations are different than "role morality" to the view that there
are reasons to identify "role morality" while leaving consideration of ethical behavior to
separate analysis. See, e.g., Virginia Held, The Division of Moral Labor and the Role of the
Lawyer, in THE GOOD LAwYER 60,-66 (David Luban ed., 1983) (suggesting that "nearly all
morality is role morality"); Bernard Williams, Professional Morality and ,Its Dispositions, in
THE GOOD LAWYER, supra, at 259, 263 (discussing "divergences" between professional and
general morality); Susan Wolf, Ethics, Legal Ethics, and the Ethics of Law, in THE GOOD
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codes' mandates for behavior often reinforce extra-code moral
constraints, the codes help lawyers achieve that type of morality
only indirectly." They suggest conduct that is peculiarly appropriate for lawyers, as lawyers, rather than conduct that is "ethical" for
moral individuals. 4
Similarly, the codes do not tell lawyers how to reconcile conflicts between their personal sense of ethics and the rules. 5 To
some extent, the codes define how the legal system expects (or
needs) lawyers to act if the system is to work in its intended fashion. 6 Yet the codes are, in a sense, morally neutral. They do not
establish that moral individuals should be willing to participate in
the role-differentiated system. Nor do the coxdes speak to the issue

LAWYER, supra, at 38, 40 (positing that legal ethics "takes as its central focus the study of
what ethical principles and virtues are essential, not to being a good person, but rather
to being a good lawyer"). In keeping with the orientation of the codes, this Article does
not concern itself with the issue of whether any particular rule or action by a lawyer is
"moral" or "ethical" in a general sense. It considers how the .drafting of the codes affects
the codes' ability to accomplish their ends, whatever those ends may be.
13 See Nelson, supra note 8, at 917-18 (describing ways in which codes reinforce
society's other moral precepts).
14 Stated another way, professional code drafters have never purported to have the
type of answers or threshold for human ethics that philosophy, religion, and criminal
legislation struggle to identify. It is precisely because the codes do not attempt to resolve
many moral issues that some scholars posit that the codes receive too much emphasis.
One such scholar, William Simon, has argued that code prescriptions - for example,
those requiring confidentiality - should merely be treated as guides for lawyers in exercising their own ethical "discretion". William Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lauyering, 101
HARv. L. REV. 1083, 1083-84 (1988). Thomas Shaffer suggests that code rules are secondary to moral relationships among lawyers, clients, and third parties. Thomas L. Shaffer,
The Practice of Law as Moral Discours, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 231 (1979). Assessing the traditional distinction between morality and "role morality," David Luban concludes that "if
[the theory of role morality] is to be made coherent, a sophisticated account must be
offered of the distinction, an account that spells out exactly how moral responsibility is
to be assumed by the role, and how role morality is to be appealed to in offering justifications for action." David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosphical Research Program
for Legal Ethics, 40 MD. L REV. 451, 466 (1981).
15 Wolf, supra note 12 (differentiating "legal ethics" from the "ethics of law"). See
also Luban, supra note 14, at 459-61 (distinguishing morality from role morality). Cf
Schwartz, supra note 7, at 953 ("[T]he model rules deliberately eschew references to
ethics; they are at least in form more a set of detailed requirements for a regulated
industry than a set of ethical principles"); Steven Hartwell, Moral Deelopment, Ethical Conduct, and Clinical Education, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 131, 138-39 (1990) (distinguishing
advanced moral development under Kohlberg's theories from ethical conduct under the
professional rules).
16 Wolf, supra note 12, at 40-41. See also Alan Donagan, Justfying Legal Practice in the
Adversary System, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 12, at 123, 124 ("no justification of
[lawyering in] the adversary system is possible except in relation to the various socialjuridical systems of which it is a part").
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of how participating lawyers should act, as moral individuals, when
they believe the system is flawed.17
Existing ethics codes almost universally disavow any intent to
control the substantive content of the prevailing constitutional,
statutory, or common law. The codes' preambles typically state the
drafters' desire not to affect legal standards regarding attorney
liability. 8 The codes do not rely on traditional evidentiary
standards in defining concepts such as confidentiality and do not
purport to seek any changes in evidentiary rules. 9 Throughout,
one finds the expressed intent to subordinate lawyers' professional
responsibilities to existing legal requirements and norms."

17 See Donagan, supra note 16, at 138 (noting the existence of some "institutional
wrongs" for which lawyer must accept responsibility); Gerald J. Postema, Self-Image, Integrity, and ProfessionalResponsibility, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 12, at 286, 309 ("[i]n
difficult moral situations ....
one seeks to determine by reference to one's conception
of the right and the good what all things considered is the best and proper thing to
do); William Powers, Jr., StructuralAspects of the Impact of Law on Moral Duty Within Utilitarianism and Social Contract Theoy, 26 UCLA L REv. 1263, 1264 (1979) (discussing the

view that "one is never morally obligated to act in a particular way simply because law
commands such action .... [L]aw is transparent to relevant moral considerations because it does not affect their impact on moral judgment"). Stated another way, the professional codes, for the most part, assume the ethicality of role-differentiated behavior. See
Deborah L

Rhode, Ethical Perspectivee on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L

REv. 589, 617-26

(1985) (challenging assumptions underlying the reliance on role-differentiation in analyses
of moral professional behavior). Cf. Powers, supra, at 1278 (defining role differentiation
as a situation in which "the occupant of. .. a role must consider the effect of disobedience on undermining various benefits of law").
18 MODEL RULES, Scope Cnt. ("Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of
action nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached"); CPR,
Preliminay Statement (asserting that the CPR does not "undertake to define standards for
civil liability-).
19 See eg., CPR, DR 4-101(C)(2) (allowing disclosure of confidential information
when "required by law or court order"); MODEL RULES, Rule 1.6 at. ("The lawyer must
comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal ... requiring the lawyer to
give information about the client").
20 See Patterson I, supra note 9, at 49 ("For almost a century, the bar has denied
steadfastly that rules of ethics have any more than a limited legal status."). I do not
mean to suggest that lawyers and code drafters never take a position on the correctness
of substantive law. As a descriptive matter, much professional regulation can be explained
in terms of lawyers' view of how the law should apply to them. See Koniak, supra note
10, at 1417-26 (interpreting code provisions and ethics opinions in terms of lawyers' "vision" of the substantive law). Particular code provisions can be explained by lawyers'
desire to rechannel existing law. Id. at 1427-41 (arguing that the bar exalts confidentiality
to the point of contradicting existing state law). In practice, the codes often do have an
impact, as for example in malpractice cases in which court-contrary to the codes' disavowals-admit codes as evidence of what constitutes due care. E.g., Fishman v. Brooks,
487 N.E.2d 1377, 1S81-82 (Mass. 1986); Lipton v. Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163, 166-67 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1981). However, with the exception of recent attempts to reform the codes,
rulemakers universally have assumed the independence and validity of extra-code legal
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Finally, lawyer codes are not designed-or at least should not
be designed-to promote the economic self-interest of the bar.
Although scholars have questioned numerous provisions on the
grounds that they are self-serving, any self-promotion has typically
been sub rosa and denied.2 1 To the extent drafters have sought to
prevent outside regulation of the bar's interests, they have done so
ostensibly out of a belief that lawyers can understand lawyers'
professional dilemmas better than laypersons.2 Provisions that
enhance a segment of the bar's legal practices have been justified
either on independent grounds or on the basis that the provisions
are needed on an institutional basis.' In short, code drafters

standards.
21 See, e.g., Richard L Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L.
REv. 639, 655-56 (1981) (suggesting that the MODEL RULES bow to the interests of the
corporate bar); Stephen Gillers, Can a Good Lawyer Be a Bad Person, 84 MICH. L REv.
1011, 1017 (1986) ("lawyers' near monopoly on the scope of their professional duty has
often resulted in narrow and self-interested resolutions"); Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concepts of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARv. L REV. 702, 739 (1977) (the CPR ends
the obligation of confidentiality when it becomes uncomfortable for lawyers); Rhode,
supra note 17, at 611 (noting self-interest in- the MODEL RULES).
22 See, e.g., KENNETH ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 37 (1974) (suggesting a
similar trade); DIETRICH RUESCMMEYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SOCIETY 13-14 (1973)

(suggesting that lawyers trade higher status and fees for expert self-regulation); Robert W.
Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1988) (noting lawyers' claim
that "[l]awyers, themselves, rather than outside regulators or laypersons, are the best
judges of client interests and how to promote them"); Koniak, supra note 10, at 1397
n.30 (discussing sociological understanding of professional expertise in self-regulation). Cf.
ABA Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Report iii (1991) [hereinafter
McKay Report] (ABA study rejecting contention that lawyers "would be better regulated
by the legislative or executive branches").
23 Thus, for example, now-defunct advertising and solicitation rules were justified on
the grounds of protecting potential clients from being misled. Compare Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 391 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(advertising rules necessary to protect public from deception) and Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978) (upholding solicitation rules) with BARLOW F.
CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 138-40, 146-50 (1970)

(advertis-

ing rules are anticompetitive) and Deborah L. Rhode, Solicitation, 36 J. LEG. EDUc. 317,
326 (1986) (solicitation rules mainly serve the bar). Strict confidentiality provisions have
always been defended as necessary for the operation of the adversary system. Compare
ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of Professional Standards, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 82 (Proposed Alternative Final Draft 1981) (clients would not confide absent
confidentiality) and MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 689-94
(1975) (confidentiality is essential to effective adversarial justice) with Fred C. Zacharias,
Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 363-66 (1989) [hereinafter Zacharias, Confidentiality 1] (questioning confidentiality's systemic justifications) and Fred C. Zacharias,
Rethinking Confidentiality L Is Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 601, 629
(1991) [hereinafter Zacharias, Confidentiality 11] (noting possible self-serving motivations
for confidentiality rules). New MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f), discussed infra at notes 186-203,
rests on the claim that it is essential to maintaining clients' right to choose counsel.

1993]

SPECIFICIY IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY CODES

have always insisted that the codes be geared towards upholding
general societal and systemic interests.
What, then, is left for the professional codes to accomplish?
Most commentators agree that, whatever legal ethics means, it has
something to do with defining lawyers' role in a system of resolving disputes.24 For particular situations that pose a dilemma, professional codes are supposed to help lawyers choose among two or
more legal courses of conduct. At least part of the codes' function
is to explain the parameters of the system and attempt to identify
how, when, and why a lawyer should act differently than well-intentioned laypersons might act.
Patently, however, the codes have subsidiary purposes. One is
to provide a basis for sanctioning lawyer conduct that everyone
agrees is wrongful, but which typically escapes punishment.' Another is to create a fraternity, or "profession," in which the members perceive a norm in dealing with one another.2 The existence of this fraternity arguably facilitates the legal process. 27 Fi-

-

Compare William J. Genego, Prosecutorial Control Over a Defendant's Choice of Counse 27
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 17, 18 (1987) (describing attorney subpoenas as a "threat to the
adversary process") and Max D. Stem & David Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The Attorney
Subpoena Problem and a Proposalfor Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783, 1794 (1988) (attorney
subpoenas make clients hesitate to use lawyers) with Fred C. Zacharias, A Critical Look at
Rules Governing Grand Juty Subpoenas of Attorneys, 76 MINN. L REv. 917, 954 (1992) [hereinafter Zacharias, A Critical Look] (questioning need for rule to achieve proponents' objectives and noting rule's benefits for the bar).
24 See THE GOOD IAWYER, supra note 12 (collection of essays reflecting common
theme that ethical lawyering must be defined with reference to the lawyer's "role"). I use
the term "role" throughout this Article to refer to what Wasserstrom and others have
described as those aspects of serving as a lawyer that may shape one's attitudes toward
appropriate conduct in a way that other laypersons do not share. Richard Wasserstrom,
Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTs. 1, 5-6 (1975). See also Held, supra
note 12, at 60; David Luban, Introduction, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 12, at 1 (describing essays in anthology and discussing fact that "lawyers are professionally obligated
to do things on behalf of their clients that would be immoral if done by nonlawyers");
Williams, supra note 12, at 259.
25 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 8, at 917-21 (discussing the morals reinforcement
purpose of professional regulation); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers, 105
HARV. L REV. 799, 804 (1992) (comparing advantages of different enforcement schemes).
26 See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 1, at 1250 (discussing bar's historic emphasis on collegiality in dealings among lawyers).
27 Creating rules of behavior for the guild helps normalize and guide lawyer behavior vis-a-vis others. If, for example, lawyers can count on adversaries not to lie, they can
themselves negotiate in good faith. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 4.1 ("a lawyer shall not
knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law"); CPR, DR 7-102(A) (5) (same).
Similarly, tribunals, clients, and third parties can rely on lawyer representations. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES, Rule 3.3 (requiring candor to tribunals).
The process of creating a "professional" faternity also tends to produce a monopoly
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nally, ethics codes provide standards to which courts can refer in
adopting common law doctrine. 8 Most codes accept, as a given,
legal standards that pre-date the codes' adoption.' However,
when such standards are unclear or do not exist, drafters sometimes have attempted to supplement the substantive law.'
This diversity of possible goals suggests that one must qualify
the characterization of the lawyer codes as legislation. The characterization seems most apt with respect to the process by which
the codes are enacted. 1 Substantively, however, the codes often

of service-providers. Alternatively, it contributes to a sense that the professionals are an
"elite" who deserve higher fees for providing the same service others could provide at
lesser cost. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Cour, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 4445 (1989) ("By asserting that their profession is somehow imbued with a public or judicial element, lawyers distinguish themselves favorably from other occupational groups that
serve their own clientele as paid agents, concerned only with their narrow private interests."); Morgan, supra note 21, at 707-12 (describing "legal" functions nonlawyers can
perform); Zacharias, Confiuentiality I, supra note 23, at 360 (noting the possible effect of
confidentiality rules on a client's willingness to pay fees). For obvious reasons, accomplishing that result is not an avowed or generally accepted purpose of the ethics codes.
28 Patterson I, supra note 9, at 55 (describing ways courts have used codes in setting
legal standards).
29 See authorities cited supra notes 18-20 and acompanying text. Cf. Koniak, supra
note 10, at 1422-41 (suggesting that the codes and their interpretation often are designed
to change, trump, or minimize the thrust of the substantive law).
30 One notable example is the bar's development of a virtual monopoly in defining
conflicts of interest. Courts often have deferred to the ethical conflict standards in determining when lawyers should be disqualified from representing particular clients. See, e.g.,
J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1359 (2d Cir. 1975) (relying upon CPR's
conflict rules); Kroungold v. Triester, 521 F.2d 763, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1975) (relying on
ABA Canons); Zions First Nat'l Bank v. United Health Clubs, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 138, 140
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (resting disqualification decision on state disciplinary rules).
It is largely when controlling legal standards are absent that code drafters have
played a legislative role. Cf. Koniak, supra note 10, at 1419, 1461-78 (noting that the bar
may resist or try to overrule state law, but is most likely to do so when the state's "commitment" to its view of the correct law is weak). For example, the codes' definition of
the duty of confidentiality thus far seems to have immunized lawyers from the duty to
protect third parties that courts have imposed on other professions. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976) (imposing duty on psychiatrist to
protect patient's victim). Cf. Hawkins v. Kings County, 602 P.2d 361, 365 (Wash. Ct. App.
1979) (suggesting lawyer may have a duty to warn potential victim). Cf. also Nix v.
Whiteside, 474 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (holding that defense counsel who threatened to
disclose client's intention to commit perjury had satisfied the constitutional requirement
of effective representation by following the mandates of the state professional code).
31 Recent codes have been adopted under a media spotlight. See, e.g., Stephen
Gillers, Wat We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model
Ruks, 46 OHio ST. "LJ. 243, 244 (1985) (describing spotlight placed on proposals leading
to adoption of the MODEL RULES); Schneyer, supra note 11, at 695-701, 734 (same). The
proposals of drafting committees have been scrutinized by an active body of the very
lawyers the codes regulate. Schneyer, supra note 11, at 708-14; Hazard, supra note 1, at
1259 (attorneys "reacted with shock and outrage" when committee drafting the MODEL
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do not operate like freestanding legislation. Even when the codes
reflect a clear moral consensus-for example, "thou shalt not steal
from clients-that morality generally also is reflected in criminal
and civil liability rules.3 2 Because the bar has limited enforcement
resources and has goals in addition to producing moral behavior,
the codes rely on noncode constraints to limit and punish misconduct; 3 they tend to defer the actual control of improper acts to.
other regulators.' As a rule, prohibitive language in the codes

RULES proposed new rules "acknowledging legal realities"). It may therefore be inevitable
that interest groups lobby for and affect the codes' substantive provisions. Sometimes
provisions clearly are driven by hidden motivations that benefit particular groups of lawyers. See supra authorities cited at note 21. See also Schneyer, supra note 11, at 709-11 (describing political motivations of opponents to the MODEL RULES). In the procedural
sense, the way codes are adopted now reflect a legislative model.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of this "procedural-legislative" model of lobbying, compromise, and politics occurred with respect to the MODEL RULES relating to
attorney-client confidentiality. As originally proposed, the rules allowed lawyers to reveal
confidential information to prevent client fraud. ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 47-48 (1987). The ABA's members rejected the disclosure provisions in favor of strict confidentiality. MODEL RULES, Rule 1.6
(permitting disclosure only to preirent "imminent death or substantial bodily harm").
However, in drafting the comments to the adopted rule, the drafters restricted the
membership's decision by authorizing lawyers aware of client fraud to "withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like." MODEL RULES, Rule 1.6 cmt.
I should not be misunderstood to say that scholars who have focused on the changing process of code drafting fail to perceive that the substantive orientation of the codes
has also shifted. Indeed, Geoffrey Hazard notes the precise change that I address in this
Article; that is, the movement from codes stating abstract norms to conduct-specific, purportedy enforceable rules. Hazard, supra note 1, at 1249-50. Similarly, Susan Koniak discusses the degree to which the bar has attempted to refocus substantive law. Koniak,
supra note 10, at 1391. My point is simply that these scholars' designation of the codes
as "legislation" stems in large measure from the way drafters have promulgated new rules
and hope they will be enforced, rather than from perceived changes in the drafters'
guiding goals and principles. See, e.g.,
Hazard, supra note 1, at 1252-60 (discussing drafting process of the MODEL RULES).
32 See Nelson, supra note 8, at 917 (relating particular professional regulations to
proscriptions against theft).
33 Often, that is the case even when the codes expressly mandate or forbid particular behavior. For example, the codes universally forbid lawyers to file frivolous lawsuits
and make frivolous claims. MODEL RULES, Rule 3.1; CPR, DR 7-102. However, disciplinary
bodies rarely have devoted resources to implementing these provisions. In recent years,
enforcement has become routine under the separate rubric of FFD. R. CIv. P. 11. See
generally Neal H. Klausner, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation by Demanding ProfessionalResponsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L REV. 300 (1986); Victor H. Kramer, Note,
Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional Responsibility, 75 MINN. L REv. 793 (1991).
34 Sometimes the bar need not write or enforce code provisions because other legal
incentives exist to promote appropriate lawyer behavior. The potential for malpractice liability or criminal sanctions may even cause lawyers to act against the apparent mandate
of the codes - for example to "maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
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serves primarily as a public relations device.'
Typically, rulemakers are concerned with situations in which
they lack anything approaching consensus concerning the correct
behavior. Unlike legislators, code drafters perceive their goal as
providing guidance for lawyers in choosing from among several
permissible courses of conduct. 6 This approach assumes that
most lawyers will act ethically, in a professional sense, if only they
know how." A more cynical view would hold that lawyers will only respond to those rules that parallel their self-interest or those
that can be enforced by sufficient sanctions to make compliance
worthwhile.s Yet the existing empirical evidence suggests that

himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6068(e) (West 1990). Only recently have scholars begun to focus upon the interrelationship of code and extra-code constraints. See Cramton & Udell, supra note 6, at 297,
305-06 (discussing the "interplay of ethics 'law' . . . with other more broadly authoritative
principles of federal substantive and procedural law"); Patterson I, supra note 9, at 49
(arguing that the law and ethics rules interrelate); Wilkins, supra note 25, at 851 (noting
importance of relying on extra-code regulation as well as professional discipline to prevent misconduct). Cf. JOHN M. KLINE, INTERNATIONAL CODES AND MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS: SETTING GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS OPERATIONS 5 (1985) (noting and
discussing development of various voluntary codes designed to guide the behavior of
multinational corporations).
35 By "public relations device," I simply mean the inclusion of a provision that
seems to serve the public interest and enhances the image of lawyers, but which has
little practical effect.
36 Stated another way, the drafters hope to help lawyers choose from among different courses of conduct upon the appropriateness of which the rulemakers cannot agree.
For example, lawyers disagree over when it is appropriate to press client interests in ways
that harass opponents or inconvenience adversary lawyers, or in situations where the
client interests are minimal. The codes respond to these disagreements by stating principles - often conflicting principles - rather than adopting rules requiring particular
behavior. Compare, e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 1.3 cmt. (requiring zeal) and MODEL RULES,
Rule 1.4 cmL (client should be empowered to decide objectives of representation) with
MODEL RULES, Rule 1.3 cmt. (lawyer need not press for every advantage) and MODEL
RULES, Rule 4.4 (lawyer should not pursue objective of harassing or burdening third
person). See also Simon, supra note 14, at 1083-84 (arguing that lawyers should view most
ethics regulations as guides for the exercise of personal discretion).
37 The CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY expresses this assumption as follows:
"The Code of Professional Responsibility points the way to the aspiring and provides standards by which to judge the transgressor. ...
So long as its practitioners are guided by
these principles, the law will continue to be a noble profession." CPR, Preamble at 1-2. See
also Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 107 (1991) (discussing hortatory nature of ethics codes and
noting that "[u]nethical lawyers always will ignore the codes when the codes conflict with
their self-interest; scrupulous attorneys will try to follow the codes' commands").
38 See Abel, supra note 21, at 643-44 ("Rules are less likely to influence behavior the
more they mandate conduct opposed to self-interest and then create loopholes for those
intent on evasion ... ."). Cf Patterson H, supra note 9, at 725 ("The ultimate function
of a code of legal ethics is the same as that of any set of ethical rules: it is to keep
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people, in general, tend to be more socialized. 9 Common experi-

within reasonable bounds the law of self-interest that operates at all times and in all
places.").
This "bad man" approach to the codes, though a minority view, is plausible. It
suggests that there is little of value in the relatively vague professional codes. Because
proponents of this view do not accept that lawyers respond to unenforced guidance in
the codes, they will consider much of this Article's analysis besides the point.
39 Developmental psychology studies support the proposition that morally-developed
adults respond even to unenforced ethics norms that do not further their self-interest.
Lawrence Kohlberg, for example, identifies five empirically testable stages of advancing
moral development, from infancy to adulthood. 2 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 174-76 (1984) [hereinafter
KOHLBERG, ESSAYS]; Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 347 (David
A. Goslin ed., 1969) (longitudinal study confirming Kohlberg's earlier findings); Charles
A. Levine et al., The Current Formulation of Kohlberg's Theoy and a Response to Citics, 28
HUM. DEv. 94 (1985) (updating Kohlberg's theories); JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT
OF THE CHILD (1965) (analyzing moral growth and development with age). Kohlberg estimates that a majority of society stops developing at Stage In or IV. 2 KOHLBERG, ESSAYS,
supra, at 172. Persons who act according to a "bad man theory" correspond to Stage I
and I1 development, in which the threat of punishment or immediate expectation of reward determines appropriate conduct. Id. at 624-26. In contrast, persons at Stage IV have
the capacity to respect personally unfavorable ethics norms; that is, to obey the law and
community standards for the common good. Id. at 631-33. Cf Thomas E. Willging &
Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral Development of the Law Student: Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 306, 314 (1982) (at Stage IV, "a lawyer would look to the
Code of Professional Responsibility as the most authoritative source of guidance for his
decisions on ethical issues relating to his own behavior"). One would hope and expect
that most. educated lawyers, mature and relatively well-integrated into society, have
reached Kohlberg's fourth stage.
Nevertheless, the psychological literature does not conclude the issue. Kohlberg and
those who have followed him primarily address the development of individuals' moral
reasoning. 2 KOHLBERG, ESSAYS, supra, at 170. See also James R. Rest, Morality, in 3 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 556, 565-69 (Paul H. Mussen ed., 4th ed. 1983) (reviewing
the vast literature on moral development). The studies do not establish the extent to
which persons who reason at an advanced stage translate their intellectual response into
conduct. Peter Kutuick, The Relationship of MoralJudgment and Moral Action: Kohlberg's Theory, Criticism, and Revision, in LAWRENCE KOHLBERG: CONSENSUS AND CONTROVERSY 125, 126127 (Sohan Modgil & Celia Modgil eds., 1986) (criticizing Kohlberg); Willging & Dunn,
supra, at 307-08. Thus, the psychological literature casts doubt on the "bad man" view of
the world, but leaves the truth open to speculation.
Probably, the answer to how lawyers act lies somewhere between the bad man theory and the ideal of the high-minded, socialized professional. One would suspect that
lawyers initially react to ethical dilemmas intuitively and then seek "a black letter [ethics]
rule to support [the] intuition." Patterson H, supra note 9, at 703. The intuition of some
lawyers will be to favor their self-interest; others will wish to act "well." The deiding
factor may be how many lawyers fit in each category, because peer pressure not only
may influence the individual's view of appropriate conduct, but also may convince the
lawyer that his or her intuitive ethical response is consistent with self-interest. See Gordon,
supra note 22, at 22 (emphasizing role of peer pressure in shaping lawyer conduct);
Luban, supra note 14, at 461 (discussing interrelationship between codes, peer pressure,
and economic self-interest); Nancy Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 ANN. SuRv.
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ence bears out the code drafters' assumptions that, at least on occasion, lawyers do consult and rely upon professional codes for
guidance even when the codes pose no threat. °
To the extent the professional codes appropriately rest on the
assumption that lawyers will respond to guidance, clear rules and
punishment for violation of those rules are not always necessary to
produce desirable conduct." Indeed, because code drafters may
AM. L. 7, 14 (discussing effect of peer pressure). Cf Abel, supra note 21, at 646 (discussing peer pressure as a positive and negative effect on lawyer conduct).
The empirical literature regarding lawyer conduct does not support or disprove any
of the alternative assertions regarding lawyers' likely responses to ethical dilemmas. Hard
evidence concerning lawyers' common behavior and reactions is virtually nonexistent. This
phenomenon is not unique; the ethics codes and the scholarly literature are replete with
empirical assumptions that require empirical testing and justification. See Theodore
Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Conception of Legal Ethics, 1984 WiS. L. REV. 1529,
1571 (discussing need for empirical testing of ethics issues); Zacharias, Confidentiality I,
supra note 23, at 353 (discussing authorities who have questioned the absence of adequate empirical evidence).
40 Compare Abel, supra note 21, at 647-50 (suggesting that rules have little effect
because they are rarely enforced) with Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L REV. 689, 708-10 (1981) (describing ways,
even absent full enforcement, that professional codes have "instrumental significance").
We often take the influence of professional regulation for granted. One overlooked
impact is the way that regulation encourages lawyers to consult ethics codes. For example, a recent survey asked upstate New York lawyers about their obligation of confidentiality in a series of scenarios in which the New York code required confidentiality. Zacharias, Confidentiality I, supra note 23. Numerous lawyers responded that they would reveal
the information in question. Id. at 389-96. That suggests that codes have limited influence because the substance of the rules is not fully understood. See Abel, supra note 21,
at 646 ("[r]ules can impinge upon behavior only if they are known"). In practice, however, one suspects that New York lawyers confronted by such situations would consult the
NEW YORK CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrIY before responding to the dilemma and,
faced with the code's strict mandate of silence, would question their impulse to disclose.
Second, many code requirements become so engrained in the professional ethos
that lawyers adopt them as givens, even though compliance is not always enforceable or
in the lawyers' self-interest. Thus, lawyers draw the line at lying to other lawyers or the
court. MODEL RULES, Rules 3.3, 4.1; CPR, DR 7-102. With some exceptions, lawyers avoid
paying legal costs for clients even if doing so would be financially advantageous in the
long run. MODEL RULES, Rule 1.8(e); CPR, DR 5-103(B). Lawyers often go overboard in
avoiding conflicts of interest, turning away clients they could represent with impunity.
MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7; CPR, DR 5-101. The principle of zealous advocacy is punctiliously obeyed - sometimes as a means for justifying conduct the lawyers wish to pursue, but
often because of the engrained sense that client-centered behavior is ethically required.
See Zacharias, Confidentiality I, supra note 23, at 381-82 (33% and 44% of surveyed lawyers
maintained confidentiality in situations in which they wished to disclose or believed they
should be required to disclose).
The bottom line is that while lawyers often may act unthinkingly or out of self-interest, the characterization of lawyers as pure hired guns or automatons who never exercise independent judgment is overly simplistic. See Schneyer, supra note 39, at 1567-71
(challenging hired gun characterization); Gordon, supra note 22, at 72-73 (questioning
view that lawyers act without responsibility or independence).
41 Ehrlich and Posner's seminal work on legal rulemaking assumes, in contrast, that
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be unwilling to select a single type of behavior as the "correct
behavior," they often opt for rules that promote introspection by
lawyers-thought about what conduct is "professional" given the
lawyer's "role."2 The desire for, or expectation of, discipline in
these categories of rules is limited to extreme cases.
This orientation, in part, explains why professional codes must
be evaluated differently than ordinary legislation and administrative schemes-even those that include legal "standards" as flexible
as the standards in the codes.4" Flexible legal standards ordinarily
rest on a premise that courts or some other lawmaking body will
flesh out the standards and enforce more specific guidelines for
behavior. Although those standards may serve the same administrative function as the codes (i.e., setting a norm of conduct that
enables parties to deal with each other in a controlled, foreseeable
manner), they anticipate that relatively firm, enforceable rules will
develop over time." In contrast, professional code provisions rare-

society envisions a "desired allocation of resources" and seeks that allocation by detailing
laws in a way that most efficiently produces the conduct society expects. Isaac Ehrlich &
Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 262
(1974). Based on this starting point, Ehrlich and Posner posit that precision in lawmaking is a "good," because it enhances deterrence and limits litigation to realistic disputes.
id. at 264.
42 See generaly Loder, supra note 7 (arguing for introspective rules). The mandate
that prosecutors "do justice" best exemplifies such a rule. See infra text accompanying
notes 108-17. Other examples include the requirement that lawyers act "competently,"
"loyally," and "zealously." MODEL RULES, Rules 1.1, 1.7 cmt., 1.3 cmtL; CPR, DR 6-101(A),
DR 7-101. Some scholars believe that professional regulation is best used to inform individual lawyer's discretion. See genffay Simon, supra note 14.
43 Examples of flexible standards include the reasonableness standards in common
law tort rules and the Uniform Commercial Code. SeM e.g., U.C.C. § 1-204(3) (1989)
(defining actions taken "seasonably" to mean "within a reasonable time"); U.C.C. § 1205(5) (1989) ("usages of trade" ought to govern interpretations of contracts); U.C.C. §
2-602(1) (1989) (rejection of goods must be within a "reasonable time"); U.C.C. § 9-110
(1989) (requiring descriptions of goods to "reasonably identify" them).
44 U.C.C. § 1-102, cmt. 1 (1989) (noting that U.C.C. is intended to enable courts to
develop law embodied in the Code in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances
and practices); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 85 (1977) (describing Karl
Llewellyn, the U.C.C.'s principal proponent, as envisioning a "case law code" which would
abrogate obsolete rules and allow courts flexibility to devise new rules for changing conditions and business practices); Richard L. Danzig, A Comment on the Juripdence of the
Uform Commenial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 624 (1975) (discussing U.C.C. drafters'
anticipation of development of rules). See e.g., Commonwealth Propane Co. v. Petrosol
Int'l, 818 F.2d 522, 529-30 (6th Cir. 1987) (limiting buyer's time to make "seasonable
rejection" under U.C.C. § 1-204(3) to sufficient time to determine whether seller or bailee intends to satisfy contract's requirements); Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil
Co., 664 F.2d 772, 791 (9th Cir. 1981) (interpreting U.C.C. § 1-205(5) as including local
"usages of trade" that are not the usage of parties' particular trade); EPN-Delaval, SA. v.
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ly are fleshed out; clarifying ethics opinions are scarce, ad hoc,
and generally inaccessible.' The professional codes, in many instances, truly intend to avoid objective rules for behavior and seek
to leave the determination of appropriate conduct to individual
4
lawyers' own consciences. 6
Viewed fairly, ethics codes thus are typical legislation only
when they try both to fix specific behavior and to anticipate at

Inter-Equip, 542 F. Supp. 238, 246 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (measuring "reasonable time" under
U.C.C. § 2-602(1) (1989) from date of delivery rather than date of discovery of
noncoformity); Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, 284 F. Supp. 987, 992 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (defining and limiting "usages of trade" under U.C.C. § 1-205(5) (1989)); Farmers
& Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Fairview State Bank, 766 P.2d 330, 333 (Okla. 1988) ("reasonable identification" of'collateral under U.C.C. § 9-110 satisfied if third parties can identify
that property is subject to security interest).
45 Until recently, opinions of the bar and bar disciplinary committees were extremely
difficult to identify. Few states collected or indexed decisions in a published format. Even
when bar associations collected decisions, few lawyers knew of their existence or location.
The opinions themselves tended to be limited in number and scope; they focused on
extreme violations of unambiguous ethics or criminal rules. Less obvious code provisions
were not, and were not expected to be, interpreted in the context of disciplinary proceedings. See Luban, supra note 14, at 452 ("[e]nforcement is generally reserved for the
most egregious violations, and consequently the body of case law in professional responsibility is small and the litigation is not very complex"). Cf. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 958
(noting that discipline has rarely been imposed).
This state of affairs has begun to change. Several legal reporters now attempt to
canvass ethics decisions throughout the country. E.g., IAw'IERS" MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) [hereinafter ABA/BNA MANUAL]; RECENT ETHICS OPINIONS (ABA)
(1991); NATIONAL REPORTER ON LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL REsPONSM IY (UPA)
(1993). Some states have invested resources in enforcing more rules and publishing decisions. See, g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6086.9 (West 1975) (referring to California's
legislatively created State Bar Discipline Monitor); CALIFORNIA COMPENDIUM ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIY (1987) (containing post-1983 opinions of California State Bar and
several local bar associations); ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CrIY OF NEW YORK COMMITFEE
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITIEES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (conmining post-1980 opinions of various local bar associations); Review of Selected 1986 California Legislation: Business Associations and Professions, 18 PAC. UJ. 467, 469-72 (1986-87) (discussing establishment of a full-time California State Bar Court to hear disciplinary cases).
Nevertheless, the number and accessibility of interpretive ethics opinions remains limited.
Perhaps more significantly, disciplinary authorities and ethics opinions are likely to continue to focus on the clear instances of lawyer misconduct despite the fact that much professional regulation is intended to guide lawyer behavior in the more ambiguous situations. See Wilkins, supra note 25, at 821 (assuming enforcement officials will only impose
sanctions when a lawyer has violated a relatively unambiguous professional norm);
Patterson II, supra note 9, at 709 (discussing the guidance function of ethics codes).
46 See Zacharias, supra note 37 (discussing hortatory code provisions). Cf. Gail L
Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form Statutes of Limitation and the Doctrine of Laches, 1992
B.Y.U. I REV. 917, 935-36 (noting that a lawmaker with "a definite sense of the right
way and the wrong way to resolve each [case]" may adopt a standard, and thereby give
discretion to a law administrator, because of the difficulty of articulating "a full set of
rules to apply to every set of circumstances").
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least some measure of discipline for violation of the rules." To
the extent code drafters expect codes to have an effect (i.e., in
promoting some goal) even without significant prospects of sanctions, the regulation departs from traditional lawmaking.' The
more codes focus on "defining lawyers' roles" and creating a "fraternity," the less they look like ordinary laws or administrative
rules. As a consequence, the function code drafters have in mind
for the regulation should shape how code rules, and reforms to
those rules, are framed.
III. THE MEANING OF SPECIFICITY IN CODE-DRAFTING

At the outset, let me define what I mean by "specificity" in
code-drafting. One can identify four elements commonly attributed
to specificity in legal rules: (1) language-the absence of vague
terms that defy understanding,4 9 (2) observability-the ease of
determining whether a rule has been complied with,50 (3)

47 Of course, no law is always enforced. However, it is fair to say that traditional
legislation almost always hopes to deter or promote particular conduct. Lawmakers generally recognize that the effectiveness of laws turns on the likelihood and degree of sanctions. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS
IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1, 9 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes

eds., 1974) (discussing correlation between probability of conviction and punishment on
deterrence); Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 41.
48 An economist would not expect professional codes to affect lawyer behavior absent the threat of sanctions or some other coercive force. Cf Ehrlich & Posner, supra
note 41, at 275 (economic analysis of importance of deterrence in rulemaking); Patterson
I, supra note 9, at 45 (noting that the "threat of discipline ... is a small impediment to
unethical conduct in a competitive world where justice is administered by the adversary

system"). Until recently, however, no one has ever thought of the codes in economic
terms. Cf Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective,

49 MD. L REV. 869, 872 (1990) (analyzing ethics rules in economic terms and concluding that any threat to professionalism comes from demand/client side rather than
supply/lawyer side); Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts; The Decision to
Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of Client Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
123, 13944 (1988) (economic analysis of attorney-client confidentiality). Indeed, the tradi-

tional view that codes identify ideals, provide guidance, and define roles is what sets
professional codes apart from traditional, economics-based laws and regulation.
49 One should not confuse the use of unclear or incomprehensible language with
the use of flexible norms. To say, for example, that lawyers should "be good" is incomprehensible. Targets cannot understand whether they are being told to act with skill, to
behave morally, or to engage in conduct consistent with being a lawyer. In contrast, all
lawyers can understand the concept "be competent." At the margins, individuals may disagree about what particular acts constitute competent representation, but the mandate
itself is clear, lawyers are under no illusion about what the rule purports to require.
50 Other formulations of this element refer to the clarity of the "operative facts" or
"factual predicate" (i.e., the factual conditions triggering application of the rule or standard). FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RU.ES 23 (1991).
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scope-the range of events or conduct that a rule covers, and (4)
particularity-the existence of a mandate for or prohibition against
particular acts. Scholars typically have focused on the first and second aspects.5' I concentrate on the latter two. For purposes of
this Article, I assume that the language of a code or provision in
question is clear; everyone knows what it means and when it applies. I also assume that the code is self-sufficient. In other words,
the drafters do not anticipate a common law development that will
give the code (or provision) additional meaning. My focus is on
the extent to which the terms of the code designate particular lawyer behavior in response to the covered situation as appropriate or
inappropriate. 2
As I have already suggested, the issues raised by specificity in
drafting professional rules are not identical to those raised by the
more general debate over "rules" and "standards" in lawmaking."
The rules-standard debate focuses upon the likely effect of particular laws in inducing agreed-upon, desirable behavior. The terms of
the debate are relevant to those parts of the professional codes
that are intended to control lawyer behavior. However, some code
provisions simply seek to influence behavior-sometimes in an un-

51 The most notable study in this vein is Ehrlich and Posner's seminal article on the
use of language and the ability of targets or enforcing bodies to identify the requirements of law. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 41, at 261.
Professor Abel challenges the usefulness of the proposed MODEL RULES on the
grounds that they "are drafted with an amorphousness and ambiguity that render them
virtually meaningless." Abel, supra note 21, at 641-42. Part of Abel's claims can be seen as
linguistic; that is, that the terms of some of the rules are so vague as to be indeterminate. Other parts of Abel's analysis share the focus of this Article; namely, the effectiveness of using comprehensible terms that provide varying degrees of, and sometimes too littie, guidance. The difference in these aspects of specificity analysis are important to note,
lest one confuse my suggestion that the modem codes tend to mandate more specific
conduct, see supra text accompanying notes 1-3, with Abel's perfectly consistent claim that
some of the new code provisions are linguistically vague.
52 Thus, in Frederick Schauer's terms, I do not focus on how codes define the factual predicates of the rules, in the sense of defining whether a rule binds a lawyer in a
particular situation. See SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 24. I assume situations in which reasonable lawyers can look at a rule and agree that, in their circumstances, the rule applies
(or does not apply). I address the information that the applicable rules give the lawyers
about how they should act.
53 See generally Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of
the Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L REV. 1217 (1982) (discussing rules and standards in the U.C.C.); Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 41 (comparing effects of precise and
imprecise rules governing the same conduct); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L REv. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976) (discussing rule-standard
distinction); William C. Powers, Formalism and Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52
WASH. L. REV. 27, 28-37 (1976) (distinguishing formal rules from less mechanical,
nonformal decisionmaking).
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defined direction-by shaping lawyer attitudes.' These provisions
set guidelines for conduct about which the rulemakers do not
share, and do not expect to attain, a consensus. 5 They contemplate that the targeted lawyers themselves will identify the relevant
conflict of values and choose a permissible course of conduct. 6

54 See, e.g., CPR, EC 5-1 ("The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties"); CPR, EC 7-1 (a lawyer "is to represent his client
zealously within the bounds of the law"); MODEL RULES, Rule 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act
with reasonable promptness and diligence"); MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7 cmL ("Loyalty is an
essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client").
Of course, many laws address attitudes. Some, for example, attempt to guide inter.preters of vague provisions on how they should develop further principles. See, e.g., U.N.
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
97/18, Annex 1, Art. 7 (1980), repiinted in 19 I.L.M. 668, 673 (1980) (telling interpireters
of the Convention to have regard for need to promote uniformity, foster good faith in
trade, and follow Convention's principles of developing trade "on the basis of equality
and mutual benefit" and removing "legal barriers"); U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1992) (urging
courts to construe the code liberally "to promote its underlying purposes and policies");
Baird & Weisberg, supra note 53, at 1227-28 (discussing U.C.C. "standards" that suggest
criteria by which courts can decide cases guided by the code drafters' intended goals).
What makes professional codes unique is that they seek to shape the attitudes of their
targets and expect the targets to engage in behavior because the targets, rather than the
code or a code interpreter, determine it is the appropriate thing to do.
Similarly, many rules reflect a compromise among disagreeing drafters, establish
fixed principles that seemingly ignore necessary exceptions, or set standards that- leave
the task of agreeing on exceptions for a future time. See SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 4252 (discussing the relationship between regulatory generality and "entrenched" exceptions). Unlike professional code drafters in the situations I discuss, however, the drafters
of most "incomplete" rules anticipate that, despite their current disagreement, a majority
view will develop over time and become part of the law.
55 See Robert H. Aronson, Profeisional Responsibility: Education and Enforcemen 51
WASH. L REV. 273, 289 (1976) (describing lack of consensus underlying some professional rules, with the result that lawyers can justify varying conduct in the same situation); Loder, supra note 7, at 324 (suggesting that "[t]he search for a consensus-based
body of enforceable legal rules may . . . be a quest for the unattainable"); Patterson II,
supra note 9, at 709 (noting that the ethics codes are primarily directed at "the unusual
situations that call for the lawyer's exercise of discretion"). Given the limited number of
ethics decisions most states issue, drafters of these open provisions probably envision little
future development of precise rules. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46. Cf. Danzig,
supra note 44, at 624-27 (discussing view of U.C.C. drafters that law would be discovered
over time, enabling drafters to adopt a more passive role in defining specific rules for
conduct).
56 For example, the MODEL RULES note the lawyer's duty of zeal and loyalty to clients, MODEL RULES, Rules 1.3 cmL, 1.7 cmt., but also state that lawyers are "not bound
to press for every advantage." MODEL RULES, Rule 1.3 cmL Similarly, lawyers must "keep
a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter," MODEL RULES, Rule 1.4, but
"may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely
to react imprudently." MODEL RULES, Rule 1.4 cm. Clients have the right to make decisions concerning the objectives of litigation, MODEL RULES, Rule 1.4 cmL, but lawyers

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:2

Almost by definition, structuring a code with such components is a
different enterprise than drafting ordinary laws.-7
This Article, therefore, studies more than the effect of linguistic clarity in bringing about particular conduct." It addresses the
relationship between substantive specificity, as I have defined it,
and the most significant factors that bear on the peculiar purposes
of professional regulation. Highlighting that relationship should, at
a minimum, help future drafters write more coherent codes. Perhaps more important, it will focus debates over proposed reforms
by forcing proponents and opponents alike to identify the purpose
of the reforms and to support their claims that the reforms will or
will not work.
Consider, for example, the role-setting function of the codes.
In order to establish appropriate responses to a context or set of
situitions, drafters need not always designate specific, enforceable
conduct. The rules can, alternatively, define the lawyer's role by

must decide if particular decisions concern those objectives or merely the means of carrying out the lawsuit. Id
57 The uniqueness of the codes rest on the combination of generalized rules and the
absence of common law development of the rules. Many legal principles are vague or
attempt to shape attitudes, but rest on the assumption that courts will define the content
of the principles over time (e.g., a "reasonableness" standard). Similarly, many laws are
sufficiently clear that the drafters envisage no substantial future development (e.g., no
"intentional murder"). The ethics codes are unusual in that many provisions state no
clear prescriptions, but also do not expect future courts or bar committees to provide
substantial guidance.
One consequence is in the considerations relevant to analyzing the effects of generalized versus specific rules. Gail Heriot notes that lawmakers, in selecting a law along the
rule-standard continuum, typically will need to consider.
(1) the ability of the formulation to guide law administrators to achieve appropriate case outcomes; (2) the ability of the formulation to guide actors towards
appropriate conduct; (3) the relative importance of guiding law administrators to
achieve appropriate case outcomes and guiding actors to appropriate conduct;
and (4) the practical ability of the formulation to attract the consensus of fellow
lawmakers who make up the law-making body.
Heriot, supra note 46, at 934 (footnotes omitted). When we compare a specific legislative
or judicial rule (e.g., a categorical approach) to a "standard" (e.g., a balancing approach), other key considerations may be institutional; that is, how the subsequent interpreter will be able to reach effective decisions, consistent with their role in a democratic
system. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L
REv. 24, 63-68 (1992) (discussing rules and standards in constitutional decisionmaking).
However, because intermediate interpretation of a code (i.e., "administration") is unlikely
to occur, only substantive considerations seem relevant in deciding upon code specificity,
that is, how provisions will affect the targets' actions. Heriot's second and third factors
and institutional concerns become less important.
58 See H.LA. HART, THE CoNcEPT OF LAW 123 (1961) (discussing "uncertainty" of
the law's ability to communicate in a way that always achieves the law's intended end).
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expressing principles, prescribing postures lawyers should adopt
towards particular considerations, setting priorities among potentially conflicting interests, and identifying goals lawyers should
pursue or avoid. Indeed, overly precise codes have the defect of
appearing all-inclusive, rather than setting standards lawyers can
apply in a variety of situations.
On the other hand, drafters sometimes may prefer provisions
that direct particular conduct because they are simpler to enforce.
Narrow provisions make sense when the resolution of an issue is
obvious and when special aspects of a given situation demand a
uniform response to a recurring dilemma that has many feasible
answers.5 9 The desire for uniform adherence to the rules in these
situations means that code drafters must focus more on the enforceability of the rules and the cost of enforcing them.' Conversely, when drafters cannot discern a consensus over appropriate
behavior and there is no imperative to adopt a uniform rule, the
drafters may be justified in leaving more outcomes to individual
discretion. 1

59 Uniformity may be desirable for a variety of reasons other than a moral imperative. By informing clients how lawyers will act in a particular situtation, professional
codes may help clients order their own conduct and exercise their own autonomy (e.g.,
in deciding what to tell their lawyer). Moreover, clients sure of uniform lawyer behavior
in one respect can choose their lawyer based upon other criteria. Reassured by the code,
clients may also be more willing to trust and use lawyers. Concomitantly, requiring uniform conduct may enable other lawyers to trust and depend on particular responses from
their adversaries, such as truthfulness in conducting negotiations. In the long run, these
mutual expectations can smooth the practice of law and the operation of the legal system.
60 The costs of enforcing rules include the expense of accepting complaints, investigating violations, making decisions on which complaints to pursue, providing due process, supervising sanctions, responding to appeals, and foregoing opportunities for other
bar activities that require resources.
61 A code's failure to set priorities for situations in which lawyers lack other sources
of guidance may, however, have costs for individual lawyers and for the system itself. See
infta text accompanying notes 110-11.
One example of the tension between providing guidance and avoiding over-regulation is the question of how the generalized ethical duty of "zealous representation" applies when a criminal defense lawyer is tempted to advise a witness to assert a fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a way that borders on obstruction of
justice. Bruce Green chides the codes for failing to provide guidance to lawyers in this
situation and thereby leaving them at the mercy of ambiguous criminal laws. Bruce
Green, Zealous Repreentation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the Ciminal Law,
69 N.C. L REV. 687, 689-90 (1991). Considering the package of ethics regulation as a
whole might lead one to view the codes' approach more favorably. Criminal defense
lawyers must assess the dividing line between zeal and improper conduct in many aspects
of their practices. See, e.g., Monroe Freedman, Profesional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lauyer The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966) (discussing difficult

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:2

These observations suggest a "specificity continuum" for provisions in the professional codes. 2 The extremes of the spectrum
are easy to identify, while the middle ranges blur at the margins.
Yet four basic categories of specificity exist, to which I refer as
Points I through IV for ease of discussion. The drafters' choice of
specificity typically reflects the degree to which they intend the
codes to establish uniform conduct, on the one hand, or to rely
on extra-code constraints to establish and enforce specific standards of behavior, on the other.' Concomitantly, the choice of
specificity ordinarily determines how a provision's mandate will, or
can, be enforced.
FIGURE A6'
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ethics scenarios for criminal defense lawyers). To the extent the codes provide a laundry
list of solutions, they run the risk of (1) suggesting that all unspecified conduct is permissible, and (2) muting lawyers' need to hunt for appropriate solutions. See Loder, supra
note 7, at 312 ("rules which embody minimum standards . . . may discourage practitioners from reaching beyond moral mediocrity"). The significance of the codes' generalized
approach in the obstruction of justice context is not that the codes unthinkingly defer to
the criminal law to set limits, Green, supra, at 712, but that the codes require lawyers to
research the law. Doing so arguably encourages lawyers to take seriously their legal obligations and to measure those obligations against their duties to clients. To the extent
this approach risks ambiguity and nonuniform responses by lawyers, that simply may reflect the difficult, ambiguous, and case-sensitive nature of the problem.
62 It is possible for this Article to discuss a single "specificity continuum" only because its discussion is limited to a particular type of specificity, namely the extent to
which codes identify and designate desired conduct. If one considered the subject of
specificity more broadly, one would have to envision a multidimensional graph. The four
elements identified above would all be relevant to ascertaining the degree of specificity of
particular rules. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50. Other attributes might also play
a part, though these may be subsumed elsewhere within the four elements; for example,
the degree to which the instructions in a rule are fact-based or rely on normative factors
(e.g., reasonableness).
63 I use the term "extra-code constraint" to refer to the entire body of noncode
regulation that affects lawyer behavior, including criminal laws, malpractice and other civil
liability, administrative rules, and noncode-related institutional pressures. For a discussion
of the relative merits of different mechanisms for disciplining lawyer misconduct, see
generally Wilkins, supra note 25.
64 Illustrations in the text of this Article will be labelled alphabetically (i.e., Figures
A through F). Illustrations in the margin will be labelled numerically (i.e., Figures 1
through 6).
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As Figure A illustrates, Point I reflects a code provision that
establishes a general role for lawyers, but leaves all further definition and implementation of lawyers' responsibilities to the courts
or legislatures. For example, most professional codes prescribe a
duty of lawyers to act competently' and loyally towards their clients.' To the extent other provisions fail to flesh out the meaning of these duties, the codes rely upon malpractice, tort, criminal
liability, and constitutional standards, among others, to constrain
lawyer behavior and set parameters for how lawyers should implement their role. Point I rules do not themselves identify behavior
for which a lawyer may be punished.
At the Point IV extreme, a code sets out specific, understandable rules that identify or require behavior, violation of which
should result in discipline. For example, "lawyers must maintain
clients' confidences."" Point V rules may leave lawyers with a
limited range of discretion.' However, for enforcement of conduct-specific rules to be workable, the rules must be narrow and
relatively unambiguous.'
Between the poles lie two related approaches. At Point II, a
code defines the relevant criteria lawyers should consider but
omits any (or provides only limited) prescriptions for appropriate
results in any given set of circumstances. The current rules governing delay tactics and courtesy to other lawyers typify this approach:
lawyers are told delay and discourtesy are wrong, but also that
lawyers must take client interests into account in avoiding them."0
In actual cases, the lawyer's exercise of informed discretion will
determine the outcome.
Point M reflects a more specific, but still not outcome-deter-

65 Se; e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 1.1; CPR, DR 6-101(A).
66 Se4 eg., MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7 cant.
67 Se&4e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 1.6; CPR, DR 4-101(B).
68 For example, strict confidentiality rules that fordid disclosure of client information
may contain limited exceptions. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 1.6(b)(1) (lawyers may disclose to .prevent imminent death or substantial bodily harm). Similarly, MODEL RULES,
Rule 3.7 forbids lawyers to act simultaneously as a lawyer and witness in a case, but contains limited exceptions to the general, strict rule.
69 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 41, at 271 (describing how enhancing detail in a
rule may make enforcement more difficult). Thus, for example, MODEL RULES, Rule
1.8(a) allows lawyers some discretion to enter into "fair and reasonable" business transactions with clients, but adds a series of specific provisions that clearly define how the
lawyer must act.
70 Compare, e.g., MODEL RULES, Rules 3.2 and 4.4 with MODEL RULES, Rule 1.3 cmt.
Compare CPR, DR 7-101(A)(1) and DR 7-102(A)(1) with CPR, DR 7-101(A)(1).
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minative, approach. The code not only suggests criteria for consideration, but also sets priorities among the relevant factors. Thus,
for example, lawyers are required to, keep clients informed about
matters and to assist clients in making informed decisions about
the representation.7 1 However, the level of information imparted
to clients is left largely for the individual lawyer to decide.72 In
other words, Point III rules suggest results for most cases, but recognize that the need for leeway in others forecloses a strict, enforceable standard. In nonextreme cases,73 the only mechanism
for implementing a hortatory provision of this type is self-regulation on the part of lawyers and their peers.74
As one would expect in codes that have varying purposes, the
prevailing rules reflect a mix of these approaches.75 Moreover,
the demarcation between points on the spectrum is not always
obvious, particularly with respect to the intermediate points on the
spectrum. For example, a rule requiring lawyers to "provide competent representation " ' can be perceived to fall at Point IV; although the standard may be difficult to apply, it tells the lawyer
specifically what he or she must do. Analyzed more realistically,
however, the provision probably fits closer to Point I. It sets a
general norm, but suggests no particular behavior for any particular case. Only if other provisions in the code supplement the rule
with more concrete directions (e.g., the competent lawyer main-

71

MODEL RULES, Rule 1.4; CPR, EC 7-8.

72

The MODEL RULES explicitly note that the adequacy of communication varies from

context to context, that lawyers have the authority to make some decisions (i.e., as to
"means" or "tactics"), and that sometimes lawyers are justified in withholding information
from clients. See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.4 cmt. The CPR leaves the issue to lawyers' imaginations.

73

The fact that some cases of obvious misconduct exist under the rule-for exam-

ple, a lawyer's failure to tell the client of a settlement offer (see MODEL RULES, Rule 1.4

cmL)-does not change the rule's basic charge that appropriate conduct may vary from
context to context. MODEL RULES, Rule 1.4 cmL
74

It is important to note the difference between designating a decision as "discre-

tionary" and leaving enforcement of a standard to "self-regulation." Ordinarily, emphasizing discretion implies that two or more responses to a situation are equally good. Relying on self-regulation may not contain the same implication. There may be correct or
incorrect responses to a particular situation, given the priorities set in the rules. Drafters
nevertheless may rely on a Point III provision because of their inability to predict the
situation or to write a useful rule that is sufficiently broad to encompass that and other

situations.
75 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 957 (arguing that "the effectiveness of promulgated
standards of behavior depends on a combination of coercion (legally imposed sanctions),
informal sanctions (peer pressure), and voluntary compliance").
76 See, e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 1.1.
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tains confidences and zealously makes all nonfrivolous arguments)
does the rule even rise to the Point II or Point III
levels that
7"
self-restraint.
and
thought
exercise
to
lawyers
require
Similarly, one could- characterize a particularized rule like
Model Rule 1.8(c) in a variety of ways. On the surface, it is highly
specific; it forbids a lawyer to prepare an instrument giving the
lawyer a substantial gift. Arguably, however, the term "substantial"
is so subject to interpretation that it prevents the provision from
being understood universally or enforced through discipline. If so,
the provision must be seen as more of a Point III rule that suggests an outcome, but leaves room for discretion.
The interrelationship among code provisions may exacerbate
the task of determining where on the continuum a particular
provision fits. Model Rule 7.1, forbidding "misleading" advertising,
seems to fit at Points I or II, but when combined with the more
specific directives in Model Rules 7.2-7.5 provides strict controls on
lawyer behavior. Model Rule 4.1's prohibition on making false
statements to third parties is highly specific (i.e., like a Point V
rule), but the rule's comments permitting puffing introduce
enough discretion that the rule seems, at most, to fit at Point
111.78
The point of these examples is not to undermine the thrust
of this Article. Just because specificity analysis involves some uncertainty in application does not render it useless. On the contrary,
considering where on the spectrum proposed provisions fit, how
they interrelate with other provisions, and how a package of regulation at that level of specificity effectuates the codes' goals helps
identify meaningful rules. Similarly, as illustrated in Parts III and

77 Arguably, all of the rules contained in the professional codes purport to require
compliance and permit discipline for lawyers who deviate from the rules' commands.
Even a generalized rule, like, "prosecutors must do justice," could in theory result in
discipline whenever a prosecutor fails t6 "do justice." The absence of discipline results
from the use of a vague term that makes enforcement difficult.
This view of the codes is either simplistic or assumes that drafters and lawyers are
incapable of making a realistic assessment of the enforceability and likely enforcement of
rules. In practice, prosecutors know that rules calling for just" conduct will result in
discipline only in extreme cases, if at all. Similarly, drafters cannot delude themselves
into believing that such a mandate poses a real threat or even provides criteria that
prosecutors can use in assessing their own conduct. If the drafters nevertheless employ a
"justice rule," they probably do so intentionally, rather than as an accidental by-product
of poorly-chosen language.
78 The behavioral control purpose of MODEL RULES, Rule 4.1 is further undermined
by other code provisions urging lawyer zeal. As a result, few lawyers iake the absolute
tone of MODEL RULES, Rule 4.1 seriously.
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IV of this Article, specificity analysis can further the backwardlooking process of evaluating existing provisions or proposed reform. The analysis will disclose the direction, or tendency, that
provisions have in producing various results. My point here is
simply that, in applying specificity analysis, one can neither expect
easy answers nor ignore the combining effect of various rules.79
It is because of the latter considerations that I choose regulation of prosecutorial ethics as the illustration for this Article's
model. The "package" of prosecutorial ethics regulation is easily
identifiable and limited in scope." With the exception of a few
rules regarding pretrial decisionmaking, all past and present codes
regulate prosecutorial conduct at the most general possible level:
prosecutors must only "do justice."" Although one might argue
that the existence of the pretrial rules suggest a thought process
to guide prosecutors throughout their practice,"2 the reality is
that most of the unique ethical dilemmas prosecutors face are governed solely by the "justice" requirement. That generalized regulation clearly fits at Point I; it neither sets out criteria for how pros-

79 It is easy to illustrate that judging rules in isolation can mislead. A provision
alone may have little effect-say, on the degree to which lawyers introspect-but, in combination with other parts of the code can help achieve a package of effective regulation.
Thus, for example, a narrow conflict of interest rule alone may not persuade lawyers to
think about factors that impair their independent judgment. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule
1.8 (governing conflicts in family transactions). However, in conjunction with the extensive regulation of MODEL RULES, Rules 1.7-1.11, the rule helps raise lawyer consciousness.
Conversely, a provision designed to promote one purpose can be undermined by
other rules. For example, rules that forbid lawyers to disclose information under any
circumstances may limit the introspective effect of rules that forbid lawyers to participate
in misconduct or require lawyers to remedy frauds. Compare MODEL RULES, Rule 1.6 (confidentiality) with MODEL RULES, Rule 8.4 (forbidding lawyers to engage in dishonesty).
80 Perhaps the next best examples of sets of self-sufficient code sections are those
relating to confidentiality and conflicts of interest. Individual provisions that cover unique
situations also can be analyzed without reference to other sections of the codes. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES, Rule 1.17 (governing sales of law practices); MODEL RULES, Rule 7.5 (governing use of firm names and letterheads).
81 CPR, EC 7-13 (providing that government lawyers must "seek justice"); MODEL
RULES, Rule 3.8 cmt. (stating that government lawyers are "minister[s] of justice").
82 See, e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(a)-(d) (detailing limited obligations of prosecutors); CPR, DR 7-103(A)-(B) (describing prosecutorial obligations in charging defendants
and making evidentiary disclosures). The American Bar Association has adopted, and
twice amended, supplemental "standards" governing prosecutorial conduct. AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (3d ed.
1992) (amending AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Ch. 3
(2d ed. 1980) (The Prosecution Function), reported in 50 Crim. L Rep. 2061 (March 4,
1991)). However, the ABA has never made these standards part of its model codes, nor
has any state adopted them. Although a few prosecutors may look to the standards for
occasional guidance, the standards remain largely unknown and unused.
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ecutors, qua prosecutors, should act nor prioritizes among relevant
considerations."3 It just proposes a prosecutorial orientation within an otherwise adversarial system of resolving disputes.
The following section analyzes how the "justice" standard
correlates with the purposes of professional regulation. It attempts
to identify the benefits and costs of relying on a highly generalized rule and considers when more specific guideposts are necessary to effectuate the regulatory goals. Evaluating the effectiveness
of the justice standard in these terms provides insights both for
drafting regulatory responses to questionable prosecutorial tactics
and for drafting professional codes more generally.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPEcIFIcITY
AND REGULATORY GOALS

Categorized loosely, one can identify five possible goals of
professional, regulation. Like ordinary legislation, codes may seek
to prevent or produce particular lawyer conduct that the drafters
perceive to be appropriate, moral, or necessary for the legal system to operate. Codes may seek to provide guidance for lawyers in
deciding how to act. Codes also may serve an administrative function, either in coordinating the activities of lawyers or facilitating
the work of the profession as a whole. On occasion, codes have
been used to influence substantive law doctrines. Finally, interrelated with all of these goals, the phrasing of codes may serve pragmatic or political considerations that the drafters have in mind
when formulating particular provisions. Each of these diverse goals
and functions of professional regulation will be discussed in turn.
A.

The Relationship Between Regulatory Specificity and
the "Legislative"Purposes of Ethics Codes

To the extent that one views code provisions as legislation,
one would expect them to prescribe or forbid particular conduct,
encourage uniform behavior, and set the stage for punishment of
persons who depart from the norm. Alternatively, they would provide standards for a neutral body- (e.g., a court, jury, or administra-

83 Prosecutors are subject to most of the professional requirements applicable to
other lawyers. See infta note 134. The justice mandate recognizes that prosecutors face
additional issues and may have unique responsiblities. The codes, however, fail to identify
those issues or define the obligations explicitly. For an interpretation of the meaning of
the justice provision itself, see generally Zacharias, supra note 37.
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tor) to refine over time.84 Laws and administrative regulation may
incorporate elements that have varying degrees of certainty.85 But,
on the whole, they share a realistic expectation that they will affect the behavior of the target group in a particular, foreseeable
direction.
The justice standard for prosecutorial ethics does not serve
these goals. By definition, Point I rules are not effective in educating targets regarding what acts are socially desirable.8 6 Different
prosecutors, for example, can justify diametrically opposite conduct
as serving justice-dismissal of a charge or pursuing conviction,
avoiding evidence of questionable admissibility or using the evidence without revealing its questionable aspects. As Figure B illustrates, professional rule's effectiveness as a behavioral control is
largely proportional to its conduct specificity because, at each
increasing level of specificity, the rule's terms tell the targets more
about what is permissible and call for increasing uniformity of
87
conduct.
84 See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
85 Legal elements such as "intent" and "reasonableness," for example, contain significant flexibility. In relying on such standards, courts and lawmakers ordinarily expect
either that the meaning of the standards are sufficiently clear that people can gauge
what a jury would require, or that the standards will become more certain as they are
interpreted over time.
86 Arguably, Point I rules that incorporate normative factors, (e.g., those mandating
just" or "reasonable" behavior), do identify socially desirable acts, but are simply difficult
to apply. Here is where the distinct nature of professional codes comes into play. Typically, when lawmakers expect targets of normative laws to understand what constitutes reasonable behavior, they provide an enforcement system that will punish aberrational behavior and develop standards for what is reasonable over time. When the professional code
drafters rely on general normative terms (e.g., "justice"), the meaning often is unclear
except in marginal cases and the terms perpetually will remain subject to individual interpretation. In such circumstances, it is fair to conclude that the rule does not, in fact, inform or guide behavior to the extent of identifying acts the codes expect the target to
engage in.
87 Although the points on the continuum increasingly insist on behavior, the correlation between that insistence and achieving uniform conduct is not necessarily direct, for
reasons of psychology. Consider the effect of the following four variations of a withdrawal
rule, ranging from Point I to Point IV in form:
(1) When X occurs, a lawyer must act reasonably;
(2) When X occurs, a lawyer must consider whether to withdraw based on a balance of
the criteria [that are specified below];
(3) When X occurs, a lawyer must withdraw unless the client will suffer irreparable
harm;
(4) When X occurs, a lawyer must withdraw.
Version (4) clearly identifies the expected conduct while version (1) does not. In
some cases, however, a lawyer governed by version (1) may be more likely to withdraw
than under versions (2) or (3), either because the lawyer wants to bend over backwards
to "do the right thing" or because, not understanding what he should do, the lawyer
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Absent external forces that enhance their effect, Point I rules
themselves cannot be expected to produce specific socially desirable acts.
Nevertheless, in combination with factors outside the codes, a
general rule can produce desired uniform conduct." When substantive law and administrative regulation of lawyers mandate particular acts, the codes often do not need to duplicate their specific
mandates. Under other circumstances, however, parallel professional standards may reinforce extra-code standards by providing additional deterrence.89 For a code provision to have measurable, rechooses to avoid problems when in a grey area. In general, however, versions (2) and
(3) give the lawyer more instruction, and therefore function better (though not proportionally better) as a behavioral control.
88 Cf. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLuAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT §§ 101-03, at Iviii-lxiv (2d
ed. 1990) (noting that lawyers are subject not only to professional codes, but also "a
whole panoply of legally binding rules that prescribe or proscribe various kinds of professional conduct" and discussing interrelationship among the various norms).
89 Consider, for example, provisions that forbid lawyers to engage in "conduct unbecoming a lawyer" or to commit a criminal act that "reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness." See, e.g. MODEL RULES, Rule 8.4. Many jurisdictions
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inforcing impact, it must appear to be realistic;" it will have no
coercive influence when its targets consider the provision unenforceable or unlikely to be enforced. 9
Although the correlation between a professional rule's specificity and its enforceability is not always clear, some loose generalizations are possible. The ability to establish code violations and
uphold convictions depends on the presence of a rule with sufficient scope to cover the offending conduct, but which defines the
elements of the offense in a way susceptible of proof.9 2 The more

use these generalized rules in disciplinary proceedings to sanction lawyers who have committed crimes unrelated to their legal practices. Clearly, the threat of professional sanction adds little deterrence to criminal laws forbidding murder. However, a lawyer who
knows that he may be suspended or disbarred for lesser crimes, such as drunk driving or
purchasing prostitution, may be affected by the presence of the ethics rule. The penal
law provides the definition for the generalized professional regulation, while the regulation itself provides supplementary sanctions. See MODEL RULES, Rule 8.1 (setting stage for
discipline or disbarment for "fraud" or "misrepresentation" presumably already sanctioned
by civil liability rules); Gaetke, supra note 27, at 53-54 (discussing code requirements that
"are merely coextensive with obligations resulting from law applicable to laymen"); Gillers,
supra note 31, at 248 ("The fact that an ethical duty is also a legal one does not make
it redundant. Placing an obligation in both categories may enhance compliance by providing a second, perhaps more influential sanction."); Kramer, supra note 33, at 808 (proposing use of professional sanctions to "maximize the deterrent effect of Rule 11 sanctions").
90 See Abel, supra note 21, at 647-49 (questioning effectiveness of current professional
rules because of lack of enforcement and lawyers' perception that the rules will not be
enforced).
91 Targets may still engage in appropriate behavior on personal or moral grounds,
or because peer pressure prompts that response. See Gordon, supra note 22, at 34 (discussing influence of peer pressure); Moore, supra note 39, at 14 (same). But the behavior will not result because of the rule.
A prime example of the interplay between code prohibitions and other constraints
concerns recent attempts to amend the codes to forbid lawyers to engage in sexual conduct with clients. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule -120 (1992); ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.17 (Proposed Official Draft) (on
file with author); OREGON RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr DR 5-110 (Proposed Official
Draft) (on file with author). Most conduct forbidden under these rules not only represents bad judgment by the offending lawyers, but also subjects the lawyers to suit for
malpractice and breach of their fiduciary duties. See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 10.11.2 (2d ed. forthcoming 1993) (discussing remedies for improper sexual relations between lawyers and clients). In most instances, the conduct probably
also violates conflict of interest rules, because the relationship is likely to impair the
lawyers' independent judgment. See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7. Yet because improper sexual
conduct persists, proponents of strengthened rules argue that specifying the forbidden
conduct-either by a separate rule or by incorporating the comments to the existing
conflict rules-will inform lawyer judgment and pose an additional sanction that will help
limit the conduct. See WOLFRAM, supra (discussing the proposals).
92 Linguistic aspects of rules that are not the subject of this Article also affect the
enforceability of rules. The use of vague or unclear terms, for example, makes it difficult
for disciplining authorities to determine what is forbidden and makes decisionmakers
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objective the elements and the easier it is for enforcers to find
evidence (e.g., witnesses), the more likely it is that enforcers will
seek and be able to maintain a conviction., The enforceability of
professional regulations, therefore, should vary directly-though
perhaps not proportionally-with the specificity of, the regulations.
The correlation may decline when a rule's specific elements are
not easily susceptible of proof,94 but the general correlation holds
true.

95

hesitate to impose sanctions. Lawyers, in particular, typically hold disciplinary bodies to
full due process. See, e.g., Zauderer v. 'Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 654-55
(1985) (discussing and rejecting due process challenge to advertising rules); Supreme
Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 277 n.3 (1985) (noting lower court's
failure to address lawyer's due process challenge to residency requirement); Hirschkop v.
Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 370-71 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (striking down gag rule on
due process, vagueness grounds); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242,
255-56 (7th Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). See also Abel, supra note
21, at 642 ("The very lawyers who drafted the Rules would be the first to attack them as
unconsitutionally vague if they were defending a client accused of violating them."); Martha E. Johnston, Comment, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, 57 N.C. L. REV. 671, 693
(1979) (arguing that many aspects of the CPR are constitutionally void for vagueness).
93 By making the elements of misconduct unambiguous, drafters run the risk of defining the misconduct so narrowly that it becomes inapplicable to most situations sought
to be covered or impossible to prove. For example, adding a state of mind element (e.g.,
intent) or a reasonableness element to the confidentiality rules might eliminate those
situations in which lawyers gossip irresponsibly about their clients or use confidential
information, without authority, for the clients' benefit. If the amended rule is deemed to
cover those situations, enforcers must deal with the fact that extrinsic proof of intent and
reasonableness generally are not available.
94 In other words, a conduct-specific rule (e.g., "lawyers may not commingle clients'
funds") becomes less enforceable if an even more specific, but hard to prove element is
introduced (e.g., "lawyers may not intentionally commingle clients' funds"). Cf Steven Alan
Reiss, ProsecutorialIntent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 142935 (1987) (discussing "systemic costs of intent-based analysis" of prosecutorial conduct).
95 The relationship between specificity and enforceability might thus be graphed as
follows:
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Because resource considerations often control enforcement
policies, one cannot predict whether even highly specific rules are
likely to be enforced.96 For purposes of our analysis, however, let
us assume the existence of an ethics provision that is, at least
sometimes, successfully prosecuted. To what extent will that provision help produce uniform desirable behavior?
The answer again turns upon the existence and nature of
extra-code constraints. Presumably, enforced specific rules are
more likely to produce uniform conduct than enforced general
rules because they inform the targeted lawyers what to do." But
when extra-code constraints already provide information regarding
the appropriate behavior, the difference between generalized and

that specify some criteria and those that specify none. At least to the extent a lawyer
ignores a key factor in determining a course of conduct (e.g., the client's interest in
winning), arguably he exposes himself to discipline. The real bite to professional regulation, however, only begins at Point III regulation that suggests answers for routine cases.
Even Point III regulation is often difficult to enforce. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES, Rule 1.5
(detailing criteria for lawyers fees that "should be reasonable"); CPR, DR 2-106 (same);
MODEL RULES, Rule 1.4 (requiring lawyers to inform clients and enable them to make
"informed decisions").
96 Initially, one might assume that, for financial reasons, the likelihood of enforcement varies with a rule's specificity. The cost of enforcement depends in part on
the ease with which a violation can be proven. As we have seen, there is a positive relationship between specificity and proof.
At some level, however, increasing specificity can make successful prosecution more
difficult. Adding an intent or lack of reasonableness element, for example, requires enforcers to produce a history of misconduct or circumstantial evidence from which an
arbiter can infer the requisite state of mind.
Conduct-specific rules may ease the cost of detecting violations by laying the
groundwork for self-identifying violations. For example, requiring lawyers to place client
funds in reported, auditable escrow accounts and authorizing random audits reduces
uncertainty in assigning investigative resources. Potential witnesses who know of violations
also tend to be more willing to come forward when a rule's requirements leave no doubt
about whether misconduct has occurred.
Arguably, the positive correlation between specificity and ease in identifying witnesses exists only for rules of increasing specificity from Points II through IV. A highly generalized Point I provision that neither sets standards nor identifies criteria for behavior
may invite victims and witnesses to complain. In the criminal context, one would expect
many persons convicted of a crime to claim that a prosecutor has failed to "do justice."
A somewhat more specific Point II rule that suggests considerations but no outcome may,
perhaps unintentionally, seem to victims to afford the prosecutor more discretion.
97 But see supra note 87.
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specific rules in influencing conduct diminishes." Moreover, if
informative extra-code constraints are already enforced in a way
that provides substantial deterrence, a parallel ethics rule will have
marginal impact on behavior however it is phrased. Indeed, a
highly specific provision that merely restates, or duplicates, extracode standards may influence behavior less than a general rule
that lawyers might interpret as applying more broadly.
As a result, when viable extra-code constraints already define
appropriate behavior, the value of ethics regulation usually must
be found in the nonlegislative functions of the codes. An ethics
provision will have significant effect in mandating desirable behavior only if it educates targets regarding the existence of the extracode constraints or itself supplements inadequate extra-code constIaints.lt

98 Figure 2 illustrates the shifting relationship between specificity and achieving uniform conduct.
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When extra-code constraints already define appropriate conduct, the code's reinforcing effect lies in the additional deterrence provided by the threat of discipline, rather
than in the additional guidance the code provides lawyers. The precision of the rules
thus becomes less important.
99 A rule can educate lawyers concerning constraints about which lawyers otherwise
would give no thought. Agency law may, for example, already require attorney-client confidentiality in most situations, but the professional confidentiality rules define the obligation. Similarly, a rule forbidding sexual relations with clients may restate existing fiduciary
obligations,. but arguably raises the consciousness of lawyers who might be unaware of
their fiduciary duty.
100 Arguably, stating even an unenforced professional norm informs lawyers and may
reduce lawyers' resistance to the extra-code constraints. See Nelson, supra note 8, at 91723 (describing correlation between code provisions and other constraints); Wilkins, supra
note 25, at 848 (noting complementary effect of different constraints on lawyer miscon-
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What does all of this say for the Point I prosecutorial ethics
standard? Because such a general rule is itself unenforceable and

provides little information, one would expect to find that it relies
upon criminal and civil liability rules and appellate procedures
that already sanction prosecutorial misconduct. In practice, however, the "do justice" rule defers to substantive law in a context in
which few realistic legal constraints exist; constitutional constraints
have proven ineffective and civil liability and administrative
schemes pose little deterrence to prosecutorial misconduct.''

duct). Cf. Koniak, supra note 10, at 1410-16' (acknowledging that "the bar and state
[largely] agree on the precepts that are relevant to the law governing lawyers," but noting that areas of conflict exist). How effective a provision can be in this regard may
depend on the degree to which the targeted lawyers perceive the normative standard as
stemming from a moral consensus, rather than interest group lobbying. See Richard L
Thornburgh, "Memorandum from Attorney General to All Justice -Department Litigators"
1 (June 8, 1989) [hereinafter DOJ Memo] (instructing federal prosecutors to interpret
narrowly local ethics rules that prohibit communications by law enforcement personnel
with suspects, and characterizing broader interpretation of rules as fiction created by
defense bar) (on file with author). See also Kevin R. Reitz, Clients, Lawyers and the Fifth
Amendment: The Need for a Projected Privilege, 41 DUKE LJ. 572, 648 n.334 (1991) (recounting that anti-subpoena rules "have drawn criticism on the ground that they are not properly cast as rules of professional conduct for lawyers, but are attempts by the defense bar
to modify the rules of procedure for criminal investigations and the substantive law of
privilege"); John Flynn Rooney, Thornburgh Says ABA Rules Hurt Prosecutors' Efforts, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 6, 1990, at 1 (chronicling Justice Department's attacks on ABA and
criminal defense bar for attempting to use ethics rules to stymie criminal investigations);
Tom Watson, Prosecutors See ABA as 'Arm of Defense Bar, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 17, 1990, at 6
[hereinafter Watson I] (indicating that prosecutors view the tightening of ABA guidelines
as symptomatic of the Bar's offensive attitude toward prosecutors); Tom Watson, AG Decrees Prosecutors May Bypass Counsel LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 25, 1989, at 1, 29 [hereinafter
Watson II] (same). Compare the cases cited in note 203 infra, in which prosecutors have
challenged the legality of professional rules based on MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f).
101 Although scholars have long questioned the propriety of much prosecutorial conduct, pressures inducing appropriate behavior are virtually nonexistent. Due process and
other constitutional requirements set standards for some prosecutorial conduct in disclosing evidence, conducting trials, presenting grand jury evidence, and assisting defendants.
See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (discussing prosecutors' limited
obligation to preserve evidence); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring
disclosure of exculpatory evidence); McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414, 419 (2d Cir.
1979) (forbidding appeals to racism); United States v. Basuto, 497 F.2d. 781, 785-86 (9th
Cir. 1974) (sanctioning use of perjured grand jury testimony). But courts have limited
constitutional remedies in specific reliance on the existence of alternative professional
regulation of prosecutorial conduct. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29
(1976) (holding state prosecutors immune from civil liability for, malicious prosecution, in
part, because of perceived amenability of prosecutors to professional discipline); United
States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 613 (1976) (Burger, CJ., concurring) ("a bar association
conscious of its public obligations would sua sponte call to account a [prosecuting] attorney guilty of the misconduct shown here"); United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834,
839 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that the constitution prescribes a baseline of minimally appropriate conduct, while ethics codes safeguard the integrity of the profession and preserve
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This suggests either that the behavioral control purposes of ethics
regulation do not drive the standards for prosecutorial conduct or
that code drafters have written a misguided rule.' 2 Justification
for an ethics standard as general as "do justice" must be found, if
at all, in some separate regulatory goal.
B.

The Relationship Between Regulatory Specificity and Defining
Guidance-Providing"Roles"

At an elemental level, providing lawyers with a clear sense of
"role" is designed to guide lawyers in selecting their own conduct.'0 3 This "guidance" aspect of codes is different from what I

public confidence in our system of justice). Cf also United States v. Kelly, 543 F. Supp.
1303, 1314 (D.Mass. 1982) (declining to dismiss indictment for prosecutorial misconduct,
but referring matter to State Board of Overseers to assess need for disciplinary proceedings). See generally Zacharias, supra note 37, at 65-102 (discussing prosecutors' obligations
under the constitution and the codes).
Similarly, the combination of special defenses and practical obstacles to winning civil
suits against prosecutors virtually immunize prosecutors from personal liability. Prosecutors
are insulated not only by immunity doctrines, but also by such factors as (1) the hesitation of defense lawyers to bring suit against them for fear of retaliation, (2) the tendency of jurors to side with prosecutors and disbelieve criminal defendants who might sue
them, and (3) the limited recovery that aggrieved criminal defendants are likely to
achieve. See, e.g., Bums v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1937-45 (1991) (state prosecutors absolutely immune from civil liability for their participation in pretrial proceedings); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976) (prosecutors absolutely immune from civil liability
for malicious prosecution); Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(prosecutors absolutely immune against charges of retaliatory prosecution); Martinez v.
Winner, 778 F.2d 553, 555 (10th Cir. 1985) (prosecutor absolutely immune from civil
liability for misrepresentation); Briggs v. Goodwin, 712 F.2d 1444, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(prosecutor absolutely immune from civil liability for lying to grand jury), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1040 (1984). Even when potentially liable, prosecutors routinely are indemnified by
their employing jurisdictions. See, e.g., 4 U.S. Attorney's Manual § 5.212(F) (1988)
(discussing circumstances in which U.S. Justice Department officials are entitled to indemnification); Romanski v. Barra, 574 N.E.2d 1206, 1207 (Ill. App. Ct. 199.1) (rejecting challenge to indemnification and provision of legal seivices to state's attorney); Diaz v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 433 So. 2d 699, 701 (La. 1983) (requiring state to indemnify employees of district attorney's office); Rosen & Bardunias v. County of Westchester, 552
N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (discussing indemnification of prosecutors for all
but punitive damages), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1086 (1991).
102 One cannot justify the justice standard on the basis that 'adopting it "cannot
hurt." There clearly are costs to employing rules that purport to affect conduct but that
'are not, and cannot be, enforced. At a minimum, targets, and others, come to disrespect
the codes and observers of the regulatory scheme perceive the need to replace it.
103 This Article does not analyze whether lawyers, in practice, ever respond to
"guidance" that calls for behavior inconsistent with their self interest. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40. However, one observation bears making. Even accepting the assumption that codes affect some lawyers' attitudes, the extent of the effect probably depends upon the subculture within which the lawyers operate.
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have previously labelled the "legislative" function in several respects. First, in guiding lawyers rather than directing (or enabling
future regulators to direct) particular acts, the codes acknowledge
that there may be more than one appropriate response to the
situations in question." 4 Second, in focusing upon role, the
codes do not address a single fact pattern or set of fact patterns,
but rather hope to address a perhaps unpredictable variety of
dilemmas lawyers may face." 5 Third, to the extent the codes do
address particular dilemmas, they attempt to provide a response
that makes the lawyer act for ethical or systemic reasons rather
than because of the coercive force of potential discipline. 116 By

Big city, large firm lawyers accustomed to "hardball litigation" and sophisticated, demanding clients may be less susceptible to professional "guidance" than small town practitioners. Alternatively, out of concern for maintaining "reputation" for purposes of hiring
and attracting clients, these lawyers may be more prone to peer scrutiny and behavioral
conventions than other subgroups.
In settings more personal than big city practice, a subgroup of lawyers who see
each other on a regular basis may adopt their own set of norms. Group reputations may
develop, resulting in attitudes like "you can't trust prosecutors" or "defense attorneys
never have facts to justify their claims." Communities of lawyers may evolve. For example,
criminal defense lawyers, as a community, may develop a unique ethos that influences
their willingness to follow generally prescribed rules.
The existence of these subgroups interpose a filter between the professional codes
and individual lawyers that necessarily affects how the codes will affect behavior. Nevertheless, because code drafters have had the role-setting function in mind in designing
many of the professional rules, it is appropriate to attempt to evaluate generally how the
drafting of provisions bears on the role-setting function.
104 See, e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 1.6(b) (permissive exceptions to confidentiality rules);
MODEL RULES, Rule 1.4(a) (requiring lawyer to keep client "reasonably informed"); CPR,
DR 4-101 (C) (permissive exceptions to confidentiality rules); CPR, DR 5-101 (A) (requiring
lawyer to refuse employment when his professional judgment "reasonably may be" affected). As we have already seen, a societal consensus in favor of particular conduct-or at
least a clear majority---is a sine qua non for legislative drafting.
105 The paradigms of this attitude are the requirements that lawyers act competently,
MODEL RULES, Rule 1.3, and that prosecutors "seek justice." CPR, EC 7-13. Cf Johnston,
supra note 92, at 686 ("when prohibited conduct is narrowly defined, there is a greater
likelihood that some types of conduct generally thought to be undesirable . . . will not
be covered by the proscription").
106 A developing literature focusing on the interplay of linguistics and philosophy
takes as one premise the notion that "linguistic structures" or "signs" in codes of conduct
influence behavior. See, e.g., ROBERTA KEVELSON, THE LAW AS A SYSTEM OF SIGNS 114-17
(1988) and authorities cited therein; MAX H. FISCH ET AL., THE NEW TOOLS OF PEIRCE,
SCHOLARSHIP (1979). Scholars in the field suggest that only rules that signal ideals while
allowing "play-that give actors a choice of conduct that includes straying from the community norm-create the potential for truly moral (or role appropriate) behavior. See
KEvELSON, supra, at 119 (discussing work of Charles Sanders Peirce and concluding that
he should be viewed "as the founder of a new mode of philosophical inquiry which
identifies freedom as the highest value and which looks to law to release such value").
Cf 6 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS
200, at 136-37 (3d ed. 1965) (dis-
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forcing lawyers to think in ethical and systemic terms, the codes
hope to promote an introspective process that carries over to
situations the drafters do not, and perhaps cannot, foresee. t7
The justice standard for prosecutorial ethics highlights the
relationship between specificity and role-setting. Perhaps the primary benefit of the generalized standard is that it addresses, in
short form, a large variety of situations prosecutors face. Inevitably,
the more general a rule, the broader its application. Here, prosecutors are required to achieve justice in all their official acts.
In this respect, Point I rules comport with the philosophy
underlying the role-definition purpose of the professional codes.
Defining roles helps lawyers understand how they should act
throughout their practices. That, in theory, helps lawyers extrapolate; that is, exercise whatever discretion they are accorded in a
manner consistent with the system's expectations. Underscoring
the need for prosecutorial justice, for example, tells prosecutors
that their role includes more than seeking conviction at all
cost. t08

cussing relationship between freedom to choose and moral actions). Parallel reasoning
underlies the CPR's heavy reliance on "ethical considerations" to supplement the disciplinary rules. To the extent other ethics rules create "play", they arguably can have a
similar effect in "developing the will to act virtuously" that may translate into improved
overall behavior. KEVELSON, supra, at 122.
107 In economic terms, provoking introspection may be a wasteful endeavor. Lawyers
who stop to question their own conduct practice inefficiently in seeking the clients' goals.
Moreover, encouraging lawyers to raise ethics issues and, in some cases, ask clients to
forego permitted tactics or ends creates a measure of unpredictability in the system. If
clients cannot know how lawyers will react to particular situations, they may have difficulty making informed choices on retaining lawyers and using their services.
Nevertheless, the codes clearly endorse a measure of soul searching and discretion
by lawyers. See MODEL RULEs, Preamble cmL ("a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers"); CPR, Preamble ("Each lawyer must
find within his own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which
his actions should rise above minimum standards"). Moral introspection is seen as part
and parcel of the concept of "professional" lawyering. See John J. Flynn, Professional Ethics
and the Lawyer's Duty to Self, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 429, 436 (discussing introspection as
essential aspect of ethical lawyering); Alan H. Goldman, Confidentiality, Rules, and Codes of
Ethics, CRIM. JUsT. ETHICS, Summer-Fall 1984, at 13 (arguing that "diversity among the
moral judgments of lawyers in certain controversial areas is preferable to an enforced
consistency"); Gordon, supra note 22, at 48-51 (discussing claim that lawyer independence
has declined over time); Loder, supra note 7, at 319-37 (emphasizing importance of introspection); Simon, supra note 14, at 1108-09 (describing lawyers' obligation to exercise
moral discretion); Wasserstrom, supra note 24, at 5 (noting importance of ethical thought
by lawyers).
108 See Zacharias, supra note 37, at 49 (discussing possible meanings of the codes'
"justice" provisions).
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At the same time, the justice standard illustrates the hazards
of employing a short-form approach to role definition. In adopting
the broadly applicable concept of doing justice, drafters define the
prosecutor's role simplistically. The general definition gives prosecutors only one factor, or non-factor, to consider: conviction is not
all that counts. A definition further down the specificity continuum-say, at Points II or III-could still be role-oriented, but would
identify positive factors that might provide more guidance and
facilitate the prosecutor's exercise of discretion."° Ironically, the
Point I approach to prosecutorial ethics contributes to the absence
of any recognized norms.
At least one valuable conclusion follows. Unless highly general
rules are combined with constraints or criteria found elsewhere (in
or out of the codes), the correlation between regulatory generality
and broad behavioral guidance disappears."' 0
Moreover, although a Point I provision covers many situations,
it does not necessarily apply more broadly than a Point II provi109

Figure 3 correlates the proportional relationship between specificity and guidance:
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110 See Aronson, supra note 55, at 286 ("The view of professional responsibility as
dependent upon the moral responsibility of individual lawyers has resulted in a set of
rules which give attorneys little guidance as to what the profession expects of them.").
Geoffrey Hazard correctly notes that, because of the correlation between specificity and
interpretable guidance, the legislative and role-providing aspects are interconnected. Hazard views the historical trend toward specificity favorably, concluding that practicing lawyers are "entitled to legal rules that are not confounded by appeals to moral regeneration." Hazard, Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at 574.
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sion. Each category relies on flexible factors that can have some
(though varying) meaning in a large number of cases. A Point II
approach also can provide significantly more information. However, as one moves further along the specificity continuum towards
Points III and IV, a negative correlation between specificity and
coverage becomes apparent because the rules delimit their own
application (Figure C). In identifying relevant considerations and
their importance, specific rules by definition narrow the number
of cases in which the rules are useful."'
FIGURE C
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The codes' reliance on a prosecutorial 'justice" standard,
despite its obvious weaknesses in providing guidance and meaningful coverage, suggests that guidance and coverage may be secondary aspects of role-setting. Arguably, if the codes are successful in
promoting introspection, lawyers will develop reasonable standards
of conduct on their own and apply them throughout their
practices., One benefit of writing rules generally is that leaving
implementation to lawyers may encourage lawyers to think about
the appropriateness of their conduct-be it in "ethical" or simply
"role-appropriate" terms. Moreover, a general rule may produce
more self-restraint on the part of some lawyers than quantified

111

See Loder, supra note 7, at 313 (noting that "loss of flexibility accompanies more

numerous and specific rules").
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prohibitions, because those lawyers may wish to avoid getting even
close to the line. 12 Conversely, as I, and others, have pointed
out, strict rules tend to prevent lawyers from engaging in serious
introspection concerning their personal responsibility to help
achieve good results."'
Interestingly, however, there is an ambiguity in the correlation
between specificity and the degree to which lawyers will think
about the ethics of their conduct. At one level, the correlation
seems clear. A highly specific professional requirement (e.g., at
Point IV of the spectrum) risks stultifying lawyers' independent
evaluation of appropriate responses, because violating the rule is
likely to result in discipline." 4 Rules further down the spectrum,
near Points III and II, expressly call upon lawyers to exercise discretion and, therefore, to engage in thought; such provisions do
not require a particular response, so lawyers cannot easily conceive
of them as establishing a threshold of appropriate conduct.
Yet when one moves further down the spectrum from a reg112 The usefulness of rules in producing these effects-and therefore the need to
emphasize them-depends on the degree to which the rules reproduce existing cultural
or legal extra-code constraints. Gail Heriot uses the example of a standard-like law that
prohibits "cruelty to animals." Heriot suggests that "reasonable pet owners will not engage
in activity that is even remotely close to the line," so that from the standpoint of affecting primary behavior there is little need for "rule-like certainty" in the prohibition. Heriot, supra note 46, at 940. The presence of a general cruelty rule raises the issue; once
reasonable targets recognize the issue, presumably they will control themselves. Heightening specificity runs the risk of suggesting that the minimum behavior society will accept
is actually the norm.
On the other hand, the benefits of the generalized rule may arise because extralegal moral constraints already tell reasonable people not to be cruel to animals. If so, a
rule is arguably important only as a tool for restraining the unreasonable person. In this
scenario, the factors of providing more guidance and setting the stage for enforcement
become more significant.
113 See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 107, at 442-43 (discussing rules that emphasize duty of
zeal); Wasserstrom, supra note 24, at 5 (arguing that rules that encourage lawyers to
analyze issues exclusively in terms of what the rules require or forbid cause lawyers to
become indifferent "to a wide variety of ends and consequences that in other contexts
would be of undeniable moral significance"); Zacharias, Confidentiality I, supra note 23, at
372-73 (discussing potential effect of confidentiality rules in keeping lawyers from thinking about disclosing where disclosure might be morally justified or required).
114 Reed Loder defends the use of generalized professional rules on the grounds that
they promote moral introspection and thereby lawyers' moral development. Loder, supra
note 7, at 314 (arguing that "prepackaged rules discourage individual . . . moral evolution" and that "the threat of sanctions will pressure lawyers to abandon their reasoned
judgments about right and wrong"). Loder's focus is different than mine, for she is concerned with "ethics" in the lay sense and assumes the purpose of professional codes is to
promote ethical behavior. Id. at 318. I, in contrast, do not attempt to characterize any
particular lawyer conduct as moral or immoral. My analysis considers the effect of specificity on a code's ability to accomplish its purposes, whatever those purposes may be.
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ulation that prioritizes (i.e., Point III) or suggests criteria (i.e.,
Point II) to one that merely states a principle (i.e., Point I), the
correlation disappears. A highly generalized mandate may not
increase lawyers' willingness to engage in thought."5 For example, the requirement that "prosecutors should do justice" affords
prosecutors leeway to take ethics considerations (including "role")
into account, but at the same time enables prosecutors to justify
virtually any response to any ethical dilemma."' Most prosecutorial tactics can be defended on the ground that the defendant is
guilty and conviction would therefore be "just." Conversely, prosecutors can rationalize most actions that undermine the
government's (or victim's) case on the basis that they have a responsibility to preserve defendants' rights. By failing to set criteria
and prioritize, the Point I provision makes decisions easy for prosecutors; anything they decide is professionally correct, so long as it
does not violate the limited constraints the Constitution and

115 Point II rules, by suggesting criteria, clearly emphasize introspection and discretion. Point III rules also afford lawyers leeway, though to a somewhat lesser extent. However, Figure D's graphical depiction of the corellation between specificity and introspection steepens from Points III to IV, because Point IV rules effectively remove lawyer
choice and thus the need for thought.
I do not mean to suggest that the correlation in the range between Points II
through IV is totally unambiguous. Figure D represents a depiction of general (presumably accurate) conclusions about most rules at different points along the spectrum. Yet
individual rules may have unexpected effects. A Point IV rule, for example, sometimes
can provoke introspection by alerting targets to a problem they otherwise do not notice
or by emphasizing to them that society takes the issue seriously. Similarly, Point II and
I rules may have varying impact, depending on the number and nature of the factors
they call upon the targets to consider. A Point II or III rule that simply suggests or
prioritizes a long laundry list of obvious considerations may have no more effect than a
Point I rule that offers a general statement of principle. Perhaps most importantly, the
degree of lawyer introspection always will be influenced, whatever the rule, by the environment, or subgroup, in which the targes practice. Peer pressure and practice norms
are significant determinants of lawyers willingness to consider a range of alternatives in
response to an ethical dilemma. See supra note 104. Nevertheless, to the effect rules have
any .effect on lawyer introspection, the general correlations described above typically hold
true.
116 Zacharias, supra note 37, at 48, and examples cited and discussed therein. Of
course, a highly determinate rule also can be subject to manipulation because specific
elements of the rule may invite lawyers and judges to engage in creative fact-finding and
arguments over interpretation.
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courts impose.' As Figure D illustrates, these conflicting effects
make it impossible to determine precisely how heightening generality beyond the initial level affects lawyer introspection and behavior on the whole.

117 Because generalizing provisions reduces their effectiveness as a foundation for
discipline, some lawyers may refuse to consider them at all. The extent of this effect
depends, in part, on a key assumption underlying ethics codes that serve nonlegislative
purposes; that is, that most lawyers are well-intentioned and will attempt to follow the
codes' mandates even in the absence of discipline. See supra authorities cited at notes 3940. See also Hazard, Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at 576 ("General normative propositions
have a limited place, and . . . we should not try to force them to use beyond that
place.").
As the likelihood of enforcement declines, generalizing the rules will have less impact in influencing behavior in a broad variety of situations. Figure 4 illustrates this effect.
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If a rule intended to impact broadly (e.g., "do justice" or "be loyal") becomes unlikely to
be enforced, lawyers will tend to consider its mandate only when it clearly is relevant.
The category of cases in which lawyers feel a need to question their conduct thus decreases, though perhaps not all the way to the level of a Point IV rule that mentions
only particular cases.
The correlation would be similar when parallel extra-code constraints are enforced,
but bar rules are not. Again, the fact that particular rules never result in disciplinary
proceedings may cause some lawyers to treat all the rules as empty. This effect should be
especially pronounced when the unenforced rule is unambiguous. Thus, specific (e.g.,
Point P.) unenforced rules seem particularly unsuited to promoting a sense of role that
will affect lawyer thought and behavior in a broad variety of situations.
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This analysis leaves one with the sense that some hidden
agenda is at play in the prosecutorial justice provisions. One could
understand a code drafter's desire to avoid Point IV regulationthat limits coverage or mutes introspection. Reliance on a standard
as general as "justice," however, eviscerates the codes' effect in
guiding prosecutorial behavior and promoting ethical self-analysis.
The justification for the broad regulation of prosecutorial ethics
must be found, if at all, in one of the subsidiary regulatory goals
discussed below.
C.

The Relationship Between Regulatory Specificity and
the FraternalPurposes of Ethics Rules

Scholars have tended to discuss the fraternal aspects of lawyer
regulation in historical terms.' In other words, they have identified periods in which lawyers have looked to the codes as a means
of establishing a group or "club" mentality to heighten the
profession's prestige." 9 Nevertheless, the fraternal features of the

118 I use the term "fi-aternal" rather than a gender neutral term because, historically,
the bar has been male-dominated and commentators conventionally have referred to the
"fraternity" or "brotherhood" of lawyers. Using a gender neutral term would, at this stage,
create unnecessary linguistic confusion.
119 See, e.g., HAZARD, supr; note 7, at 15-16 (discussing fraternal control prompted by
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profession's organization and regulation have served a number of
valid, instrumental functions that help justify the codes in a way
the quest for economic benefit cannot.
Perhaps most important, creating a community or "brotherhood" of lawyers can advance the administrative function of standardizing and facilitating communications-both between competing lawyers and between lawyers and supervisory tribunals. A professional standard that forbids lawyers to lie enables lawyer-adversaries to rely on procedural assurances without resort to judicial
supervision.1 2' Rules that encourage lawyers to cooperate with
their "brother" and "sister" lawyers-for example, in granting extensions and negotiating stipulations-promote efficiency and
avoid friction that increases transaction costs.' 2 ' Similar reasoning
drives regulation imposing on lawyers obligations of truth and fair
dealing toward tribunals.1 22 To the extent codes define and fix
the extent of those obligations, they inform judges as to the matters in which the court reasonably can rely on lawyers to depart
from a purely adversarial posture.12 As Professor Koniak notes,

the image of "a self-regulating band of gentle persons engaged in public service"); Hazard, supra note 1, at 1251 (discussing "fraternal understandings" that marked early codes);
David R. Papke, The Legal Profession and its Ethical Responsibilities: A History, in ETHICS AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 32, 38 (Michael Davis & Frederick A. Elliston eds., 1986) (discussing history of profession). Cf Rhode, supra note 40, at 692-702 (discussing historical function of professional regulation to "protect [the profession's] members' economic and psychological stake in public esteem").
120 See MODEL RULES, Rule 3.4(b) (forbidding falsification of evidence); MODEL
RULES, Rule 4.1(a) (forbidding false statement to third persons); CPR, DR 7-102(A)(5)
(forbidding false statements).
Lawyers are savvy enough to distrust information that comes from opposing parties.
Cf MODEL RULES, Rule 4.1 cmt. (limiting lawyer's duty to disclose client fraud because of
confidentiality principles). However, when an adversarial attorney puts his or her word on
the line, lawyers generally feel comfortable relying on that word because direct lying
would subject the adversary to disbarment. At the same time, lawyers know not to take
each other's opinion, puffing, or negotiating positions at face value because the professional norm is to exaggerate when doing so will enhance the client's position.
121 MODEL RULES, Rule 3.4(d) (requiring reasonably diligent efforts to comply with
discovery requests); MODEL RULES, Rule 4.4 (forbidding tactics to burden third persons);
CPR, EC 7-38 (requiring courtesy and reasonableness towards opposing counsel). Thus,
for example, lawyers often avoid having to ask courts to intervene with respect to routine
extensions and discovery requests.
122 MODEL RULES, Rule 3.3(A)(1) (forbidding false statements to tribunals); CPR, DR
7-102(b) (forbidding frauds on tribunals).
123 For example, the codes forbid lawyers to lie to the courts, hide directly adverse
authority, or assert frivolous positions. MODEL RULES, Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.3(a)(3), 3.1; CPR,
DR 7-102(A)(5), DR 7-106(B)(1), DR 7-102(A)(2). However, courts are aware that the duties of confidentiality and zeal ordinarily keep lawyers from volunteering information
prejudicial to their clients or harmful but not controlling precedents, and that lawyers do
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in so doing the codes promote the profession's vision of its legal
the
responsibilities and counteract any judicial tendency to invade
2
adversarial role that lawyers have established for themselves. 1
Part and parcel of the fraternal purposes of lawyer codes is
the intent to enhance, or at least control, the public image of the
bar. There are noncynical justifications for this concern with image. At one level, enhancing the professional image makes it easier for lawyers to deal with, and ultimately to serve, clients. When
the profession can convince the public that it acts on a selfless
plane, clients will trust and confide in lawyers."ES Moreover, reputable professional regulation is a tool by which lawyers can fend
off unreasonably self-serving client demands. To the extent that
the codes create a baseline for conduct that most lawyers follow,,
lawyers can dissuade the client by pointing to the professional
norm established in the codes.126 The presence of the norm enthat the client
courages lawyers to attempt dissuasion with less fear
27
will go elsewhere to obtain the requested service.
not limit themselves to offering only arguments that they believe should succeed. These
parameters enable judges to gauge the statements and arguments of lawyers and plan
their schedules. They also inform judges how not to ask lawyers to take positions the law"yers are duty-bound to avoid.
124 See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 10, at 1460-78 (describing areas in which states are
not prepared to force lawyers to abandon their adversarial posture).
125 Arguably, promoting client trust enables lawyers to represent clients better, which
in turn enhances the legal system as a whole. See Zacharias, Confidentiality I, supra note
23, at 366-67 (discussing argument in context of confidentiality rules, and citing authorities).
126 Robert Gordon has pointed to the existence of strong professional norms as a
key to maintaining independent judgment among lawyers. Gordon, supra note 22, at 34.
A prime example of the way in which codes can help serve this function is the newly
adopted MODEL RULES, Rule 3.3(a)(2),(b), which allows lawyers to disclose client perjury.
Lawyers now can refer to this rule in attempting to dissuade clients who seek help in
committing perjury. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 174-76 (1986) (holding that lawyer acted properly in threatening client with disclosure if client perjured himself).
L Ray Patterson has long argued that existing professional codes are deficient in
falling to take into account client obligations in defining how lawyers should act. See, e.g.,
Patterson I, supra note 9, at 45; Patterson II, supra note 9, at 699. It is true that the
codes establish a strong ethic of loyalty to clients and their wishes. Nevertheless, at least
the modern codes emphasize lawyers' duty to consult with clients and discuss tactics and
objectives with them. See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.2 cmt. Provisions that forbid or disapprove of particular lawyer conduct are tools by which lawyers may persuade clients to
meet some of the client "obligations" to which Patterson refers. Cf Stephen L. Pepper,
Autonomy, Community, and Lauyers' Ethics, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 939, 946 (1990) (discussing
lawyers' ability to influence clients); Shaffer, supra note 14, at 231 ("The beginning and
end of a lawyer's professional life is talking with a client about what is to be done ....
[T]he role orientation is a way to pretend that the law office conversation is not a moral
conversation.").
127 Cf. MODEL RULES, Rule 2.1 (encouraging lawyers to give "candid" advice to clients
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Nevertheless, it cannot be gainsaid that, in promoting a fraternity of lawyers, the lawyer codes are inward as well as outward
looking. From its inception, professional regulation has been designed to enhance lawyers' self-image and economic self-interest.
By creating an aura of "professionalism"-the notion that lawyers
are, by intellect, training, and special characteristics, unique-the
codes enable lawyers to command respect and financial reward
exceeding that of blue collar workers and other professionals who
perform similar services.12 From a cynical perspective, using the
codes to create a public image that secures these benefits merely
reflects greed."2 More charitably, enhancing lawyers' self-image
and well-being promotes their enjoyment in being a member of
the profession. Economic advantages and a sense of self-respect
give lawyers a reason to bear the significant psychological and
personal moral costs of professional role-differentiation.'
The correlation between regulatory specificity and the administrative/communications aspects of fraternity seems clear. A rule's
influence may vary among subcultures of lawyers. 3 ' But if one

based on a variety of factors other than "law"). Paralleling the effect on clients is the effect on lawyers themselves. Code provisions that most lawyers follow enable lawyers who
actually wish to act "well" to do so with less fear of losing clients as a result. Luban,
supra note 14, at 461. This effect, however, may depend on whether the provisions are
sufficiently enforced to induce general compliance. Id.
128 By convincing the public that lawyers can be counted on uniquely to maintain
confidentiality, the bar gains a competitive advantage over other professionals, such as accountants, who are equally qualified in some legal endeavors. Morgan, supra note 21, at
707-12; Zacharias, Confidentiality II, supra note 23, at 629.
129 See Abel, supra note 21, at 653-67 (describing codes in terms of their effects as
market controls); Gillers, supra note 31, at 259, 275 (describing lawyer self-interest underlying the MODEL RULES).
130 One should not dismiss the real personal cost that lawyers assume in accepting
the system's ethics requirements. The obligations to represent clients zealously, to maintain confidentiality, and sometimes to set aside personal ethics can take a heavy psychological toll. See Andreas Eshete, Does a Lawyer's Character Matter?, in THE GOOD LAWYER,
supra note 12, at 270, 274 (discussing "trace" on lawyer as a person acting as adversary);
Postema, supra note 17, at 286-88 (discussing strategies by which lawyers can come to
terms with the "knavery" of the professional role). Recent studies show that, more and
more, lawyers are dissatisfied with their professional lives, suffer from unusual stress, and
turn to substance abuse for relief from the pressures of practice. See, e.g., Andrew Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and Cocaine Abuse Among United
States Lawyers, 13 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 233 (1990); Andrew Benjamin et al., The Role
of Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 1986
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 225.
131 See supra note 104. For example, communications among a subculture of lawyers
may be controlled by the degree of personal contact they have had and shared experiences that define their outlook toward adversarial lawyering. If a highly specific rule
seems arbitrary or indefensible to a subculture of lawyers-in light of their shared expe-
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assumes some level of obedience to the codes, rules fix expectations regarding fraternal behavior in proportion to their specificity (Figure E)."
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In the context of prosecutorial ethics, for example, communication between defense attorneys (or the courts) and prosecutors
is facilitated best by rules that enable the defense attorneys (or
judges) to know prosecutors' perspectives toward the communications. Most commentators assume that prosecutors are bound to
the same rules as other lawyers:TM they may not lie or mislead a

riences-the lawyers may well feel free to ignore the guidance the rule seeks to provide.
This occurs, if at all, not because of any logical relationship between specificity and the
rule's effect, but rather because of the peculiar, unanticipatable psychology or ethos that
particular subcultures develop.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
133 Figure E is parabolic because at Points I and II the codes' criteria for lawyer
behavior may be so variable that other lawyers have only limited additional information
regarding what actions to expect. The curve climbs steeply between Points II and III
because Point I rules, by definition, give a strong (though flexible) indication of how
lawyers should act in most situations.
134 See Ernest F. Lidge III, Government Civil Investigations and the Ethical Ban on Communicating with Represented Parties 67 IND. LJ. 549, 563 (1992) (arguing that ethics rules
apply to government lawyers); Nancy J. Moore, Intra-ProfessionalWarfare Between Prosecutors
and Defense Attorneys: A Plea for an End to the Current Hostilities, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 515,
522 (1992) (concluding that the argument that federal prosecutors are exempt from
professional regulation is "clearly untenable"); Peter C. Sheridan, Grand Juiy Subpoenas to
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tribunal, must treat defense lawyers with courtesy, and follow the
other general mandates of the codes. However, insofar as the
codes seek to impose additional obligations upon prosecutors-for
example in disclosing evidence 5 -- a general "justice" standard
does not enable defense attorneys to predict how a particular
prosecutor will act. It thus fails to inform or guide defense counsel in structuring informal requests or bargaining positions and
keeps judges in the dark concerning how much discovery they
must require as a matter of law. In contrast, specific disclosure
provisions in the codes (i.e., Point IV rules) or explicit standards
for when disclosure is appropriate (i.e., Point III rules) would help
facilitate communications.
There is some, though less, linkage between regulatory specificity and the public image of the bar. To the extent that lawyers
wish to refer to code norms in negotiating with clients over tactics,
clients must be able to understand that a clear norm exists.
136
Heightened specificity, though limiting in terms of coverage,

Criminal Defense Attorneys: Massachusetts Restrains the Federal Prosecutor Through An "Ethical"
Rue, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 485, 523 (1988) (arguing that restraining prosecutorial
misconduct through the existing ethics rules is valid); Monroe Freedman, Dirty Pool in the
Prosecutor's Office, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 24, 1990, at 24 (expressing the author's and the
ABA's position that the ethics rules apply to all lawyers, including prosecutors); Jerry E.
Norton, Ethics and the Attorney Genera4 74 JUDICATuRE 203, 207 (1991) (arguing against
emerging notion that government attorneys should be held to a different and lower standard of ethics than other members of the bar). But see DOJ Memo, supra note 100, at 7
(purporting to exempt Department of Justice litigators from compliance with anti-contact
rules); Cramton & Udell, supra note 6, at 298 (concluding that anti-subpoena rules are
an impermissible attempt to overcome binding federal law). Cf United States v.
Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988) (although the ethics rules apply generally to
federal prosecutors, the rules allow federal prosecutors to use legitimate investigative techniques), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 192 (1990); United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433,
1448-49 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (anti-contact rules apply to prosecutors to protect the represented individual from the overreach of opposing counsel and to ensure that the adverse
party's attorney can function properly).
135 See generally Zacharias, supra note 37, at 56-60 and authorities cited therein.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
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highlights behavioral baselines.
The effect of specificity upon the bar's public image is uncertain. Depending on the circumstances, specifying prohibited conduct can be perceived either as confronting a particular ethical
dilemma-and thereby exhibiting the bar's willingness to regulate
itself-or as engaging in politics as usual.S Generalizing regula-
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An appropriate pictorial representation would be as follows.
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138 Narrow rules that limit themselves to particular conduct have, in the past, often
been characterized as self-serving. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 21, at 655-56 (discussing confidentiality rules); Gillers, supra note 31, at 275 (discussing the MODEL RULES as a
whole); Rhode, supri note 23, at 326 (discussing solicitation rules); Zacharias, Condfuentiality II, supra note 23, at 629 (discussing confidentiality rules). For example, rules specifically forbidding advertising and solicitation have been challenged as furthering lawyers' economic self-interest. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 377 (1977) (noting negative effect of advertising rules on competition). Cf. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486
U.S. 466, 490 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing anticompetitive effects of advertising and solicitation rules); Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 278
(1985) (noting anticompetititve effect of local practice rule). Rules forbidding lawyer
criticism of judges and other lawyers arguably project an incorrect, self-serving image of
lawyer competence. See Zacharias, Confidentiality II, supra note 23, at 629 n.144 and authorities cited therein.
Specific rules are prone to foster a negative public image because the process of
reaching consensus on a circumscribed rule may include logrolling among affected segments of the bar. Cf. Schneyer,, supra note 11, at 689-90 (discussing way in which narrow
MODEL RULES, Rules 1.11(a) and 4.1(b) responded to the lobbying of the "elite firms
that cared about" revolving door and SEC whistleblowing issues). This in turn may create
an image that the rulemakers have engaged in unseemly politics.
Of course, this trend does not always hold true. Generalized provisions can seem
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tion-limiting it to basic role definition-can help avoid any appearance of impropriety. No one could reasonably argue that
requiring lawyers to act zealously on behalf of clients promotes
lawyers' self-interest.'39 Professional standards of diligence, 4 '
confidentiality, 4 ' and loyalty' can hardly be viewed as specialinterest legislation. Nor, in the area of prosecutorial ethics, would
anyone dare quibble with the requirement that prosecutors "do
justice".
On the other hand, overgeneralization may itself be an attribute of self-serving regulation. A rule that leaves lawyers free to do
as they wish ducks the issue of appropriate conduct. Point I regulation that does not even suggest appropriate results allows lawyers-in the "justice" example, prosecutors-to act in their own
interests without fear of repercussions. 4 ' That, in turn, may
breed distrust of the bar.' It is thus impossible to identify a
strict correlation between specificity in drafting and the way the
public will react to the rules. Probably, the public's sense of lawyers will depend more on independent factors such as the performance of lawyers and the circumstances under which particular
rules are proposed.
The picture is less ambiguous with respect to the effect of
specificity on lawyers' self-image. General rules which, by definition, accord lawyers discretion inevitably promote lawyers' sense of
self-respect'
This effect is particularly strong where extra-code
constraints are also limited, as in the prosecutorial context, for

self-serving as well. See infra text accompanying notes 144-45. And some strict rules clearly
are designed to protect consumers of legal services. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 1.5(a)
(limiting fees); CPR, DR 2-106(B) (same).
139 See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.3 cmt.; CPR, Canon 7.
140 See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.3; CPR, DR 6-101 (A) (3).
141 See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.6; CPR, DR 4-101.
142 See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7 cmt; CPR, EC 5-2.
143 Heightening specificity (e.g., to the Point II level) may appear to provide at least
minimal control. Some laypersons will recognize that, in a closed society of lawyers dependent on mutual cooperation and referral of business, peer opinion can be counted
on to constrain self-serving behavior. See Gordon, supra note 22, at 34 (noting impact of
peer pressure); Rhode, supra note 17, at 624-25, 639 (discussing effect of institutional
pressures on lawyer behavior); Zacharias, supra note 37, at 109 (discussing importance of
peer influence).
144 This discussion, of course, assumes that the public knows about the rules. Generalized provisions that have no obvious practical effect or particular situations are more
likely to escape public, and media, attention.
145 See Gaetke, supra note 27, at 77 (discussing generalized 'officer of the court"
provisions and concluding that "the profession reaps public esteem, self-satisfaction, and
other benefits from its allegedly critical and quasi-official role in the judicial system").
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then society truly delegates control to the individual lawyer.
Increasing specificity from a Point I to a Point II level should
not significantly erode lawyers' self-image. At either level,*the message is clear that society trusts the targeted lawyers to govern their
own conduct. 4 ' As a regulation moves to Point III, however, it
signals that lawyers ,are to be trusted less. Moreover, to the extent
the rule is enforced, it warns lawyers their conduct is being
watched. Inevitably, the individual lawyer's sense of power diminishes, and with it the sense of personal professionalism.'
146 Lawyers know that other lawyers have written the codes. They therefore may attach no significance to the "trust" that the codes embody. On the other hand, the importance bar leaders and judges seem to attribute to the notion of professionalism suggests that lawyers tend not to think in these terms or to give the matter of who writes
the rules much thought at all. See, e.g., Eugene A. Cook, Professionalism and the Practice of
Law, 23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 955, 958 (1992) (discussing role of self-governing rules in establishing lawyers as public servants); Marvin E. Frankel, Why Does Professor Abel Work at a
Useless Task?, 59 TEX. L. REv. 723 (1981) (justfying codes as meaningful part of establishing lawyers as professionals); Kenneth Kipnis, Professional Responsibility and the Responsibility
of Professions, in PROFMTS AND PROFESSIONS 9, 17 (Wade L. Robinson et al. eds., 1983)
(the "codes embody a theory about the relationship between the profession and the
community"); Rhode, supra note 17, at 592, 606 ("attorneys have variously appeared [in
the discourse] as 'sentinels,' 'ministers,' and 'high priests of justice,'" and "legal practice
is still idealized as a self-directed calling, informed by the spirit of 'public service'") (citations omitted). Cf James R Elkins, Ethics: Professionalism, Craft, and Failure; 73 KY. LJ. 937
(1985) ("Professionalism is a sort of devil-term that allows members of a profession to
efijoy status and claim lofty ideals while avoiding responsibility"); Stanley Fish, Anti-Professionalism, 7 CARDOzO L. REV. 645 (1986) (viewing professionalism as a self-satisfied and
self-serving invocation of special privilege). To the extent professional regulation defers to
the profession's judgment, thus establishing a legislatively or judicially adopted norm,
lawyers seem ready to accept that the codes say something favorable about the place of
lawyers in society.
147 See Hazard, supra note 1, at 1242 (stating that the trend toward "legalization" of
the codes has "resulted in the disintegration of the profession's sense of self"). The correlation between specificity and lawyer self-image would take this graphical form:
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The prosecutorial 'Justice" provision can be seen as serving
the function of promoting prosecutors' self-image. On the surface,
the provision also appears to set a high-minded standard that the
public can accept and which individual prosecutors can use to
counteract supervisory and public disapproval of their choice of
tactics. The public's view of a particular prosecutor's decisions,
however, is unlikely to be influenced significantly by the common
sense, and elusive, concept of prosecutorial "justice.""4 And,
once the codes' Point I orientation becomes subject to public
scrutiny, the positive "public image" effect of an unanchored 'Justice" standard is likely to disappear.14 The fraternal purposes of
ethics codes thus do not provide firm support for the prevailing
approach to prosecutorial ethics.
D.

The Relationship Between Regulatory Specificity and
Influencing Judicial Standards

Most codes disclaim any intention to influence substantive,
extra-code legal standards. 5 ' But Professor Koniak makes a persuasive case for the proposition that many aspects of the code are
designed precisely to establish lawyers' own vision of the law of
lawyering."5' The legitimacy of the profession's special point of
view depends, of course, on the degree to which lawyers uniquely
appreciate the problem in question. In some instances, the profes-

148 Unlike the situation in which a lawyer can use an ethics rule to dissuade individual clients from undesirable conduct, see supra notes 126-27, the generality of the term
"justice" limits its persuasive effect. A prosecutor who argues that justice requires her
conduct must recognize that other conduct the public prefers will usually fit the requirement as well.
149 That is because the standard will be exposed as establishing no norm in practice.
See supra text accompanying note 109.
150 See, e.g., MODEL RULES, Scope 11 3, 6; CPR, Preliminry Statement; CALIFORNIA RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1-100(A) (1988) ("Nothing in these rules shall be
deemed to create, augment, diminish, or eliminate any substantive legal duty of lawyers."). See also Miami Int'l Realty Co. v. Paynter, 841 F.2d 348, 352 (10th Cir. 1988)
(malpractice decision refusing to rely on standard of care in Colorado ethics code because of code's disclaimer of intent to influence substantive law); Woodruff v. Tomlin,
616 F.2d 924, 936 (6th Cir.) (same for Tennessee), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980);
Carlson v. Morton, 745 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Mont. 1987) (same for Montana). Cf Ellen S.
Podger, Criminal Misconduct: Ethical Rule Usage Leads to Regulation of the Legal Profession, 61
TEMP. L. REv. 1323, 1335 (1988) (positing that courts use ethics rules as guides, but
specifically disclaim their effect as rules of law).
151 See generally Koniak, supra note 10, at 1417-41. Cf George L. Hampton, Toward an
Expanded Use of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 655 (1991)
(urging use of codes as sources of law in civil cases).
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sion truly may know best because they have more information
concerning the interaction of clients, lawyers, and the law.152 In
other instances, the profession's vision is simply driven by its selfinterest or self-image.'5 3 Whether the bar should use the codes
to press the profession's perspective on the substantive law is a
normative question beyond this Article's scope.
The ability of the bar to influence substantive law turns on a
variety of factors. Perhaps most important is the extent- to which
extra-code standards already determine the legal principles. If
"law" precedes the codes, courts considering changes are likely to
be persuaded by the codes' disclaimers that judges should not rely
on the codes.5 Moreover, once courts fix standards indepen
dently of the codes, they set a precedent for the sources that
future courts should use in assessing changes in the standards; one
of the best reasons courts have for looking to the codes is that
alternative sources for decisionmaking are unavailable. Finally, the
legitimacy of code standards is often open to question because of
the danger that the bar has promulgated self-serving standards.
Courts will inevitably hesitate to rely on lawyers' own interpretation of how they themselves should be regulated. 5
The sum of these' considerations is that codes are most likely

152 Thus, for example, lawyers may be in a superior position to appreciate the difficulties in screening cases for conflicts of interest or in supervising partners and associates in a large law firm.
153 Koniak, supra note 10, at 1486-87 (discussing negative aspects of lawyers' vision).
154 For example, many courts have accepted the proposition that a state's governing
ethics code does not provide a standard for malpractice liability, even though the code
requires all lawyers in the jurisdiction (not only the average lawyer and better) to satisfy
the code standards. See, e.g., Miami Int'l Realty Co. v. Paynter, 841 F.2d 348, 352 (10th
Cir. 1988) (holding that violation of COLORADO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrIY is
not malpractice per se); Woodruff, 616 F.2d at 936 (concluding that the TENNESSEE CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY does not define standards for civil liability), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 888 (1980); Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (Mass. 1986) (holding
that a violation of ethics rule itself is not an actionable breach of duty, td a client). One
court recently held that expert witnesses testifying to the malpractice standard of care
may not even refer to professional code standards. Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 654
(Wash. 1992), noted in 8 ABA/BNA MANUAL, supra note 45, at 159, 160.
Although the above analysis mentions only courts, it applies to legislative decisionmaking as well. But one significant difference is apparent. In the legislative arena, lawyers
and bar associations can, and do, influence lawmaking by direct lobbying as well as by
example in the codes.
155 Zacharias, Confidentiality I, supra note 23, at 625-28. See also Cramton & Udell,
supra note 6, at 317-18 (arguing that, in interpreting ethics codes and deciding whether
to give them legal effect, courts should take into account the "strong evidence that lawyers, when they regulate themselves, are inclined to take positions that favor the use of
lawyers and enhance their authority and prestige").
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to influence extra-code standards significantly when several elements are present. Gaps in the prevailing law must be evident.
Traditional sources for resolving the issues (or setting the standards) must be absent or have failed. And the standard setter
(e.g., the courts) must have reason to believe the bar's response is
measured.156 In these circumstances, courts may feel justified in
relying on the special expertise of bars or bar drafting committees.
Let us assume a situation in which courts might look to the
codes. How might the specificity of the code provisions in question affect their influence? For obvious reasons, a highly generalized provision cannot assist the courts in filling gaps in the substantive law. In the prosecutorial ethics context, for example,
courts have focused on prosecutorial misconduct in determining
whether due process is violated. Yet the courts have rarely cited
the ethics codes in fleshing out the meaning of misconduct, largely because the codes' general justice terminology fails to supply
the ingredient of concreteness that the term "due process"
lacks.'57 In contrast, more specific code provisions regarding
prosecutorial disclosure of evidence have had somewhat greater
impact.'5 8
The relationship between specificity and influence on the
substantive law, however, may not be completely proportional.
Conduct-specific rules tend to be frozen in time; they are incapable of adjusting with changing notions of reasonable conduct. 9
This has at least two consequences. First, because codes historically
have tended to be amended relatively rarely,"6 courts may hesi-

156 In other words, the court must believe that the bar has studied the matter carefully, reached its conclusions by virtue of its special experience or expertise, and avoided
adopting a position to further the membership's self-interest.
157 See Michael J. Hoover, The Model Rules of Professsional Conduct and Lawyer Malpractice Actions: The Gap Between Code and Common Law Narrows, 22 NEw ENG. L. REv. 595,
615 (1988) (noting situations in which 'the codes' failure to address recurring problems
in a specific manner led courts to develop "their own analytic framework"). See also authorities cited in Zacharias, supra note 37, at 95-97 (discussing limited use of codes' justice mandate in due process decisions).
158 See Zacharias, supra note 37, at 74-76 (canvassing ethics rules and constitutional
decisions relating to disclosure of evidence).
159 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 41, at 278 ("the more detailed a rule is, the
more often it will have to be changed"); Powers, supra note 53, at 31 (noting that one
cost of "formal rules" is their inability to take account of changing values over time);
Powers, supra note 17, at 1280-81 (same).
160 For the most helpful history of the various codes, see generally Hazard, supra
note 1. Of course, since the promulgation of the CPR and MODEL RuLES, state codes
have seen more frequent amendments than in the past. However, if one looks at most

19931

SPECIFICITY IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CODES

tate to delegate authority for the standard to the bar. In other
words, courts are unlikely to accept proposed legal standards that
are satisfied whenever, and simply because, lawyers obey the
codes. 6 ' Second, a highly specific ethics rule is likely to seem
anachronistic by the time a court considers its adoption. 6 2
I do not mean to overstate the significance of code specificity
in judicial decisions involving professional responsibility issues.
Courts routinely have followed the codes' conflict of interest rules
in reaching attorney disqualification decisions and have relied on
a variety of provisions as evidence of malpractice. 63 Yet typically,
courts have ignored code provisions that are either highly general
or highly specific. By adopting general code standards as substantive law, a courit ordinarily would be according individual lawyers discretion to govern their own conduct. As in the case of the
"justice" standard for prosecutors, judges hesitate to abdicate control in this way. Conversely, in the context of adversarial lawsuits,
adopting a highly specific code standard would favor one type of
litigant or lawyer over another-again removing case by case control from the courts." The courts' universal refusal to accept
specific code constraints on prosecutors' ability to speak with represented witnesses in fa~or of rules that give courts discretion to
judge prosecutorial conduct on a case by case basis typifies the
judicial response. 65

jurisdictions individually, one finds that their codes have remained fairly stable even in
recent years.
161 One extraordinary departure from this tendency is Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157
(1980) (lawyer's conduct satisfied the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of
counsel by virtue of the lawyer's compliance with lQcal bar requirements).
162 In a different context, H.L. Hart has expressed a preference for generality in
lawmaking when legislating in new areas of law, because this generality enables the law
to evolve more easily (usually judicially) over time. By contrast, highly specific laws tend
to remain fixed. See HART, supra note 58, at 123-32. The same analysis applies with respect to judicial adoption of specific professional code provisions. These tend to control
courts and limit their ability to adjust as unforeseen cases arise.
163 See supra cases cited at notes 20, 30, and 154. The malpractice cases present a
conundrum. The courts' general refusal to rely on code violations as proof of malpractice
could be characterized as representing judicial reluctance to adopt the codes as substantive law. Yet the codes specifically state that their provisions should not be used as liability standards. The courts' hesitance to rely on the provisions thus could be seen, in fact,
as adopting the codes.
164 For examplej a strict rule forbidding or permitting lawyers to represent multiple
defendants before the same grand jury would give a tactical advantage to prosecutors or
defendants, respectively. The Supreme Court has opted for a case-bycase approach.
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988).
165 Under MODEL RULES, Rule 4.2 and CPR, DR 7-104(A)(1), the criminal defense
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What these observations suggest is that a measure of specificity, but not too much specificity, is usually a sine qua non for provisions intended to influence the substantive law. To have influence
on the courts, ethics provisions must be sufficiently concrete to
supplement gaps in legal standards. Point I provisions like the
prosecutorial justice rule and most Point II provisions are likely to
fail in this regard as well. As one moves up the spectrum towards
Point III, the codes attach priorities to a series of criteria. Provisions that operate in this way may be useful to courts in establishing legal doctrines that set presumptions, without eliminating
judicial flexibility. On the other hand more specific provisions
tend to scare judges. They raise the specter of potentially biased
standards1" and of tying judges' hands. As Figure F suggests, one
therefore can expect the influence of rules on substantive law to
decrease as their level of specificity moves from Point III to Point
IV.

bar (and the ABA) contend that the government may not use undercover agents to obtain statements from suspects who have lawyers. Prosecutors contend that these rules, at
least to the extent they apply pre-indictment, cannot apply to the government. By adopting and enforcing either of these interpretations, courts would be establishing new legal
principles governing criminal investigations that would favor either criminal defendants or
the government. Most courts have avoided such a strong position, preferring to adopt a
case-by-case approach that enables courts to permit some use of undercover agents, while
preserving the option of curbing some prosecutorial conduct. See United States v.
Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that investigative needs sometimes
allow contact with represented party), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990); United States v.
Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (upholding application of anti-contact rule to
prosecutors, but suggesting in camera proceeding through which prosecutors can sometimes speak with represented parties), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 989 F.2d
1032 (9th Cir. 1993).
166 See supra notes 138-39.
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LEVEL OF SPECIFICITY
The Relationship Between Regulatory Specificity and Pragmatic
ConsiderationsRelevant to Code Drafting

Generalized regulation has few direct consequences upon
lawyers, so it is by definition unthreatening. Code drafters ordinarily prefer to avoid antagonizing groups that might defy the
rules. Because in the past many codes only have had the force of
"moral persuasion," controversy threatened to undermine their
adoption or impact. Even in jurisdictions where the rules have
legal effect, as is the case with most current codes, defending
them against defiant lawyers can be expensive, time consuming,
and beyond the resources of the bar."

167 I term one extreme of the vertical axis of Graph F the "strongest chance of influence" rather than "strong chance," in recognition of the fact that other factors significantly influence the likelihood that any code provision will have an effect on the substantive law. See supra text accompanying notes 154-56.
168 See Zacharias, supra note 37, at 105-06 (discussing resource considerations) and
authorities cited therein; Kennedy, supra note 53, at 1706 (noting that particular rules
"may be advocated because they fit a political strategy for dealing with conflict rather
than for reasons intrinsic to the social situation in which they will be applied, or to the
substantive content of the law in question") (emphasis in original).
With respect to traditional laws, Gail Heriot suggests that it is easier for lawmakers
to attain a consensus over a rule than a standard, because standards reveal the principles
underlying the law better than rules and these may provoke disagreement. See Heriot,
supra note 46, at 941-42. Although I question whether standards necessarily reveal more
information than rules even in the traditional lawmaking context-consider "reasonable-
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One might reasonably question whether it is appropriate for
code drafters to cave to the desire to avoid conflict. If, for example, drafters respond to prosecutors' potential defiance of specific
code reforms by avoiding appropriate regulation of prosecution
tactics, the drafters seem to abdicate their function. 169 Nevertheless, becoming embroiled in disputes concerning regulatory jurisdiction inevitably diverts the bar from other important and valuable tasks. This is a cost reasonable drafters must take into account.
Specific rules tend to affect the practices of some subgroups
of lawyers more than others. When an affected subgroup is organized, the mere proposal of a specific rule almost automatically
induces it to lobby. If the subgroup is not organized, but the impact on its individual lawyers is likely to be significant, the cost of
organizing the subgroup will be relatively small because its interest
is defined by the provision. In contrast, the general membership
of the bar may have only an intellectual interest in the provision's
promulgation. The effort to organize the membership to support
the rule can be prolonged and expensive.' Moreover, because

ness"-they certainly do not in the professional code-drafting context. Because code provisions may never be interpreted and enforced, drafters can employ standards at an extreme level of abstractness (e.g., "justice"). Consensus over abstract principles is easy to
obtain, provided that no one expects the principles to be translated into concrete examples or more observable subprinciples.
169 See DOJ Memo, supra note 100, at 7 (Justice Department memo challenging validity, and threatening to defy, anti-contact rules). See also Kolibash v. Committee on Legal
Ethics, 872 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1989) (removal proceeding in which federal prosecutor
claimed exemption from local ethics rules); United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839
(2d Cir. 1988) (accepting federal prosecutors' claim that investigative needs sometimes
excuse strict compliance with ethics rules), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 192 (1990); Foreman v.
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, No. 91-C8257 (N.D. Ill. filed Dec. 24,
1991) (local U.S. Attorney's complaint challenging to Illinois anti-subpoena rule); Baylson
v. Disciplinary Bd., 764 F. Supp. 328, 337-41 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (upholding federal
prosecutor's challenge to the applicability of Pennsylvania anti-subpoena rule); Linda
Himelstein, Top Lawyers Are Subpoened in BCCI Probe, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 27, 1992, at 1, 18
(recounting Justice Department policy that the government's subpoena power may not be
saddled by overly technical ethics requirements); Norton, supra note 134, at 207 (concluding that DOJ may claim an unlimited exemption from ethics rules); F. Dennis Saylor, IV
& J. Douglas Wilson, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Application of Model Rule
4.2 to Federal Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 459, 483 (1992) (DOJ attorneys taking position that states are barred from enforcing disciplinary rules against federal prosecutors
whenever the prosecutors comply "with the Constitution and all applicable federal statutes").
170 The prime example is the six year process by which the MODEL RULES were
adopted. The Kutak Commission was first appointed in 1977. Apparently, its first several
years of business were devoted not only to identifying appropriate changes in the professional rules, but also to deciding how to package the rules, sell them to the public, and
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code drafters can anticipate a divisive political process, they become prone to. misspending resources upon unnecessary committees and issue-study groups in order to create a record that will
facilitate adoption of the measure.
To the extent specific rules carry with them significant potential for opposition and debate, they also tend to focus media attention upon the ethics regulation process. Sometimes that attention has beneficial effects in informing the debate and providing
the public with insight into the way lawyers regulate themselves.
But almost inevitably, the spotlight has negative effects as well.
Because specific rules typically can be attacked, rightly or wrongly,
as promoting the interests of a select group of lawyers,' some
observers will be persuaded that the rules are self-serving. Highly
generalized rules can be attacked similarly, as a cowardly "ducking"
of the issues. Thus, as soon as media attention is drawn to the
debate, the pressure increases to preserve the bar's "public image"
by adopting compromise provisions at Points II and III levels of
specificity. Compromise based on factors other than principle may
diminish the rule's capacity to achieve its objectives."
These attributes of code drafting help explain the historical
approach to prosecutorial ethics. Within the profession, prosecutors are an organized group. Trained politicians head most state
prosecutors' offices. In resisting controls on prosecutorial behavior,
they understand how to harness the public's natural fervor for law
enforcement. Similarly, federal prosecutors have ready access to
Congress and the media. By adopting regulation of prosecutorial
ethics that sounds high-minded but, in practice, defers to prosecutorial discretion, code drafters can avoid in-fighting, media attention, and any questioning of the motives underlying the codes.
The drafters may find it especially appropriate to emphasize these
concerns in the law enforcement area because internal administra-

convince lawyers to be receptive to them. See Schneyer, supra note 11, at 695-97. The
next few years were spent educating the bar and reacting to lobbying by disaffected subgroups of lawyers. Id. at 700-07. The final stage, which Ted Schneyer characterizes as the
.endgame," consisted of negotiating behind-the-scenes, informing the ABA House of Delegates on the merits, and convincing it to accept the commission's proposals. Id. at 71424.
171 See supra note 138.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 140-45.
173 An unprincipled rule may cause lawyers to disregard it. To the extent the rule attempts to shape or influence substantive law, an appearance of "politics" may also persuade courts and lawmakers to give the rule less credence.
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tive mechanisms 4 and external media oversight independently
exert some constraint on prosecutorial behavior. 5 Thus, for
purely practical (some would say "unprincipled") reasons, code
drafters may assign a low priority to the regulation of prosecutorial
16
ethics as a whole.
F. Lessons for the Code Drafters
What does this analysis of regulatory specificity and the codes'
"justice" provisions teach us for purposes of drafting ethics codes?
The costs and benefits of flexible standards and the
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of specific rules rest on
many considerations that are common to legal and ethics provisions. Insofar as professional codes are designed to produce uniform behavior (e.g., through the threat of discipline), to define
appropriate conduct, and to achieve broad coverage, they can be
analyzed in traditional rule-standard terms. But other factors underlying the codes demand special analysis. The expectation that
lawyers will produce their own norms through introspection is an
element uniquely relevant to the codes. Enforcement concerns, in
many respects, are less important. By definition, considering the
effect of a provision on substantive law makes sense only in the
code context, where the provision in question is not itself the
substantive law. Many of the practical concerns that influence
code-drafters' drafting decisions differ from those that influence
legislators and administrative rulemakers.
One can draw some loose conclusions concerning the effectiveness of schemes at different levels of specificity. A generalized
code provision offers less guidance and produces less uniformity in

174 These include peer pressure, supervisory controls, and institutional guidelines. See
Zacharias, supra note 37, at 108-09 (discussing internal control mechanisms).
175 Because of the public's fascination with criminal law, prosecutors' decisions are,
perhaps to a greater extent than the decisions of lawyers in other areas of practice, subject to media attention. At least in publicized cases, elected prosecutors inevitably take
public opinion into account.
176 See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITr. L. REv. 393, 444-45
(1992) (documenting failure of disciplinary bodies to act against prosecutors and giving
reasons); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinay Sanctions Against Prosecutors for "Brady" Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987) (criticizing the absence of discipline against prosecutors); Zacharias, supra note 37, at 104-07 (explaining hesitation of disciplinary authorities to enforce codes against prosecutors and citing authorities). Cf McKay Report, supra
note 22, at 9 (ABA study documenting inability of disciplinary authorities to respond to
all meritorious claims that the codes have been violated and assuming need for disciplinary authorities to set priorities); BENNErr L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT §
13.6 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (general discussion of professional discipline of prosecutors).
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conduct than a specific provision, but not necessarily "insufficient"
guidance or uniformity to accomplish some regulatory purposes.
How much guidance lawyers need from ethics codes depends
upon the availability of other sources that lawyers can consult.
Behavioral uniformity is valuable in that it leads to similar results
in similar cases. However, the benefit of achieving this "equality"
may be offset by the loss of individual ethical thought and the risk
of unfairness when lawyers lack flexibility and leeway, for example
to "do justice" in a given case.
Nevertheless, our analysis illustrates that a Point I rule makes
little sense when it supplies the sole, or primary, standard by
which lawyers are to determine their conduct. In effect, Point I
rules defer to substantive law for enforcement and further guidance, a process which proves counterproductive if "law" fails to
provide standards of conduct.177 Greater specificity in this limited
range of circumstances comes at no cost to coverage or to the
appearance of well-intended rulemaking, and arguably enhances
the possibility of independent moral behavior. At the same time,
greater specificity has the benefit of regularizing lawyer conduct
and enhancing potential enforcement of the rule.
Point II rules emphasize introspection and self-regulation.17 8
They thus make most sense where two elements are present (1)
the affected lawyers are able to balance relevant considerations,
and (2) no consensus exists with respect to the appropriate outcome to the covered set of problems. The first element requires
the lawyers to have, by virtue of other provisions, a good sense of
the role they are to play; in other words, an internal mechanism
for setting priorities. When such a mechanism exists, society can
trust the lawyers to exercise discretion in cases in which society
itself has no ready solution to the problems in question.
Point III regulation bridges the desire for more uniform behavior and the need to accord lawyers leeway to depart from the
rule to achieve a better result at the margins. 19 But as regulation becomes more specific in this way, two potential dangers
become prominent: first, that lawyers will cease to reflect on ethical matters; second, that the rule itself will be (or be perceived as)
a product of special interest influence.'
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Highly specific, Point IV regulation usually is the most enforceable and provides the clearest guidance to lawyers. Yet Figures C and D show that typically it has significant costs in terms of
lawyer introspection and, often, to coverage. Strict professional
rules are rarely necessary when the lawyer's role is clear or when
extra-professional standards direct the lawyer's conduct, but sometimes it is useful to avert possible misunderstanding by prescribing
obviously appropriate behavior. Alternatively, specific rules may be
necessary when the solutions suggested by the relevant decisionmaking criteria are inevitably ambiguous, yet society (or the legal
system) prefers one answer over another. 181 One would therefore
expect code drafters to rely on Point IV rules either with respect
to recurrent problems with a history of nonuniform response by
similarly situated lawyers or with respect to situations where lawyers' natural incentives lead them to seek the wrong result. In short,
specific rules are best suited to situations in which code drafters
cannot trust lawyers to use good judgment in implementing their
role.
Our analysis of the code drafters' approach to prosecutorial
ethics illustrates that the justice provisions serve only the function
of defining a role.' Yet one comes away with the conclusion
that they serve even the role-defining goal badly. The Point I
approach contributes to broad coverage; that is, it ostensibly requires prosecutors to consider "justice" in a broad spectrum of
situations. Together with the few pretrial rules, 18 3 it highlights
prosecutors' obligation to preserve defendants' rights. However,
the approach provides little guidance regarding the nature of the
rights which should be protected or the emphasis they should
receive. A Point II approach would apply just as broadly and could
guide prosecutors better. A Point II or Point III approach would
provoke more introspection. And, because discipline for violating
any Point I rule is unlikely, the justice provisions have minimal
direct impact on behavior. If the initial code drafters had analyzed
the subject carefully, they probably would have had no choice but

181 For example, the codes try to create black letter rules for when lawyers who appear as wimesses should be disqualified from representation, even though the balance of
hardship may vary from case to case. See MODEL RULES, Rule 3.7; CPR, DR 5-101.02.
182 Arguably, the justice provisions also enhance prosecutors' sense of self-respect and,
at the time of their adoption, avoided political conflict within the bar concerning appropriate regulation. However, these attributes have dissipated as attention to the subject of
regulation of prosecutorial activity has increased. See supra text accompanying note 149.
183 MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8; CPR, DR 7-103.
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to embrace a Point II or III approach to accomplish their roledefining goal.
V.

MODEL RULE

3.8(F) -

A CASE STUDY

This Article's analysis of the prosecutorial ethics experience
suggests three drafting principles. First, it is critical that code
drafters identify the purposes of the code generally, and of parts
of the code that form their own unit. Second, when codes or code
segments stem from multiple purposes, the drafters must set priorities among them; for purposes of drafting and justifying the provisions, it is important that the drafters note which purpose should
take precedence in the event that all cannot be served. Third, in
writing or reforming the rules, the lrafters should focus on the
purpose or purposes they have identified and select the drafting
approach-or level of specificity-that best effectuates those purposes. Specificity can be correlated with each goal and attribute of
the goal. Only by recognizing those correlations at the outset can
rulemakers hope to draft provisions that accomplish their objectives.
Code drafters who learn these lessons will undoubtedly write
better, or at least more rational, codes. But the long term effects
may be even more pronounced. By identifying and pursuing particular objectives, the drafters make it possible for subsequent
reformers of the rules to see how proposed reforms fit within the
codes' scheme. That in turn should help focus the debate surrounding reforms upon the relevant issues.
The final section of this Article illustrates the usefulness of
the specificity model in analyzing code reforms. It takes a brief
look at one area in which the ABA has proposed new limits on
prosecutorial behavior; in particular, the area of prosecutors' decisions to issue subpoenas directed at attorneys.184 Consistent with
its model, the Article identifies the goals of the proposed regulation and urges each jurisdiction responding to the ABA proposal
to determine how those goals fit with the thrust of their own
codes.,' To the extent adoption of some rule governing attorney
subpoenas would be compatible with the priorities embodied in a

184 MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f).
185 Because the issue of whether local jurisdictions should adopt the ABA's proposed
reform depends, in part, on the goals embodied in each jurisdictions' codes, this Article
does not attempt to resolve that issue. Instead, it analyzes the ABA proposal in light of
the ABA's own model codes.
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particular jurisdiction's code, the Article encourages the
rulemakers to consider what level of regulatory specificity can best
achieve the reformers' legitimate goals.
A.

The Background: Model Rule 3.8(f)

Whether and when prosecutors should subpoena defense
attorneys to testify about client affairs has long been a topic of
debate. 8 The number of attorney subpoenas rose dramatically
in the 1980's,"" in large part because legislatures increasingly
criminalized conduct in which lawyers themselves may be intimately involved.SS Beginning in the mid-1980's, the ABA began to
consider whether it would be appropriate to adopt a professional
rule to circumscribe prosecutors' discretion to issue attorney subpoenas."' 9 In 1990, the ABA adopted a highly specific (i.e., Point,
IV) Model Rule.' Six states have followed suit,' and two have
rejected a similar proposal.'92 Numerous jurisdictions are in the
process of considering regulatory reform.'"

186 See, e.g., Cramton & Udell, supra note 6, at 362-69 (disapproving of MODEL RULES,
Rule 3.8(f)); William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 781, 874-75 (1988)
(describing attorney subpoenas as a "threat" to the adversary process); Genego, supra
note 23, at 18 (same); Stern & Hoffman, supra note 23; Zacharias, A Critical Look, supra
note 23, at 939 (criticizing MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f)) and authorites cited therein.
187 See Seymour Glanzer & Paul IL Taskier, Attorneys Before the GrandJuy: Assertion of
the Attorney-Client Privilege to Protect a Client's Identity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1070,
1070 nn.1-2 (1984) (citing authority for assertion that attorney subpoenas have increased);
Stem & Hoffman, supra note 23, at 1787, 1789 (same); Robert N. Weiner, Federal Grand
Juty Subpoenas to Attorneys: A Proposal for Refonn, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 95 (1985) (discussing recent trend).
188 Zacharias, A Critical Look, supra note 23, at 920-21 and authorities cited therein.
189 See ABA Resolution on Attorney Subpoenas (Feb. 1988), reprinted in Stem & Hoffman,
supra note 23, at 1853-54; ABA Resolution on Subpoenaing Attorneys Before the Grand Jury
(Feb. 1986), reprinted in Stem & Hoffman, supra note 23, at 1852.
190
191

MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8.
MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME

COURT

RULES

Rule

3:08

(Prosecution

Function

15)

(1986); NEw HAMPSHIRE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.5 (1987); PENNSYLVANIA
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.10 (1988); RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT
RULES Rule 47 (Rule 3.8(f)) (1988); TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT RULES Rule 8 (DR 7103) (1987); VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT RULES Rule 3A.12 (1987).
192 See D.C. Adopts New Ethics Rules, Permits Non-Lawyer Partners, 6 ABA/BNA MANUAL,
supra note 45, No. 3, at 53-55 (Mar. 14, 1990) (reporting D.C.'s rejection of MODEL
RULES, Rule 3.8(f)); New York's Courts Adopt Changes to Ethics Rules, 6 ABA/BNA MANUAL,
supra note 45, No. 9, at 172, 175 (June 6, 1990) (reporting N.Y.'s rejection of MODEL
RULES, Rule 3.8(f)).
193 After litigation, Illinois reconsidered its adoption of the rule. See 8 ABA/BNA MANUAL, supra note 45, No. 21 at 367 (Nov. 18, 1992) (reporting Illinois Supreme Court's
adoption, stay pending reconsideration, and subsequent repeal of MODEL RULES, Rule
3.8(f)).
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Model Rule 3.8(f) states, in pertinent part:
(f) [A prosecutor shall] not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury
or other criminal proceeding unless:
(1) the prosecutor reasonably believes:
(i) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;
(ii) the evidence sought is essential to the successful
completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution;
(iii) there is no feasible alternative to obtain the information; and
(2) the prosecutor obtains prior judicial approval after an
opportunity for an adversarial proceeding.
Ostensibly, Rule 3.8(f) was prompted by several valid concerns
concerning attorney subpoenas. Unless carefully employed by the
prosecutor and dutifully resisted by the lawyer-witness, a subpoena
may prompt a lawyer inadvertently to disclose privileged
information."M A defense lawyer will ordinarily lose his client's
trust by appearing as an adverse witness.' Even when the lawyer
protects the privilege and remains silent, a client may doubt the
lawyer's loyalty if the testimony has occurred in secret grand jury
proceedings. 9 ' And, in highlighting an actual or potential conflict between the interests of the lawyer and client, attorney subpoenas increase the likelihood that defense lawyers will be forced
to withdraw from the representation or be disqualified.'9 7 Thus,
attorney subpoenas are prone to prosecutorial abuse.' 8
194 See Zacharias, A Critical Look, supra note 23, at 925-35 (discussing concerns raised
by attorney subpoenas) and authorities cited therein. As I have previously discussed, in
today's world, attorney subpoenas validly may seek unprivileged information concerning
such matters as the identity of an attornpy's client, the source of attorney fees, and
wrongdoing by the attorney himself or herself. Id. at 920.
195 In re Harvey, 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 n.4 (noting chilling effect on attorney-client
relations), vacated 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc); In re Sturgis, 412 F. Supp
943, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (noting danger of creating "doubts" about the attorney in the
client's mind).
196 See Weiner, supra note 187 (discussing risk to sense of loyalty); Thomas K. Foster,
Note, GrandJuiy Subpoenas of a Targt's Attorney: The Need for a Preliminay Showing; 20 GA.
L REv. 747, 756 n.41 (1986) (same).
197 See Zacharias, A CriticalLook, supra note 23, at 929-30 and authorities cited there-

in.
198 Roughly speaking, an abusive subpoena can be described as one that interferes
with defendants' counsel of choice without adequate justification. These may include subpoenas issued to selected defense counsel who the prosecutor perceives to be a strong
adversary or whom the prosecutor dislikes personally. See Robert Burkart Ellis, Attorney
Subpoenas: The Dilemma Over a Preliminary Showing Requirement 1991 U. ILL L. REV. 137,
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Nevertheless, numerous criticisms have been leveled at the
new Model Rule. The rule seems to set legal obstacles to the
prosecutor's subpoena power that find no justification in the law
of privilege"9 or the limited constitutional right to choose counsel.2 ° In other words, the Model Rule sets a substantive standard
for discovering information from lawyers which diverges from the
law and in favor of which there is no consensus among courts and
lawmakers. Concomitantly, critics claim that the rule represents an
attempt by the bar to control the courts. Arguably, this oversteps
the bar's proper role.
Because the rule attempts to control prosecutorial conduct
rather than guide it, the rule does not fit the traditional view of
the discretionary prosecutorial role. Moreoever, the rule tends to
undermine ethical introspection by prosecutors; prosecutors bound
by such tight rules may lose the sense that they have a duty to
judge the ethics of their own conduct in this and other areas.?"
Perhaps most significant, some critics perceive the rule to be a
self-serving attempt by the defense bar to preserve and entrench

139 (describing defense bar's fear that prosecutors will use attorney subpoenas to eliminate skilled attorneys from important cases). Alternatively, prosecutors have been criticized
for issuing subpoenas for tactical, rather than substantive, reasons. See, e.g., Himestein,
supra note 169, at 17 (reporting view of defense bar that attorney subpoenas are part of
an assault on confidentiality and attorney-client privilege); Stem & Hoffman, supra note
23, at 1791-92 (arguing that unscrupulous prosecutors will use attorney subpoenas to
intimidate); Tom Watson, Clash Over Lawyer Subpoenas: DOJ Bids to Block ABA Rule Change,
LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 12, 1990, at 1, 14 (reporting fear that prosecutors will use subpoena
to deprive defendants of counsel of choice).
199 To justify a subpoena under MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(0, a prosecutor not only
must show that that she seeks unprivileged information, but also that the information is
"essential" and unavailable from any other source. In addition, MODEL RULES, Rule
3.8(f)'s prohibition extends to all information "about a client," a category that exceeds
the scope of the privilege. See 8 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
2292, at 554 (J. McNaughten ed., rev. ed. 1961) (limiting attorney-client privilege to communications between attorney and client made for the purpose of giving or obtaining
legal advice).
200 MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(0 is geared, in part, towards avoiding the disqualification
of defense attorneys who develop a conflict of interest because of an attorney subpoena.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment precludes claims to any
constitutional right to keep an attorney with a conflict. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.
153, 162-63 (1988).
201 The literature is vast regarding prosecutorial discretion and the need for flexible
prosecors who take into account society's desire for justice, victims' interests, and
defendants' rights. See, e.g., KENT GREENWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALrlY 348-56
(1987) (discussing rationale for prosecutorial discretion); MORTIMER KADISH & SANFORD
KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 80-85 (1973) (same); John Kaplan, The ProsecutorialDiscretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REy. 174, 174-92 (1965) (describing favorably practical
applications of prosecutorial discretion).
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their practices, even at the c6st of legal and appropriate law enforcement." 2 Largely for this reason, federal and some state
prosecutors have challenged the new model rule and refused to
obey its mandates.0"
B.

Model Rule 3.8(f)s Ambiguous Goals

A major difficulty in analyzing Model Rule 3.8(f) is the possibility that its proponents were dishonest in their justifications for
the rule. Publicly, the reformers based their proposals on the need
to avoid an inadvertent chill on attorney-client relationships. They
consistently disavowed any intent to question prosecutorial good
faith, weaken prosecutorial subpoena power, or change the substantive law. In practice, however, the reformers proposed a remedy that goes well beyond preventing the inadvertent chill. In reality, they probably did not trust prosecutors to implement ethical
guidance and may have been trying to revise attorney-client privilege so as to exempt lawyers from the grand jury's reach.2
Whatever the merits of these positions, I assume they are best
dealt with in the open. Analyzing reforms on a specificity basis has
the benefit of forcing proponents to identify the true, or best,
justifications for reform proposals, thus focusing the debate on the
real issues. In the actual and continuing debate over Model Rule
3.8, proponents and critics have tended to talk past each other.20 5 Proponents focus on the alleged evils of attorney subpoe202 See Cramton & Udell, supra note 6, at 360-61 (recounting defense bar's reasons
for pursuing the adoption of anti-subpoena rules); Rooney, supra note 100, at 1 (describing DOJ's attacks on the criminal defense bar for attempting to use ethics rules to stymie criminal investigations). See also Ellis, supra note 198, at 146-51 (analyzing defense
bar's expressed concerns regarding attorney subpoenas).
203 See, e.g., Baylson v. Pennsylvania Supreme Court Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102 (3d
Cir. 1992) (rejecting the applicability of Pennsylvania anti-subpoena rule to federal prosecutors); United States v. Klubock, 8.32 F.2d 664, 665 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc) (upholding Massachusetts' adoption of the anti-subpoena rule); Foreman v. Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Comm'n, No. 91-C8257 (N.D. Ill. filed Dec. 24, 1991) (dismissing challenge to Illinois anti-subpoena rule pending state supreme court's reconsideration of the
rule). Cf Andrea F. McKenna, A Prosecutor's Reconsideration of Rule 3.10, 53 U. PrTt. L.
REV. 489 (1992) (calling for repeal of Pennsylvania rule).
204 I, and others, have expressed a suspicion that the proponents of MODEL RULES,
Rule 3.8(f) are driven by a hidden agenda. See Koniak, supra note 10, at 1398-1402; Zacharias, A Citical Look, supra note 23, at 954. One could, for example, make a reasonable
argument in favor of the rule, based on the position that the judicial definition of the
attorney-client privilege is too narrow. The rule's proponents, however, claim that the
rule is not designed to change the law of privilege. See Zacharias, supra, at 926 n.33, 95456 and authorities cited therein.
205

See; e.g., Robert C. Bonner, A Balanced Perspective on Attorney Subpoenas, 36 EMORY

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:2

nas.21 6 Critics focus on the motives of rulemakers °7 and the alleged adverse impact of the rule on law enforcement." 8 The two
sides largely ignore the underlying issues of whether an ethics rule
is an appropriate mechanism for addressing the legitimate concerns the proponents assert, what regulatory purposes an ethics
rule would serve, and how best to draft an effective rule.
The form of an appropriate rule should depend, in part, on
the precise purpose the rulemakers identify. If, in considering
provisions like Model Rule 3.8(f), rulemakers propose to create
uniformity in prosecutorial conduct and to set the stage for disci-

L. J. 802, 806 (1987) (claiming criminal defense practioners raised a "red herring argument ...
in order to inflame the issue and to deflect rational discussion of the real
issue"); Moore, supra note 184, at 530-39 (discussing prosecutors' tactic of "derid[ing
defense efforts like the subpoena rule as 'an attempt to elevate lawyers to an exclusive
status'").
206 See, e.g., Genego, supra note 186, at 874-75 (discussing threat to ability of lawyers
to continue representation); Genego, supra note 23, at 18 (discussing threat to maintenance of defense bar); Marjorie E. Gross, The Long Process of Change: The 1990 Amendments
to the New Yor* Code of Professional Responsibility, 18 FORDHAM UR. LJ. 283, 320-22 (1990)
(discussing prosecutorial abuse of subpoena power).
207 Proposals like MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f) have been driven by the defense bar.
Defense lawyers have both personal (i.e., selfish) and ideological reasons to support MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f). The defense bar is accustomed to advocating defendants' interests.
Limits on prosecutorial discretion and investigative tools benefit defendants. Moreover,
the limits on attorney subpoenas arguably help encourage good lawyers to continue practicing criminal law. At the same time, however, the precise prosecutorial tactics upon
which defense-oriented code reformers recently have focused (e.g., subpoenas and fee forfeitures) are those that most threaten the pocketbooks of defense lawyers. See Cramton &
Udell, supra note 6, at 321, 360 (discussing orientation of defense bar and its arguments); Koniak, supra note 10, at 1398-1402 (same). State and federal prosecutors, therefore, have responded to the attorney subpoena proposals bitterly, immediately questioning
the proponents' good faith. See DOJ memo, supra note 100, at 1 (decrying defense bar
for broad interpretation of ethics rules); Rooney, supra note 100, at 14 (chronicling
claims by Attorney General that the Criminal Justice Section of the ABA is a "stacked
deck" made up mostly of criminal defense lawyers attempting to develop standards for
prosecutors); Watson I, supra note 100, at 1, 6 (reporting DOJ's belief that ABA's amendments exceed ABA's jurisdiction, interfere with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
represent biased attempt by defense bar to sabotage legislative choices of the people);
Watson, supra note 198, at 15 (same). Cf. Playing Politics, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 20, 1990, at 12
(criticizing Attorney General Thornburgh for betraying a bias against defense attorneys
who do their jobs by zealously advocating the proposed ethics rules).
208 See, e.g., Richard Thornburgh, Ethics and the Attorney General: the Attorney General Responds, 74 JUDICATURE 290, 291 (1991) (arguing that to interpose ethics rules between
prosecutors and represented individuals would make investigation and prosecution of
federal criminal offenses nearly impossible); Tom Watson, supra note 198, at 15 (discussing DOJ's fear that the anti-subpoena rules obstruct and delay the grand jury's functions and provide opportunity for the destruction of evidence); Daniel Wise, Are Federal
Prosecutors Beyond State Discipline?. N.Y. L.J., Mar. 8, 1991, at 1, 2 (chronicling U.S.
Attorney's suggestion that the defense bar has significant influence over the formation of
ethics rules, and that the rules are being asserted to gain "a litigation advantage").
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pline, then highly specific regulation can be an appropriate drafting response.2" On the other hand, the thrust of most codes'
regulation of prosecutorial ethics is to identify a prosecutorial role
and to rely upon individual prosecutors to consider the ethics of
each situation. If the rulemakers continue to accept role definition
as the overriding purpose of ethics regulation of prosecutors'
conduct, Point II or III regulation makes more sense. 210 A departure from a code's general thrust would not necessarily be wrong,
but should be justified specially, since such a departtire can erode
the code's capacity to accomplish its primary purpose.
Model Rule 3.8(f)'s specificity suggests that its proponents
hope to influence the substantive law of attorney-client privilege.
The rule seeks to convince courts that unprivileged communications between attorneys and clients deserve protection from discovery that other unprivileged communications do not enjoy. 212 Yet
the abstractness of the debate over the rule has meant that the reformers never have had'to discuss the validity of that objective or
whether a specific rule is the best way of accomplishing the objective.21-3 Moreover, any attempt by.the bar to influence substantive law makes sense only when certain prerequisites are present,
including gaps in the substantive law, a failure by the judiciary to
identify traditional sources upon which to base legal decisions, and
a reason for the courts to trust the bar in this area.14 Yet the
debate has not focused on the presence of these factors.
My point here is simply that different types of rules governing
attorney subpoenas may be appropriate, depending upon the goals
the drafters set. The discussion surrounding Model Rule 3.8(f)
never reached the stage of identifying goals and drafting methodology. As a result, the new21 6 rule is singularly vulnerable to criticism215 and legal challenge.

209 See supra text accompanying note 87.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
211 For example, by reducing introspection.
212 In particular, MODEL RULE, Rule 3.8(f) incorporates the unique requirement that
prosecutors first must seek information from alternative sources. See Koniak, supra note
10, at 1400 (discussing likely goals of MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f)).
213 See generally Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 MD. L. REV.
274, 275-76, 286 (1986) (discussing "abstract mode of most reformist discourse" and urging "less categorical rhetoric and more contextual analysis").
214 See supra text accompanying notes 163-67.
215 See generally the criticisms in Cramton & Udell, supra note 6; Zacharias, A Critical
Look, supra note 23.

216 Thus far, versions of MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f) have been challenged in federal
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C. A Specificity Analysis of Model Rule 3.8(f)
Let us briefly -consider the merits of the attorney subpoena
question. And let us assume the validity of at least some of the
substantive concerns of the rule's proponents; in other words, that
attorney subpoenas may interfere unduly with attorney-client relationships and may cause some qualified members of the bar to
forego a criminal defense practice. What does our discussion of
regulatory specificity say for code drafters attempting to formulate
a response to those concerns?
1. Reform As a Part of Role-Definition
To remain most consistent with the codes' role-setting approach to prosecutorial ethics, reformers might simply leave the
question of attorney subpoenas to prosecutors' general sense of
"justice." Arguably, by telling prosecutors to do justice in all their
actions, the codes already inform them that they must take into
account the effect of attorney subpoenas on attorney-client relationships and upon defense representation as a whole. For obvious
reasons, however, the "justice" approach seems inadequate to reformers, both as a general method of role definition2 17 and as a
means to alleviate the reformers' specific concerns regarding attorney subpoenas. Empirically, the justice provisions have not
worked.218 This Article's theoretical discussion of regulatory specificity illustrates that, in the absence of other constraints, a Point I
rule provides minimal behavioral guidance 19 and, in practice,
may even reduce prosecutors' ethical introspection." °
courts in Pennsylvania, Massachussetts, Illinois, and in state court in Rhode Island. Baylson v. Pennsylvania Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.) (rejecting applicability of state rule to federal prosecutors), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1578 (1992); United States
v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc) (upholding local rule); Foreman v.
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, No. 91-C8257 (N.D. Ill. filed Dec. 24,
1991) (challenging dismissed pending state's reconsideration of adoption of rule); In re
Almond, 50 Grim. L. Rep. 1532 (RI. Mar. 18, 1992) (rejecting petition to grant waiver
from state rule for federal prosecutors).
217 See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
218 See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and Section of
Criminal Justice, Report to the House of Delegates 4-5 (Feb. 1990) [hereinafter 1990 Report to
the House of Delegates] (discussing number of attorney subpoenas issued prior to adoption
of MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f)). See also ABA Section on Criminal Justice, Report to the
House of Delegates, 111 ANN. REPORTS OF THE ABA 11D, 2 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Report
to the House of Delegates] (citing anecdotal statistics).
219 See Figure 3, supra note 109, and accompanying discussion.
220 See supra Figure D and related discussion at text accompanying note 117.
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At the other extreme, reform might take the form of a highly
specific, behavior-controlling rule like Model Rule 3.8(f). Point IV
rules are generally inconsistent with the role definition purpose of
ethics regulation; they tend to cover only few cases, 1 to mute
introspection,' and to have the least effect on the targets' general ethical outlook.' Arguably, however, reformers in the prosecutorial ethics realm may perceive highly specific regulation as a
means to counteract the "justice" approach's overgenerality; perhaps a mix of general and specific regulations can illustrate a
prosecutor's appropriate role in a way the Point I approach alone
does not.
If a Point IV rule, like Model Rule 3.8(f), were the only rule
purporting to govern prosecutorial behavior with specificity, the
appeal to symmetry and balance might be persuasive. In the example of the ABA's approach, however, the Model Rules already include some Point III and IV provisions relating to pretrial prosecutorial decisionmaking. 4 The presence of an increasing series of
Point IV reforms magnifies the negative impact on the Model
Rules' ability to influence introspection; the more a code appears
to define appropriate behavior specifically, the more likely targets
are to assume that other, undefined behavior is permissible.'
. Moreover, to the extent any reform is intended to become
part of a code's effort to define the target-lawyers' roles, the reform must be one that engenders the targets' respect for the
code. Point IV regulation often runs special risks both of appearing self-serving on the part of a segment of the bar and of creating dissatisfaction on the part of the targeted lawyers.226 The proponents of attorney-subpoena reform, for the most part, come
from the defense bar.' Prosecutors have perceived Model Rule

221 See supra Figure C and related discussion at text accompanying note 111.
222 See supra Figure D and related disscussion at text accompanying note 117.
223 See supra text accompanying note 113.
224 For example, MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(a) limits prosecutors' charging decisions and
MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(c) contains a specific prohibition on rights prosecutors may seek
to nullify. MODEL RULES, Rules 3.8(b) and (d) contain somewhat more general priorities
for prosecutorial behavior in affirmatively assuring defendants' rights.
225 See supra text accompanying note 113.
226 See supra text accompanying notes 138, 170-71.
227 See, e.g., Genego, supra note 186 (study by leading defense attorney surveying
other defense attorneys that supports call for reforms, quoted as ABA's main support for
proposing MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f) in 1986 REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra
note 218, at 7 and 1990 REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 218, at 4 n.4,
8); Glanzer & Taskier, supra note 187 (proposals by defense attorneys); Ellen R. Peirce &
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3.8(f) as the defense bar's attempt to control prosecutors for their
own gain." As a result, prosecutors not only have challenged
the validity of the rule, 2' but also have transferred their perception that the code drafters are self-serving to other provisions.2 "
Even before Model Rule 3.8(f)'s adoption, drafters should have
been able to predict that a Point IV approach to attorney subpoenas would undermine prosecutors' willingness to embrace the lessons of the code as a whole.

Leonard J. Colamarino, Defense Counsel as a Witness for the Prosecution: Curbing the Practice of
Issuing Grand Jury Subpoenas to Counsel for Targets of Investigations, 36 HASTINGS LJ. 821
(1985) (one co-author a defense attorney); Stern & Hoffman, supra note 23 (proposals
urged by lawyers defending MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8 in KIubock).
228 See Cramton & Udell, supra note 6, at 361 (discussing defense bar's use of forum
in which it has "special privileges and political influence" to further its own objectives);
Paul R. Friedman, Subpoenas to Defense Lawyers in Criminal Cases: A Part of the "Assault on the Citadel" 23 (Oct. 16, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, quoted in Moore, supra
note 134, at 537) (characterizing anti-subpoena rule as "an attempt to elevate lawyers to
an exclusive status"); Moore, supra note 134, at 531, 537 (discussing prosecutors' claims
that anti-subpoena rules further defense bar's personal interests).
229 See authorities cited supra note 216.
230 Other than the anti-subpoena rules, the ethics rules which have incurred the
greatest degree of prosecutorial resistance are those pertaining to contact with persons
represented by counsel and the forfeiture of criminal defendants' assets used to pay legal
fees. See, e.g., DOJ Memo, supra note 100, at 1, 2, 7 (purporting to exempt Justice Department litigators from compliance with anti-contact rules and asserting that defense
counsel have misinterpreted anti-contact rules in an effort to forge a nonconstitutional,
pre-indictment right to counsel that threatens the law enforcement process); 8 ABA/BNA
MANUAL, supra note 45, at 396-98 (Dec. 16, 1992) (reporting proposed new DOJ anticontact rules based on the principles expressed in the Thornburgh memo); William
Glaberson, Thornburgh Policy Leads to a Sharp Ethics Battle, N.Y. TMES, Mar. 1, 1991, at B4
(reporting DOJ's belief that "there may be situations in which literal compliance" with
ethics standards could be "inconsistent with a Government attorney's ability to carry out
his or her responsibilities under the law"); Rooney, supra note 100, at 1 (reporting DOJ's
contention that defense lawyers promote and invoke anti-subpoena, anti-forfeiture, and
anti-contact rules in an effort to "cripple" federal investigations). See also Kolibash v. Committee on Legal Ethics, 872 F.2d 571 (,4th Cir. 1989) (federal prosecutor claiming exemption from West Virginia ethics rules). Cf 6 ABA/BNA MANUAL, supra note 45, at 27 (noting ABA delegate's view that DOJ position represents "sheer arrogance"). Compare Norton,
supra note 134, at 205 (criticizing the legal authority for the DOJ Memo) with
Thornburgh, supra note 208, at 291 (accusing Norton of misreading the DOJ Memo).
Some commentators have inferred from the legal authority upon which the DOJ
Memo is grounded that the Department of Justice might claim a categorical exemption
from ethics rules. See, e.g., Norton, supra note 134, at 207 (arguing that the DOJ Memo's
reliance on the Supremacy Clause implies that the Attorney General claims the power to
choose which ethics rules, if any, would apply to his office). Department of Justice officials have attempted to defuse the controversy engendered by this possibility. See
Glaberson, supra, at B4 (reporting DOJ's public position that the DOJ Memo applies only
to the limited area it addresses and that DOJ expects its lawyers to abide by most ethics
rules); Thornburgh, supra note 208, at 291 (denying that the DOJ Memo is an openended authorization for government litigators to ignore all ethics rules).
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In considering how a Point IV regulation governing attorney
subpoenas meshes with the role-defining function of a code, one
must assess the effect of extra-regulatory constraints on
prosecutors' conduct. Reform proponents have disavowed any
intent to establish new substantive law. If one is to believe that
disavowal and providing role guidance is indeed the overriding
goal of reform, the key issue becomes what guidance prosecutors
lack.
Courts have defined the scope of attorney-client privilege,"I
2
provided mechanisms for protecting privileged information, 2
and recognized motions to quash when prosecutors have abused
the subpoena power.s On the other hand, courts have defined
clients' right to keep their chosen counsel as not encompassing
the right to retain a lawyer whose possession of unprivileged information creates a conflict of interest' m Substantive law thus tells
prosecutors, fairly dearly how far client rights extend and provides
enforceable sanctions for prosecutors' failure to honor those
rights.

231 The codes, in general, and MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(0, in particular, purport to
accept the validity of the judicial definition of the attorney-client privilege.
232 In re Horn, 976 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1992) (quashing attorney subpoena as overly
broad); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 831 F.2d 225, 227 (11th Cir. 1987) (discussing motion to quash procedure for raising attorney-client privilege with respect to grand jury
document subpoena); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Served Upon Field, 408 F. Supp. 1169,
1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (quashing attorney subpoena on privilege grounds); In re Stolar, 397
F. Supp. 520, 523-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same).
233 See, eg., YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 668-69 (7th ed.
1990) (summarizing cognizable objections to subpoenas on grounds of prosecutorial
abuse); In re Ellsberg, 455 F.2d 1270, 1274 (1st Cir. 1972) (allowing indicted defendant
to challenge prosecutors use of grand jury to continue building case against him); United
States v. Pennsalt Chem. Corp., 260 F. Supp. 171, 181 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (discussing abuse
as grounds for judicial interference with grand jury subpoenas). Cf United States v. R.
Enter., 498 U.S. 292 (1991) (discussing court's role in enforcing "reasonableness" requirement of Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)). By "abuse," reformers generally mean prosecutorial
attempts to use subpoenas to eliminate particular defense attorneys from the case or to
harass the lawyer or client. See 1990 REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note
218, at 8 (quoting and discussing examples cited in In re Grand Jury Matters, 593 F.
Supp. 103, 107 (D.N.H.), affd sub. nom. United States v. Hodes, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir.
1984)).
234 See United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 654 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that attorney subpoena often will require attorney to withdraw), vacated, op. withdrawn, on reh'g;
832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc) (upholding application of local rule); In re Doe,
759 F.2d 968, 973 (2d Cir.) (noting that attorney subpoena sets stage for disqualification
of attorney), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); In re Sturgis, 412 F. Supp. 943, 945-46
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (discussing ramifications of attorney subpoenas on potential disqualification of lawyer).
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The only area in which ethics codes usefully might provide
guidance is in telling prosecutors how to take into account client
concerns that do not rise to the level of a legal right.' This is
an issue upon which substantial disagreement exists"5 and which,
accordingly, requires a case by case assessment of the relative
importance of client interests and society's separate interest in
successful prosecution of crime. A Point IV approach, however, is
not suited to situations that call for balancing; it works best where
the prescribed outcome is obvious, where a consensus exists on
the outcome to a recurring problem but the relevant discretionary
factors do not lead to that outcome, or where society cannot trust
the lawyers in question to exercise discretion in a respectable manner.
All of this leads to the question: if professional code reform is
to guide the issuance of legitimate attorney subpoenas, what regulation is appropriate? The kind of guidance prosecutors need
depends at least in part on how they would exercise their discretion in the absence of an ethics rule. The federal government has
promulgated specific administrative guidelines to regulate the
issuance of attorney subpoenas." 7 These provide standards which,
although not judicially enforceable, track Model Rule 3.8(f)'s in
many respects and include the additional proviso that individual
prosecutors must seek approval from high level superiors before
issuing attorney subpoenas." For the federal arena-the realm
in which reform proponents have criticized prosecutorial conduct
most vociferously 59 -the guidelines provide a relatively clear standard for prosecutorial conduct. They assure some prosecutorial

235 In other words, telling prosecutors to what extent they should, as ethical professionals, avoid attorney subpoenas because of their potential chill on the attorney-client
relationship, their effect on confidential but unprivileged communications, and their interference with clients' desire to retain chosen counsel.
236 See Zacharias, A Critical Look, supra note 23, at 952-53 (discussing extent of
prosecutors' obligations to defendants' interests) and authorities cited at 953 n.128.
237 Department of Justice, Policy with Regard to the Issuance of Grand Juiy or Trial Subpoenas to Attorneys for Information Relating to the Representation of Clients, in UNrrED STATES
ATrORNEYS MANUAL § 9-2.161(a), at 35-37 (Oct. 1, 1990) [hereinafter DOJ Guidelines].
238 Id. § 9-2.161(a)(D) (requiring approval of attorney subpoenas by Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division).
239 The preoccupation with the federal arena reflects the reality that attorney subpoenas have predominated in cases involving new federal statutes such as the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988), the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988), the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act
of 1984, 21 U.S.C. §§ 853, 881 (1988), and the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (1988).
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introspection, consideration of the relevant criteria, and uniformity
of conduct."4 In jurisdictions in which local district attorneys
adopt similar rules, professional code drafters might therefore be
justified in resting on a Point I "justice" regulation that defers to
extra-regulatory constraints. 4 '
In jurisdictions in which no administrative guidelines exist,
drafters would want prosecutors to weigh law enforcement interests
against the degree to which an attorney's testimony negatively
affects the attorney-client relationship, the potential loss of confidences, and the danger that a client will unnecessarily lose his
counsel of choice. As illustrated in the margin, a Point II approach to balancing, the goal of which is to identify criteria for
consideration, might start with a statement of principle and provide assurances that prosecutors heed substantive law constraints.'t A Point II rule would identify the key decision-making

240 In essence, the guidelines require prosecutors to try to seek alternative sources of
information, DOJ Guidelines, supra note 237, § 9-2.161 (a) (C), to limit the use of attorney
subpoenas where possible, id § 9-2.161(a) (E), and to consider the effects on the
defendant's attorney-client relationship. Id. § 9-2.161(a). See also Michael F. Orman, Note,
A Critical Appraisal of the Justice Department Guidelines for Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to Defense Attornes, 1986 DUKE L.J. 145 (analyzing the guidelines and concluding that it represents an appropriate balance between fairness to defendants and needed prosecutorial
discretion).
241 As the ABA has noted, the guidelines provide no external enforcement mechanism. 1986 REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 218, at 7. See also Moore,
supra note 134, at 538 (noting that "the real disagreement between prosecutors and defense lawyers seems to be how to get prosecutors to follow their own internal
guidelines"). However, once code drafters determine that professional regulation must
take a more flexible form than MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f), enforcement with respect to
particular subpoena decisions immediately becomes less likely even under relatively strict
code provisions. Enforcement bodies would inevitably recognize that the discretion accorded by the (sub-Point V) rules stems from the absence of a consensus on how the countervailing considerations should be accommodated in any given case. Only a Point IV
rule, like MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f), is potentially enforceable because it removes prosecutorial discretion-for example, in deciding whether to pursue alternative sources of
information. But in removing discretion, the Point IV rule also would undermine the law
enforcement interests; that is, it would have to assume a single correct way to balance
the competing considerations.
The Justice Department guidelines illustrate, by way of contrast, the danger of Point
IV reform. By requiring trial level prosecutors to submit subpoena decisions for supervisory approval, the guidelines encourage the prosecutors to give the decision careful
thought, and thereby to reach an appropriate accommodation of the competing interests.
A specific rule, like MODEL.RULES, Rule 3.8, is likely to have the opposite effect on introspection. This, in turn, may have adverse consequences for the way prosecutors perceive and give weight to defendants' interests in the attorney-client relationship in nonsubpoena contexts.
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criteria and require prosecutors to exercise reasoned discretion in
implementing them.243

242

A Point II rule thus might state:
(A) In deciding whether to issue a subpoena to a lawyer to testify on matters
relating to a client, a prosecutor must consider whether the law enforcement
purposes to be served by the issuance of the subpoena outweigh the client's
interests in preventing the testimony. In enforcing a lawyer subpoena, a prosecutor must protect the relationship between the subpoenaed lawyer and his or her
client by taking all steps consistent with law enforcement interests and feasible as
a matter of law enforcement resources.
(B) The prosecutor shall not issue a lawyer subpoena for the purpose of interfering with the relationship between the subpoenaed lawyer and client, causing
the lawyer to withdraw or be disqualified from the representation, or harassing
the lawyer or client.
(C) The prosecutor shall ensure the client's ability to employ legal measures to
protect the attorney-client privilege. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
code, the prosecutor may advise the client of the time, place, and nature of the
subpoenaed testimony and describe the procedures by which the client or the
lawyer-witness may assert any applicable privilege.

The rough proposals in this Article's footnotes are offered only for illustrative purposes. Many other formats are possible. Even these would probably be accompanied by
explanatory commentary that would spell out such matters as the nature of the client
interests and the way secrecy affects them.
243 For example:
(D) A prosecutor who subpoenas a lawyer to appear before the grand jury must
recognize that the lawyer-witness's secret testimony may interfere with the client's
willingness to trust the lawyer.
(1) When consistent with law enforcement interests, the prosecutor
should allow the client to be present at the lawyer's testimony or to
review a transcript of any portion of the testimony that relates to the
client.
(2) When a prosecutor recognizes the existence of an issue of attorney-client privilege in the course of grand jury testimony, the prosecutor should notify the client in accordance with § (C) and permit
the lawyer-witness to file a motion to quash.
(E) A prosecutor who issues a lawyer subpoena shall consider whether the
lawyer's testimony is likely to result in the lawyer's withdrawal or disqualification
from the representation and should attempt to accommodate the client's legitimate interest in keeping counsel.
(1) If the prosecutor concludes that the lawyer-witness should withdraw or be disqualified under the provisions of this code even in the
absence of a subpoena, the prosecutor may proceed with the
subpoena.
(2) If the prosecutor concludes that withdrawal or disqualification
might result as a consequence of the subpoena, the prosecutor should
consider whether the law enforcement purpose to be served by the
subpoena can be achieved without issuance of the subpoena.
(3) If the prosecutor concludes that law enforcement interests require
the subpoena but that its issuance may result in the lawyer-witness's
withdrawal or disqualification, the prosecutor should take all steps to
mitigate the need for withdrawal or disqualification that are consistent
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Alternatively, appropriate ieform might adopt a Point III approach that sets priorities more clearly. Such a rule could determine specifically how prosecutors should balance law enforcement
and client interests. Code drafters might require prosecutors to
raise potential issues of attorney-client privilege, forego grand jury
secrecy, or avoid subpoenas resulting in disqualification unless
specified circumstances exist. Or, the rule might strike the balance
in the opposite way, by authorizing prosecutors to issue subpoenas
unless defense counsel can demonstrate that the attorney-client
relationship will be chilled and that law enforcement can be accomplished another way.
It is not my function to identify precisely which policies and
values code drafters should emphasize. Rules at Point II or III
levels of specificity can be written to implement any orientation
that, after debate, code drafters deem appropriate. Unlike Model
Rule 3.8(f), however, both the Point II and III approaches would
be consistent with what appears to be the Model Rules' and most
codes' general goal of guiding prosecutorial behavior through a
discretionary model-one that relies upon individual prosecutors'
accepting their defined role."
2.

Other Plausible Goals of Attorney-Subpoena Reform

Nothing in the above analysis suggests that" rulemakers should
be forbidden to use individual provisions to implement values that
differ from the code's primary goal. In the attorney subpoena
context, drafters justifiably may believe that prosecutors cannot be
trusted to pursue justice adequately and that a specific rule controlling discretion and changing the law is warranted. It is, however, important for the drafters to recognize when this position is
inconsistent with their code's general attitude toward prosecutorial

with law enforcement interests and feasible as a matter of law enforcement resources.
244 Whether code drafters optimally should choose a Point II or Point III response to
the attorney-subpoena issue turns on the degree to which code drafters perceive a special
need to counteract special prosecutorial vindictiveness or conviction orientation in the
attorney-subpoena context. Heightening specificity to the Point In level has few benefits
if prosecutors are already willing to accommodate defendants' rights, but simply need
guidance that the law otherwise fails to provide. Because a Point III rule would need to
recognize that law enforcement interests sometimes dominate, it is unlikely to be significanty more enforceable than a Point II version. Spelling out prosecutorial responses
would come at the cost of reducing prosecutors' ability to tailor responses on an individual case basis.
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conduct. Such a significant divergence in approach should occur
only after open and honest deliberation, including a consideration
of how the proposed revision might affect the overall effectiveness
of the code.245
I have already mentioned some of the objectives that Model
Rule 3.8(f) might serve. Analyzing the validity of using Model Rule
3.8(f) to accomplish those objectives is beyond the scope of this
Article. It may, however, be useful to identify the range of alternatives and to draw some conclusions about them from our previous
discussion of regulatory specificity.
(a) Model Rule 3.8(0 and the "Legislative" Function.-Earlier,I
defined the legislative function of ethics codes as prescribing or
forbidding particular conduct, encouraging uniform behavior, and
setting the stage for punishing lawyers who depart from the
norm."4 Under the correct circumstances, Point IV regulation is
effective as a behavioral control because of its insistence on particular behavior.247 Moreover, a rule like Model Rule 3.8(f) provides
a good basis for discipline because its mandates are clearer than
the Point II and III alternatives, the required elements of conduct
are capable of objective ascertainment, and violations of the rule
are self-identifying.2 The key question with regard to the workability of Model Rule 3.8(f) as "legislation" is whether the rule
appears realistic, for our analysis has noted that a provision will
lack influence when its targets doubt that it will be enforced.
Historically, disciplinary authorities have rarely sought to apply
ethics codes to prosecutors. One explanation is that prosecutors
are perceived as public servants whose economic interests are not
affected by individual case outcomes. Discipliners may assume that
even misconduct by prosecutors is ordinarily not self-serving and,
as matter of priority in allocating regulatory resources, deserves
less attention.249 However, Model Rule 3.8(f) possesses the capaci-

245 For example, if a jurisdiction's rulemakers come to the conclusion that MODEL
RULES, Rule 3.8(f) is necessary because prosecutors cannot be trusted to seek justice, that
may call into question the jurisdiction's entire approach to prosecutorial ethics. Arguably,
that conclusion calls for wholesale change in the professional rules governing prosecutorial conduct, including more specific, enforceable mandates.
246 See supra text accompanying note 84.
247 See supra text accompanying notes 87-96.
248 Violations identify themselves because (1) in some jurisdictions, subpoenas issue
only under judicial supervision, and (2) attorney-targets are, in any event, capable of
protesting and likely to raise any violations of the rules.
249 See Zacharias, supra note 37, at 105-06.
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ty to be enforced, a characteristic arguably lacking in previous
ethics rules governing prosecutorial behavior. Prosecutors' failure
to comply with the requirements of Model Rule 3.8(f) will be so
patent that discipliners may be hard put to explain a failure to
invoke the disciplinary process." One therefore cannot assume
that Model Rule 3.8(f) will simply take its place as another unenforced, self-defeating constraint on prosecutorial misconduct.2sI
Assuming, then, that Model Rule 3.8(f) may be workable, is
its adoption an appropriate exercise of the rulemakers' power to
act in a legislative mode? An important aspect of that question is
whether extra-code constraints already provide guidance and enforcement; duplicative legislative rules can have a negative impact
on producing the desired behavior.1 2 Despite proponents' disclaimers, Model Rule 3.8(f) applies its standards where the prevailing substantive law imposes no special standards for attorney subpoenas. Indeed, to the extent extra-code constraints speak to the
matter, they speak inconsistently with the new rule.s
What this means is that Model Rule 3.8(f) is drafted in a way
that maximizes its potential for achieving a legislative impact and,
because it operates in an area where extra-code constraints are
absent, that rulemakers reasonably can hope that it will have an
effect. However, the rule's tension with the prevailing substantive
law suggests that the rule represents more than a behavioral control that fills a void. Rulemakers are not implementing a consensus regarding appropriate prosecutorial behavior. Contrary to their
public statements, the rulemakers are implementing their own vi-

250 Under the rule, prosecutors can have no valid explanation for avoiding judicial
oversight. Once in court, prosecutors either will be able to establish, the objective prerequisites of MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f) or, with few exceptions, will have violated the rule.
251 One consequence of imposing any ethical obligations on prosecutors is that failure to enforce the imposed obligations leads to disrespect for the codes and the administration ofjustice. See Zacharias, supra note 37, at 103-114.
252 See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
253 Prior to the adoption of MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f), courts had reached the conclusion as a matter of constitutional law and the law of attorney-client privilege that government investigations and prosecutions should not be hampered by an inflexible attorney subpoena rule. See authorities cited in Zacharias, A Crtical Look, supra note 23, at
929-30. Similarly, legislatures had declined to limit grand jury and prosecutorial discretion
to issue subpoenas despite endless calls for reform. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, FEDERAL PROSEcuTORIAL AUTHORITY IN A CHANGING LEGAL ENvitoN-

mENT: MORE ATTENTION REQTIRED, H.R. REP. No. 986, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1990)
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] (urging further attention to but no new limits on current
prosecutorial behavior). One thus cannot justify MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8 on the basis of a
societal consensus favoring client concerns over law enforcement interests.
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sion of the direction the law should take. That regulatory goal
must be analyzed on its own merits.
(b) Model Rule 3.8(f) and the Function of Influencing Judicial Standards.-Perhaps nowhere in the Model Rules is the goal of influencing judicial standards more apparent than in Model Rule
3.8(f). The Rule purports to regulate prosecutorial conduct, but in
practice requires judges to engage in a procedure and employ
standards that the courts have not adopted." Courts in some
jurisdictions already have declined to put local versions of Model
Rule 3.8(f) into effect.'
We have seen that codes are most likely to influence extracode standards when gaps in the prevailing law are evident, traditional sources for developing standards. are absent, and the
standard setter (e.g., the courts) has reason to believe the bar is
acting objectively. 6 Yet the issues upon which proponents of
Model Rule 3.8(f) attempt to influence courts are traditional questions of privilege and prosecutorial subpoena power, both of
which courts always have felt competent to address."' Gaps in
the law exist only because courts have rejected the bar's substantive viewpoint and preferred to accept the status quo."

254 In other words, the rule requires courts to supervise the issuance of each attorney
subpoena according to substantive standards established in the rule. See Cramnton & Udell,
supra note 6, at 296 (characterizing MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f) as "an effort to vindicate
the profession's normative vision of a lawyer's immunity from ordinary legal process").
255 SeA e.g., Baylson v. Pennsylvania Supreme Court Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102 (3d
Cir. 1992) (holding state version of MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8 inapplicable to federal prosecutors); New York's Courts Adopt Changes to Ethics Rules, 6 ABA/BNA MANUAL, supra note
45, at 172, 175 (June 6, 1990) (N.Y. courts reject rule fashioned after MODEL RULES,
Rule 3.8(f)).
256 See supra text accompanying notes 154-65.
257 See Cramton & Udell, supra note 6, at 305 ("If ethics rules are to impose legal
duties upon federal lawyers, these duties must harmonize with duties imposed by the
Constitution, Congress, and the Attorney General.").
258 For example, courts have declined to impose restrictions on prosecutors' subpoena power, expand the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel to incorporate
a right to keep subpoenaed attorneys, or extend the attorney-client privilege to currently
unprivileged information that prosecutors can obtain from a source other than the attorney. See Zacharias, A Critical Look, supra note 23, at 929-30. Cf. Hoover, supra note 157, at
615 ("because the Model Rules are in greater harmony with common law than the Model Code was, the chances that the Model Rules will be regarded as authoritative rather
than persuasive appear to have increased").
MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8's specificity cannot be justified by the need to counteract
institutional pressure to win cases on prosecutors' exercise of reasoned discretion. The
danger that prosecutors will exercise discretion unwisely when issuing attorney subpoenas
is substantially limited by the fact that, unlike most other pretrial decisions, prosecutorial
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From the moment Model Rule 3.8(f) was first proposed, there was
reason to believe it represented the self-interest of a discrete segment of the bar."s9 The attorney-subpoena area thus does not
look like one in which rulemakers are likely to receive significant
judicial deference."8
Although a measure of specificity is essential for any code
provision designed to influence the law,"' Model Rule 3.8(f)'s
strict (i.e., Point IV) specificity may undermine its effectiveness in
influencing judicial standards. In one sense, the rule maintains the
flexibility of common law approach to attorney-client privilege,
because it does not purport to change the law of privilege. But
under the rule, judges may not authorize attorney subpoenas unless no feasible alternative exists. This irrebuttable presumption
would prevent courts from adjusting their discovery rules with
changing notions of reasonable conduct. Judges' fear of accepting
such Point IV standards that are "frozen" in time262 reduces the
likelihood that the courts will adopt the rulemakers' substantive
vision.
Courts have tended to reject the influence of provisions at the
Point IV end of the specificity continuum, in part because such
provisions ordinarily favor one type of litigant and thus remove
judges' case by case control." These provisions also run the spe-

discretion to issue subpoenas is supervised by the courts. In determining the reach of the
attorney-client privilege and in precluding abuse and harassment, courts safeguard many
of the precise client concerns that give rise to MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8. Zacharias, A Crtical Look supra note 23, at 929-31. Moreover, because the prosecutorial conduct directly
affects attorneys, the likelihood that improper conduct will be brought to judicial attention is at its peak. See id. at 932-33 (discussing obligations of defense attorney to raise
the issue).
259 See Cramton & Udell, supra note 6, at 293, 363, 387 (arguing that the criminal
defense bar sought to avoid the effect of legal rules permitting the use of attorney subpoenas by abrogating the matter to the province of professional ethics); Sheridan, supra
note 134, at 511, 520 (asserting that the essential purpose of Massachusetts' anti-subpoena
rule was to protect criminal defense attorneys, but arguing that it is appropriate for defense attorneys besieged by attorney subpoenas to use ethics rules to deter overzealous
prosecutorial conduct).
260 One court has already rejected the application of MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f) to
federal prosecutors. Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 764 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1991), ad,
975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1992). Another has upheld the same application, but only on the
basis that the federal jurisdiction in question had expressly incorporated the state's version of MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f) into its own local rules. United States v. Klubock, 832
F.2d 664, 667-68 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc).
261 See supa text accompanying notes 166-67.
262 See supra text accompanying notes 160-63.
263 See supra text accompanying notes 164-65.
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cial risk of partisanship that can undermine judges' faith in the
rulemakers. The heated, partisan prosecution versus defense rhetoric surrounding Model Rule 3.8(f)'s adoption, 21 the legal challenges to the rule's constitutionality, 2 s and the resulting literature condemning the rulemakers' good faith 2' are a natural outgrowth of Point IV regulation that benefits a segment of the
bar.2 67 Those reactions are symptoms of a concern that judges

will inevitably share and consider as a negative factor in evaluating
the rulemakers' substantive view.
(c) Model Rule 3.8(l) and the FraternalFunction.-Although specific rules tend to promote communications among lawyers, 2 s it
is difficult to see how Model Rule 3.8(f) serves that function. By
creating an obstacle to attorney subpoenas, it provides greater
assurance for defense attorneys that they will be able to continue
representing clients whom they accept. But to the extent a dispute
concerning potential lawyer testimony exists, the rule does not fix
expectations regarding prosecutorial behavior; it merely sends the
question to litigation, adding into the equation the issue of "feasible alternatives." In practice, the rule therefore complicates the issue of what attorney-client communications are discoverable, while
failing to provide greater stability in counsel-prosecutor dealings.

264 See supra notes 206-09.
265 See authorities cited supra note 216.
266 See Cramton & Udell, supra note 6, at 316-17 (suggesting self-serving motivation in
adoption of rules relating to prosecutorial conduct); Koniak, supra note 10, at 1401
(same). Cf Zacharias, A Critical Look, supra note 23, at 954 (discussing possible hidden
agenda underlying adoption of MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f)).
267 Much of the rule's supporting documentation relies on the number of attorney
subpoenas that prosecutors have issued and the consequences of those subpoenas for the
practices of defense lawyers. See 1990 REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note
218, at 5-6. Similarly, proponents justify reform with the claim that, without reform, lawyers will hesitate to represent criminal defendants because of the inconvenience attorney
subpoenas cause. Id. at 8. See also Genego, supra note 186, at 815-19 (defense attorney's
empirical appraisal of effects of attorney subpoenas). These justifications can be viewed
benignly, on the basis that, as an institutional matter, the legal system needs to maintain
the criminal bar. See Morgan Cloud, Government Intrusions Into the Attoro-lient Relationship: The Impact of Fee Forfeitures on the Balance of Power in the Adversary System of Criminal Justice, 36 EMORY LJ. 817, 818-19 (1987) (discussing maintenace of institution of
defense bar). But because many reform proponents are themselves defense lawyers, it is
just as easy to imagine that ethical limitations on attorney subpoenas are designed to
protect their economic well-being. See Zacharias, A Critical Look, supra note 23, at 954-56.
268 See supra text accompanying notes 132-36.
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This Article has already illustrated the conflicting impact that
Point IV provisions can have on the bar's public image.2 9 The
open warfare between the defense and prosecution bar that was
prompted by the proposal of Model Rule 3.8(f) magnified its
adverse effects.2 10 In terms of prosecutors' self-image, the Point
IV approach is unambiguously and decidedly negative. A rule that
lessens prosecutors' discretion and threatens them with oversight
inevitably erodes their sense of empowerment and professionalism.
Thus, just as the fraternal purposes of ethics codes do not justify
the Point I justice approach, they also cannot support the highly
specific Model Rule 3.8(f).
V.

CONCLUSION

The example of Model Rule 3.8(f) highlights the importance
of focusing the thrust of reform. Existing. professional codes inevitably provide a foundation-a purpose, or set of purposes, into
which any reform must fit. Only by identifying the primary purposes that the codes seek to fulfill can rulemakers determine whether
new rules are needed and how consistent reform should be drafted. Alternatively, focusing the debate in this way forces proponents
of rules that would embark in an entirely new direction to justify
that departure and to test its effect on the bulk of the codes.27'

269 See supra text accompanying notes 139-45.
270 See generally Cramton & Udell, supra note 6, at 386 (noting increasing conflict between opposing segments of the organized bar in the context or prosecutorial ethics
rules); Moore, supra note 134, at 515-18, 530-39 (discussing warfare between prosecutors
and defense bar); Tom Watson, ABA Soundly Rejeds Justice Dept. Advice on Rules Change,
LEGAL TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1990, at 7 (reporting ABA's rejection of DOJ's advice not to adopt
an anti-subpoena provision); Watson, supra note 198, at 1, 15 (reporting U.S. Attorney's
accusation that the ABA is mounting an ethical end run around Congress and the U.S.
Supreme Court).
271 My observations concerning specificity in code-drafting apply to codes as a whole
or significant portions of codes, rather than to minor individual provisions. Whatever the
quality of a single provision, it is unlikely to have an impact upon lawyers globally. No
one rule controls the way lawyers approach their whole practice. Even far-reaching provisions, such as confidentiality rules, do not alone determine whether lawyers are introspective on moral matters, whether they cooperate with fellow fraternity members, or whether
courts will look to the codes in setting the substantive law. At most, individual provisions
contribute to a package of regulation which has those effects. I have focused on the "justice" provisions because they include the whole package of ethical restrictions on prosecutorial behavior. Reforms like MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8(f), therefore, can easily be evaluated
in terms of those provisions' goals.
There is a difference between adopting whole new codes and adopting individual
reforms. In enacting a whole code, drafters may be justified in pursuing a new approach
or set of goals. That is what the Kutak Commission originally planned to do in drafting
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Although space does not permit a lengthy discussion here, it
is important to note that the same analysis applies to other areas
in which specific reforms in prosecutorial ethics have been proposed (e.g., in seeking disqualification of defense counsel and
seizure of defendants' assets) 22 and to unrelated areas in which
piecemeal changes to existing codes are debated. 3 The principles remain the same: in considering each stage of reform-whether reform is needed, what kind of reform, and how
to draft the reform-drafters must keep in mind the underlying
purpose(s) of the code and gear changes toward effectuating the
purpose(s) that the drafters can agree should be targeted.
Essential to these principles is the recognition that code provisions interrelate-both to each other and to extra-code constraints
on the targeted lawyers' behavior. To evaluate the regulation of
prosecutorial ethics, for example, one must determine what the
codes hope to accomplish in demanding 'justice" and determine
what legal constraints and internal incentives operate to produce
that end in any particular setting. Specificity in professional regulation can be counterproductive when the targeted lawyers already
know how they should act. Conversely, to the extent the codes
seek to establish a "role," the result of which is prosecutorial introspection and self-control, reforms must be evaluated in that
light. A single rule that imposes strict external control on prosecu-

the 1983 MODEL RULES. See Gillers, supra note 31, at 275 (arguing that the MODEL
RULES' "sole rationalizing principle seems to be that when the law allows a choice, competing claims should be resolved in the way that most benefits the profession");
Schneyer, supra note 11, at 701-07 (describing new brand of "legalism" underlying original proposals, which "regarded law as cause and legal ethics as effect"). However, unless
one accepts as a normative base the suggestion that the codes have turned completely
into legislation, drafters of individual reforms should be faithful to the overall scheme of
a given code. It is in this vein that scholars such as Roger Cramton have criticized recent attempts by the bar to proscribe particular prosecutorial conduct. See, e.g., Cramton
& Udell, supra note 6, at 390-01 (noting that bar has attempted to assume, under ethical
rubric, broad federal issues that should be made by federal institutional decisionmakers).
272 The main areas in which reforms have been proposed involve fee forfeitures, IRS
summonses to attorneys, and prosecutorial attempts to disqualify defense counsel. See
generally HOUSE REPORT, supra note 253 (congressional study of need for reforms governing prosecutorial conduct); William J. Genego, supra note 186 (empirically evaluating fee
forfeitures, IRS summonses, and disqualification motions and proposing reforms) and
authorities cited therein; Bruce A. Green, Her Brothers's Keeper: The Prosecutor'sResponsibility
When Defense Counsel Has a Potential Conflict of Interest, 16 AM. J. GRIM. L. 323, 332-52
(1989) (discussing prosecutors' ethical obligations and proposing guidelines to govern
disqualification motions).
273 Perhaps the area still most debated is whether mandatory or piecemeal exceptions
to attorney-client confidentiality rules should be adopted. See, e.g., Zacharias, Confidentiality
I, supra note 23, at 353 n.5 (detailing the approaches of various states).
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torial behavior, like Model Rule 3.8(f), is unlikely to affect
prosecutors' willingness to "introspect." A series of rules limiting
prosecutors in this and other areas can change the whole nature
and function of the ethics regulation that is now in place. 7 4
Such a fundamental change may be appropriate, but should not
be undertaken unthinkingly or accomplished as a by-product of a
reform process that focuses on isolated issues. 5
By analogizing the adoption of ethics regulation to the adoption of "legislation," the academic community has encouraged a
political process of rulemaking that fluctuates with the interests of
influential groups. My analysis suggests that even if the analogy is
apt with respect to the adoption of codes as a whole, it should be
tempered when drafters consider code reforms. Ethics regulation
may have evolved, but it has always followed a theoretical model
or approach. Routine piecemeal reform-even reform that seems
defensible in isolation-will undermine the approach if not tai-

274 Stated another way, reform may have a positive effect in directing prosecutors'
attention to their obligations in the one area, but a negative effect in minimizing introspection regarding other areas in which prosecutors must do justice. Emphasizing too
many narrow contexts in which prosecutors must focus upon particular rights of defendants may discourage prosecutors from heeding the more general mandates of their role
(e.g., "do justice") and engaging in introspection in other contexts. MODEL RULES, Rule
3.8, which highlights a handful of constitutional rights, already risks this reaction. But by
mentioning the rights only briefly and in one place, MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8 reduces the
likelihood that prosecutors will consider its mandate comprehensive.
275 Consider the mandate that lawyers represent clients with zeal. CPR, Canon 7. The
codes include other general principles that take precedence: lawyers may not engage in
criminal conduct; lawyers have obligations to the court. Taken as a whole, the codes
present a package of countervailing considerations that resemble Point II or III regulation. The package leaves development of the role to lawyer introspection and discretion.
Commentators have highlighted tactics which the codes do not address directly and
have calied for specific resolutions. For example, various rules have been proposed that
would limit lawyer discretion to advise third parties to assert the privilege against selfincrimination and that would force lawyers to prevent client perjury. See, e.g., MODEL
RULES, Rule 3.3(b) (requiring lawyers to remedy client perjury); Green, supra note 61
(proposing alternatives for regulating lawyer advice regarding. assertion of right against
self-incrimination). The reform proponents have tended to consider the issues in a vacuum, focusing exclusively on whether the codes give lawyers sufficient information to know
how to act. But as we have seen, providing instruction is not the codes' only function;
indeed, the drafters themselves often lack agreement on particular results. What the reform proponents ignore are the costs of specific regulation. For example, the effect on
introspection and the danger that lawyers will come to treat a series of specific rules as
an exclusive list of their obligations. Before adopting reforms, it behooves code drafters
to chart an approach for regulating the whole category of conduct in question. Only by
determining the level of regulatory specificity that is appropriate for the context can
drafters assess whether the codes have already adequately defined the regulated lawyers'
role.
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lored to the code and extra-code law. Similarly, a pattern of regulatory changes may affect both the way lawyers perceive the motivation underlying the whole
package of regulation and their will6
2
inguess to abide by it. 1

In making tradeoffs between coverage and enforcement, guidance and leeway, appearances and strict control, code drafters act
most wisely when they are clear about their goals and use professional regulation to fill gaps in the extra-regulatory standards. I
have attempted to provide a framework by which code drafters
and code reformers can identify the factors that should be considered as the drafting process unfolds. Recognizing these factors will
focus the debates, both in the context of drafting new ethics
codes and in considering revisions. 7 Perhaps more importantly,

276 For example, in the abstract, prosecutors may welcome a rule providing guidance
with respect to a particular dilemma. When the same rule becomes part of a pattern of
regulation limiting prosecutorial discretion, they tend to perceive it as an attack by the
criminal bar or an effort to preserve the defense bar's selfish interests. Recent history
shows that piecemeal limits on prosecutorial discretion, particularly where some prosecutors have limited the exercise of discretion on their own, make all prosecutors more
likely to resist the regulation on political grounds.
277 Consider the example of attorney-client confidentiality rules. The basic prohibition
on revealing client secrets is a strict, Point IV regulation. However, decades of debate
have led to actual and proposed exceptions to protect third party or societal interests.
The proposed exceptions typically have been Point IV rules requiring specific conduct in
specific situations. However, because the legal community is divided on the relative importance of loyalty to clients, little consensus has evolved. As a consequence, jurisdictions
which have adopted exceptions have followed the course of political compromise. Cf.
MODEL RULES, Rule 1.6 cmt. (comment to rule allowing lawyer to "disaffirm any opinion,
document, affirmation" a client may use to defraud, despite text of rule's strict confidentiality mandate forbidding lawyer to disclose fact of fraud directly).
In effecting compromise, regulators have failed to analyze the appropriate level of
regulatory specificity. The compromise has centered on enforcement, resulting most often
in voluntary limits on strict confidentiality: attorneys may disclose in order to prevent
future crimes or may disclose to prevent certain kinds of harm. See authorities cited in
Zacharias, Confidentiality I, supra note 23, at 352-53 n.5. At best, such provisions identify
relevant considerations for lawyers who find themselves in permissive disclosure situations,
but do not prioritize the relative importance of loyalty to clients, promoting legal conduct, and preventing harm. Because the rules provide no guidance on how lawyers
should exercise their discretion to balance the considerations, they provide little hope
that different lawyers will address the issues in a similar way.
I do not mean to suggest that either this Point II regulation or the proposed Point
IV alternatives are necessarily wrong. My point is that selecting the level of regulatory
specificity has ramifications code drafters have not even considered. Whether the rules
should provide guidance or prescribe uniform conduct are separate questions from what
the guidance or conduct should be. Whether professional rules should define lawyers'
role specifically may depend, in large measure, on the nature of what I have called extra-regulatory constraints-including lawyers' economic incentives and agency and malpractice law. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tentative Drafts 1-5,
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this framework should help participants in the debates to avoid
the temptation of power, and to reject the invitation to act as
legislators in just another political process that results in rules.
After all, to those who really believe that'lawyers have special duties, ethics has always meant something more than law.

1990-92) (ongoing project attempting to collate the entire body of law governing lawyer
conduct).
In failing to decide initially how regulators should approach the confidentiality dilemma-what level of regulatory specificity is appropriate-the legal community has
avoided a threshold issue that could produce more agreement than issues regarding the
substance of exceptions. To the extent proponents and opponents of exceptions can
decide upon the level of regulation the context requires, they will be far closer to
achieving agreement on particular rules. The opposing parties may be willing to recognize that defining lawyers' roles in a meaningful fashion is the central function of the
codes and that, when extra-regulatory constraints and the codes together fail to guide the
exercise of discretion to results that all can agree are justifiable (if not necessarily correct), then more specificity is needed. That conclusion suggests to all that, in context,
relegating disclosure decisions to individual choice may inappropriately leave lawyers with
the task of defining their own roles.

